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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature in finance and eco-
nomics providing a deeper understanding about insider trading and its effects
over information dissemination in the financial markets. To this end, this
thesis is organized in three chapters.
The first chapter tests whether insiders exploit their stock’s mispricing af-
ter earnings announcements to make profitable trades. The analysis involves
estimating a model of ‘normal’ market reaction to an earnings announcement
and use the deviation of the fitted value from the realized market reaction as
a measure of mispricing after earnings announcements. In line with the mis-
pricing hypothesis, the results show that insiders sell (buy) more often after
large positive (negative) values of our mispricing measure and earn significant
post trading returns.
The second chapter extends the analysis in the first chapter by exploring
more deeply the source of that mispricing. Focusing on insider sales, this
chapter studies whether insiders exploit investors’ sentiment during earnings
announcements to make profitable trades. In line with Miller (1977) model,
the results show that insiders sell in response to market reaction of earnings
announcements that are associated with an increase in divergence in investors’
opinions about their firms’ valuation and more binding short sale constraints.
Finally, the third chapter studies the interaction between 2 types of in-
formed investors, insiders and short sellers, during earnings announcements.
The chapter documents that insiders and short sellers are skilled information
processors who compete for trading on the news released at earnings announce-
ments. In line with competition, stock returns are significantly more negative
faster for stocks with intensive trading by both traders together than in cases
where they trade intensively alone. The evidence suggests that insiders and
short sellers tend to accelerate their processing skills after earnings announce-
ments and trade faster making stock prices more efficient.
x
Introduction
Corporate insiders, that is, officers, directors or beneficial owners of publicly
traded companies are usually considered informed investors as they have ac-
cess to private information about their firms. Insiders know their companies
better than any analyst in the market and, therefore, their trades are very con-
troversial. In fact, insider trading is commonly associated to an illegal activity
when is heard, but insider trading is any transaction (purchase or sale) made
by a corporate insider on the shares of her company’s stocks. In the U.S. in-
sider trading is regulated by Security Exchange Commission (SEC) who oblige
insiders to report their transactions by filling forms 3, 4 or 5 specified by the
Security Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC define illegal insider trading as those
transactions that are carried out in possession of non-public material informa-
tion. As this definition is very broad, detecting illegal insider trading is not
an easy task. The SEC must demonstrates that a person “trades a security
while in possession of material non-public information in violation of a duty
to withhold the information or refrain from trading”.1 Cases of illegal insider
trading are abundant, from the famous case of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company in
the 60’s (Manne, 1966) to more recent ones as the Galleon Group (the largest
1From the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website:
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#intro.
1
hedge fund insider trading case in U.S. history) in late 2009 (Cohen et al.,
2012).
Should then insider transactions be allowed? This question has generated
a large debate in recent years as it remains unclear how beneficial these trans-
actions are for the stock markets. The main argument in favor of permitting
unregulated insider trading is that it improves market efficiency. Early theoret-
ical studies show that insider trading helps to incorporate private information
into stock prices increasing informational efficiency of the market (Manne,
1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983). More efficient stock prices are a desirable
feature for a capital market as they reduce the informational asymmetry be-
tween firms’ future performance and prospective investors (Myers and Majluf,
1984). In a efficient capital market, stock prices serve as a signal conveying
information to outside investors who are willing to invests their capital on at-
tractive companies. Therefore, the better the quality of the signals, the better
is the allocation of resources in the market.
Nevertheless, other studies refute the association between insider trading
and more efficient stock markets. This stream of the literature argues that
insider transactions could crowd out information collection from outside in-
vestors deterring efficiency of stock markets (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).
Under this view, insider trades may discourage market professionals from ac-
quiring information and trade in stocks, reducing the amount of information
conveyed into stock prices. In line with this argument, Fernandes and Ferreira
(2009) show that in countries with better Corporate Governance systems, once
insiders are barred from trading, the efficiency of the capital market increases.
That is, prices reflect more firm’s true value when insiders are more restricted
from trading.
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Not surprisingly, the widespread interest in insider trading has spawned a
large empirical literature trying to determine whether insiders trade on mate-
rial non-public information and whether their trades convey new information
to the market. Early evidence agrees that insiders possess superior informa-
tion and outperform the market in their transactions (Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty,
1976; Seyhun, 1986, 1998; Lin and Howe, 1990; Pope et al., 1990; Rozeff and
Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003). Broadly speaking,
these studies show a strong market reaction to the announcement of insider
trading and future return predictability, which is attributed as a signal that
insider transactions convey information to investors. Although, these papers
show that insiders seem to correctly anticipate the direction in which prices
move afterwards, they do not permit to distinguish whether insiders use valid
inside information when trading or not.
The source of insiders information when trading has also generated debate
in the literature. Wide consensus exists that insiders behave as contrarians,
which means that they are more likely to sell their shares after periods of
high stock returns and buy after periods of low stock returns (Rozeff and Za-
man, 1998; Seyhun, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone,
2005). However, the literature is split in explaining the nature of this contrar-
ian behavior of insiders. On the one hand, insiders use their superior inside
information about their firms cash flows and trade on future reversals of their
firms performance (Noe, 1999; Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005;
Cheng et al., 2007). On the other hand, they do not use much valid inside
information other than the one is publicly available. In this view, insiders
time very well their transactions and trade when their stocks are mispriced by
the market (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter,
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2005).
Do insider trading conveys new information to the market making stock
prices more efficient? If so, which set of information do insiders use when
trading? Is it non-public material information or publicly available informa-
tion? This thesis addresses these and other questions. So far most of the
literature focus on trading decisions by insiders on private information. This
research explores an alternative hypothesis for insiders’ superior trading ad-
vantage: Corporate insiders are skillful interpreting the information released
in public news announcements. In particular, the thesis studies insider trading
decisions in the context of earnings announcements. The setup is chosen fol-
lowing recent evidence that insiders trade mainly around important corporate
events and mostly around earnings news (Ke et al., 2003). Specifically, they
tend to trade right after quarterly earnings announcement or several months
before, because they try to minimize legal jeopardy (Huddart et al., 2007;
Kallunki et al., 2009). This setup allows to clearly identify how insiders inter-
act with new information when is made public and how their trading decisions
affects information dissemination in the stock market.
The thesis is split in 3 chapters. The first chapter studies whether in-
siders exploit their stock’s mispricing after earnings announcements to make
profitable trades. It shows that insiders trade more often after larger mis-
pricing and earn significant post trading returns, suggesting that insiders do
not use much valid inside information in their trades. The second chapter
is very related to the first. However, while the first chapter establishes in-
sider trading on mispricing after earnings announcements, the second explores
more deeply the source of that mispricing. Focusing on insider sales, this
chapter explores whether insiders exploit investors’ sentiment during earnings
4
announcements to make profitable trades. In line with Miller (1977) model,
the results show that insiders sell in response to market reaction of earnings
announcements that are associated with an increase in divergence in investors’
opinions about their firms’ valuation and more binding short sale constraints.
Finally, the third chapter analyzes the interaction between insiders and short
sellers around earnings announcements. Both are considered to be informed
traders in the literature and, therefore, studying their trading strategies and
how their trades affects information dissemination in the stock market is very
relevant. The results of this chapter suggest that insiders and short sellers are
skilled information processors who compete for trading on publicly available
information. In line with competition, stock returns are significantly more
negative faster for stocks with intensive trading by both traders together than
in cases where they trade alone.
5
Chapter 1
Do insiders trade on mispricing
after earnings announcements?
Insider trading is not random. If we look at distribution of insider trading
activity across quarters, that are defined as periods between two earnings an-
nouncements for all listed US firms over 2003-2009, we see obvious patterns.
First, insider purchases and sales across individual insiders within the same
firm tend to cluster in particular quarters: majority of quarters with insider
sales contain only insider sales and quarters with purchases contain only pur-
chases. Only 5% of all quarters contain both insider purchases and sales.1
Second, insider trading also exhibits serial auto-correlation: 58% of all quar-
ters with insider sales are followed by another quarter with insider sales while
32% of quarters with insider purchases are followed by another quarter with
insider purchases. These patterns suggest consistency in opinion among insid-
ers. Insiders seem to agree when it is time to sell, purchase or not to trade at
all.
1Note that 58% of quarters do not contain any insider transactions.
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If insider trading is not random, what are then the trading rules they follow?
This chapter shows that insiders of U.S. publicly listed companies are able to
identify situations when their stock is mispriced after earnings announcements
and following their trading leads to abnormal future returns. In particular,
insiders tend to sell their stock after earnings announcements when the stock
price is high relatively to their perception of fundamental firm value and buy
stock when the current stock price is too low. These findings are in line with
recent evidence on attentive insider trading (Alldredge and Cicero, 2015) that
argues that insiders are attentive to interpreting new public information and
tend to take advantage of situations when the market misinterprets the news.
Given stringent U.S. insider trading regulation and high legal jeopardy, insid-
ers are often trading immediately after releases of price sensitive information
rather than before (Huddart et al., 2007). Use of information after it was pub-
licly released provides higher protection against legal jeopardy, but attentive
insiders might still interpret the published information differently to the mar-
ket. Better information processing and interpretation skills as well as intimate
and deep knowledge of their firms provides insiders with an advantage even
after earnings news is released to the public domain. Engelberg et al. (2012)
show evidence that also short sellers profit on their superior information pro-
cessing skills after news announcements.
In a broad sense, this chapter revisits the question posed by Piotroski and
Roulstone (2005) on whether insiders trade on market pricing errors or rather
on their superior foreknowledge of future cash flows. This question is of pro-
found interest for both regulators and financial economists. The former are
profoundly interested in the effectiveness of restrictions concerning trading on
material information, which could potentially disadvantage other (uninformed)
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market participants, discourage stock trading and harm market liquidity (Fish-
man and Hagerty, 1992; Leland, 1992). The latter are interested in the wide
process of information revelation in the stock market and stock price efficiency
and, therefore, in the question of how dealings of insiders in the stocks of their
own firms affect this process.
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) show that the insider purchase ratio is both
positively related to the firm’s future earnings performance and inversely re-
lated to recent returns (and positively related to book to market ratio). Each
relation has incremental explanatory power. However, Piotroski and Roulstone
(2005) conclude that information about future cash flow changes explains a
smaller portion of insider purchases than recent returns or book to market ra-
tio. We extend Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) in three important ways. First,
even though Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) mainly focus on a horse race be-
tween ‘[insiders] trading against current investor sentiment (i.e., by trading
with less bias and/or better models than outside investors) and trading on the
basis of superior cash flow information’ (page 57), they only show that insiders
are contrarians but not that insiders actually trade on mispricing. They show
that yearly insiders’ purchases are placed against recent stock returns and in
line with book to market ratio. However, selling (buying) when recent returns
are high (low) versus recognizing moments when the stock price is too high
relatively to the fundamental firm value is not the same. Contrarian trading
purely based on recent stock returns (or book to market ratio) is mechanistic
and is not able to distinguish cases when stock price is rightly high because
future firm prospects improved significantly nor cases when a firm is indeed
overpriced even though recent stock returns are very low (the stock return
should be even lower and, thus, the market has under-reacted to bad news).
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In other words, showing that insiders trade against recent stock returns is con-
sistent with insiders trading on mispricing of their stock, but does not validate
the hypothesis of mispricing. A valid test would benchmark against a measure
of insiders’ own valuation of the firm’s fundamental value. The set-up of ana-
lyzing insider trading after earnings announcements allows us to address this
weakness.
Second, measuring insider trading relatively to earnings announcements has
also an advantage of more precise measurement of future stock returns, which
are essential as supporting evidence for insider trading on mispricing. Brown
and Warner (1980) highlight the importance of precise knowledge of event
dates for the power of abnormal return tests. The well defined time structure
around earnings announcements means that post trading abnormal returns are
estimated with high precision and their tests exhibit high power. Indeed, our
future stock return analysis provides strong supportive evidence, which is in
contrast to Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) but also to Jenter (2005).
Third, our sample covers a period of stricter regulation after adoption of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that requires insiders to report their trades
within two business days and imposes higher penalties for trading on material
information (Brochet, 2010). Naturally this change in legislation relatively
to the pre-SOX sample in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) would affect the
horse race between trading on different interpretation of public information
(attentive insider trading) versus trading on private information of future cash
flows.
We design two sets of tests that in our view provide supporting evidence
that insiders trade on deviations of stock valuations from their perceptions of
fundamental firm values after earnings announcements. The first set of tests
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is designed to show that insiders do not trade purely contrary to earnings
announcement news. A simple contrarian trading strategy predicts positive
future returns when going long in poorly performing stock (with negative earn-
ings announcement market reaction) and going short in good performing stock
(with high earnings announcement market reaction).2 On U.S. insider trading
data over 2003-2009, we show that insider transactions that follow this sim-
ple contrarian trading strategy are indeed profitable. However, insiders trade
profitably also when selling stocks with negative earnings announcement ab-
normal returns and buying stock with positive earnings announcement abnor-
mal returns.3 They trade on market overreaction to good news but also on
market underreaction to bad news. Thus, they trade profitably after earnings
announcement price adjustments regardless of the direction of the earnings
news. In our view, these results suggest that insiders are able to recognize
when the market over- or under-reacts to earnings disclosures and profit on
price reversals as the stock then adjusts back to the fundamental value.
The second set of tests involves a direct estimation of mispricing associated
with an earnings announcement. The design of these tests takes advantage
of useful properties of earnings announcements. Earnings announcements are
regular and frequent and insiders tend to trade closely after the announce-
ments. Also, earnings surprises are important information events that capture
the attention of investors due to pervasive discussion of firm’s earnings news
in financial media (Barber and Odean, 2008; Brown et al., 2009) and, there-
fore, are associated with significant stock price movements. Engelberg et al.
2Sivakumar and Waymire (1994) and Garfinkel (1997) show that insiders are likely to
sell after positive earnings announcements and buy after negative earnings announcements,
which is consistent with contrarian trading patterns.
3Insiders follow both contrarian and momentum trading, but selectively.
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(2015) argue that mispricing gets more pronounced around news announce-
ments. Furthermore, measures of the actual market reaction to the earnings
announcements are quite well established in the literature and, so, designing a
measure of mispricing is then relatively easier in this well-defined environment.
We estimate a ‘normal’ market reaction to earnings news and then take the
deviation of the realized market reaction from the fitted value as a measure
of mispricing. We take the ‘normal’ market reaction, or fitted earnings an-
nouncement abnormal return, as a proxy for the fair stock price adjustment
after an earnings announcement that reflects the fundamental firm value. As
managers are closely associated with the day-to-day operations of their firms,
it is reasonable to assume that the fitted value is also close to the managers’
perception of the fundamental firm value.4 In line with the mispricing hypoth-
esis, insiders tend to sell after large positive deviations of this variable while
they tend to buy after large negative deviations. At the same time, follow-
ing Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), we assume that realized future earnings
innovations represent unbiased proxies of future cash flow changes that are
unexpected by the market participants but known by the insiders at the time
of their trade. The results suggest that the odds of insider trading are not
significantly associated with future earnings innovations. This result is very
persistent for both purchases and sales and is line with a change towards more
stringent insider trading regulation after SOX. Importantly, Jensen’s alphas
estimated on future returns indicate high profitability of insider purchases and
sales of mispriced firms.
To summarize, our results confirm effectiveness of current insider trading
regulations where insiders are encouraged to trade after rather than before pub-
4I further justify this measure in section 1.3.
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lic announcement of important corporate news such as quarterly earnings and
strongly discouraged to trade on material information. Not only do insiders’
trades concentrate in the period immediately after earnings announcements,
but also, and perhaps more importantly, the odds of insiders selling (buying)
are not associated with future negative (positive) earnings or earnings inno-
vations. Rather, they are strongly associated with positive (negative) stock
price deviations from fundamental firm value. Insiders do not seem to trade
on foreknowledge of future earnings, but rather on different interpretation of
newly released public information. Their attentive interpretation of public
information and trading when their view differs from the prevailing market
consensus, which is reflected in the stock price, should eventually contribute
to stock prices better reflecting fundamental valuations and, therefore, higher
price efficiency.
Our analysis is also closely related to Jenter (2005), Kolasinski and Li (2010)
and to some extent to Veenman (2012). Jenter (2005) also explores the idea
that managers’ perceptions of fundamental value often diverge from market
valuations. However, he focusses on testing ‘the hypothesis that managers per-
ceive their own stock as misvalued when making corporate decisions’ and uses
‘managers’ own portfolio trades as a window into their beliefs’ (page 1904).5
Therefore, Jenter (2005) takes trading in the personal portfolio as a strong and
direct indicator of whether managers view their company stock as mispriced,
but does not provide any direct evidence supporting the conjecture in excess
to showing that insiders have contrarian views. He is neither able to show any
5The idea of insiders recognizing mispricings of their stock and attempting to take advan-
tage of it through their corporate decisions has been advanced in the literature, for example
through equity issues, repurchases or takeovers (Ritter, 1991; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003).
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significant future returns consistent with the conjecture. In contrast, we focus
directly on insider trading associated with deviations from fundamental firm
values and show strong future abnormal stock returns.
The main difference to Kolasinski and Li (2010) is that we analyze insider
trading association with any mispricing, while they choose to focus on a subset
of insider purchases and sales that follow after market underreacts to earnings
information. Moreover, Kolasinski and Li (2010) do not directly estimate
mispricing associated with earnings announcements and, therefore, are only
able to show that net insider purchases follow after positive market reaction to
earnings announcement when earnings surprise is low. Veenman (2012) shows
that insider purchases reported in Form 4 filings help investors learn about the
valuation implications of past earnings signals. Our results suggest that this is
because insiders’ purchases follow those earnings announcements when insiders
disagree with the market’s original interpretation of the earnings information.
Insiders buy after earnings announcements when the market reaction to the
earnings announcement is in their view too negative. Following Form 4 filings,
investors adjust initial pricing errors.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes the data
set. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 present our results concerning post insider trading
abnormal returns and using our estimated measure for mispricing, respectively.
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.1 Data
Our sample of US corporate insider trades is from the Thomson Financial
Insider Filing Data, which contains trades by corporate insiders required to be
13
filed via Form 4 by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Insiders
required to fill in the form are company officers (executives), directors (non-
executive members of the board), and beneficial owners of more than 10%
of the company stock. We start our data set as of January 2003 to include
only insider transactions that are reported under the more timely new rules
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The last year covered is 2009. We have
information on the trading date, the reporting (announcement) date, the firm
id, the insider and their position within the firm, the number of shares traded,
the transaction price and the direction of the trade (purchase or sale). We
exclude from our data set owners of more than 10% of the company stock.
We merge all transactions within one day of the same director in the same
direction (purchases/sales), but we keep transactions if in different direction
even on the same day. At this stage, we do not merge transactions over different
directors. All together we have 79,630 individual insider-day purchases and
212,491 individual insider-day sales for 6,494 firms.
Our analysis is built around earnings announcements that are together
with other accounting information downloaded from COMPUSTAT. Figure 1.1
shows our setup, timings and notation. For each quarter, we denote the two
earnings announcements at the beginning and end of the quarter as EA0 and
EA1, respectively. The numbering of earnings announcements then goes up
from EA1 to the future and down from EA0 to the past. Accordingly, the
fourth earnings announcement after the quarter when insider trading is mea-
sured is denoted EA4 as the first one is EA1. Thus, the period between two
earnings announcements (for example EA0 and EA1) is a quarter and we ag-
gregate all insider transactions on this quarterly level. Our data set includes all
firm-quarters with data available in COMPUSTAT. Stock and market returns
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are downloaded from CRSP and the benchmarks for size and B/M portfolio
returns are downloaded from Kenneth French’s web page. All together, over
the period from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2009, we have data on
132,334 firm-quarters for 5,232 firms. We classify each firm-quarter as one of
the following types: (i) without any insider trading, (ii) containing only insider
purchases, (iii) containing only insider sales and (iv) containing both insider
purchases and sales. We label them no insider trading quarters, insider sale
quarters, insider purchase quarters and mix quarters, respectively.
Insert Figure 1.1 about here.
Table 1.1 shows the main frequencies and statistics. In Panel A we see that
all together, insiders decide not to trade in 57.6% of all firm-quarters in our
data set. This in turn means that 42.4% of quarters have at least one insider
trading transaction. Insider sales are more frequent relatively to purchases:
26.9% of quarters contain only sales versus 10% contain only purchases. Quar-
ters with a mix of insider purchases and sales are quite rare (5.5%). The fact
that insiders are more eager to sell than to buy is also documented when look-
ing at the average per quarter of the number of transactions and total number
of shares traded as a fraction of all shares outstanding.
Insert Table 1.1 about here.
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows that insiders do not only agree to buy and sell in
the same quarters, but purchase and sale quarters are also clustered together
over time. All the quarters in Panel B are partitioned conditional on insider
trading in the previous quarter. We see important time dependence: ‘No
trade’ in a quarter is significantly more likely in case there was no trading also
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the previous quarter. Similarly, purchases are more likely following a quarter
with purchases and sales following a quarter with sales. Another interesting
observation is that mix quarters seem to be transient: both quarters with
purchases and sales are more likely to follow after a mix quarter rather than
a quarter without any insider trading.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for earnings announcements and ab-
normal returns. In Panel A, we see that the overall average return on assets
(ROA) corresponding to all earnings announcements is –0.06 and the earnings
per share adjusted by the earnings per share in the same quarter 1 year ago
and scaled by the stock price (EPS) is –.02.6 On average, each firm has 7 an-
alyst earnings forecasts. We subtract the mean analyst forecast from the EPS
to get the unexpected element of the earnings announcement and scale the
difference by the stock price. The unexpected earnings (UE) are still negative,
but substantially smaller at –0.005. One should also note the significant drop
in observations because analysts do not tend to cover smaller firms.
Insert Table 1.2 about here.
The last part of Panel A of Table 1.2 provides information on the size and
book to market ratio of firms in our sample. The average firm has a market
capitalization of USD2,426 million. To put this number into perspective, we
also compute the size quintile based on the NYSE break points as reported in
the Kenneth French’s web page. Each firm-quarter is assigned into quintile 0
to 4, where 0 is the smallest size quintile and 4 is the largest. The quintile
average of 0.93 suggests that our firms are relatively small. The average book
to market ratio is 0.63 and the average B/M quintile is 1.65 showing that the
6The low average values are due to very low values during the financial crisis.
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average firm in our data set is on the growth side of the spectrum of NYSE
firms that define the break points.
Panel B of Table 1.2 shows the abnormal returns for all firm-quarters in
our data set as well as for insider sale, insider purchase and mix quarters,
respectively. Due to our setup we report abnormal returns relatively to the 2
earnings announcements at the beginning and end of the quarter in which me
measure insider trading (EA0 and EA1). All abnormal returns in Table 1.2
are computed as buy and hold returns that are adjusted for the return on the
corresponding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio as downloaded from the
Kenneth French’s web page. The earnings announcement abnormal returns
are computed over the 3 days surrounding the earnings announcements. The
past abnormal returns include the EA0 announcement effect and so end 1
day after EA0. The post insider trading abnormal returns include the EA1
announcement effect and start on day -1 relatively to EA1.
Panel B shows that, as expected, the average return pattern depends strongly
on insider trading. For example, the overall EA0 announcement effect is small
and insignificant in column 1 with the unconditional average, but significantly
positive for insider sale quarters and significantly negative for purchase quar-
ters. It confirms findings in the literature that insiders are on average con-
trarian traders (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Garfinkel, 1997). Past returns
confirm the contrarian nature of insider trading over longer horizons (Piotroski
and Roulstone, 2005; Jenter, 2005). In contrast to EA0, the announcement ef-
fect for EA1 is statistically insignificant and economically small indicating that
insiders do not trade opportunistically just before earnings announcements.
Post trading returns for insider purchases are significantly positive and eco-
nomically large. Even though the returns for sales are not significant over 3
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and 6 months, they are still the smallest across the partitions. The returns for
mix quarters show that the special category is justified: mix quarters differ
from sale as well as purchase quarters.
1.2 Post trading returns
In this section we explore patterns of post insider trading abnormal returns
to show that insiders do not trade purely in contrarian fashion to earnings
announcement news but rather on deviations of stock prices from fundamen-
tal firm value. A simple contrarian trading strategy that follows earnings
announcements would suggest that insiders sell after positive news and buy
after negative news and it should be the ‘sell after positive news’ and ‘buy
after negative news’ that are profitable.7 In contrast, trading on mispricing of
stock should not depend on the direction of earnings news, that is on whether
the market reaction to the earnings announcement is positive or negative.
Insiders should be able to recognize over-pricing and sell both when market
over-reacts to positive news as well as when market under-reacts to negative
news. Similarly, if insiders buy on under-pricing, they should react to both
market under-reaction to good news and market over-reaction to bad news.
As a result, if insiders trade on mispricing, we should observe that their trad-
ing is profitable both after positive and negative news. A simple contrarian
trading strategy, in contrast, predicts significant returns only for selling after
good news and buying after bad news.
Table 1.3 shows average post insider trading abnormal returns over 1, 3,
6 and 12-months starting one day before EA1 (as shown in Figure 3.1) that
7Similarly, ‘sell after negative news’ and ‘buy after positive news’ should be profitable
following a simple earnings momentum trading strategy.
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are conditional on positive, no and negative news.8 Partitioning by news is
defined based on the 3-day EA0 abnormal return terciles. We adjust for size
and B/M portfolio returns in Panel A and equally weighted market returns
in Panel B. First, in the last column in Panel A with frequency of quarters
across the partitions we see that insiders sell and buy both after positive
and negative news. Even though 39% of sales (12,586 out of all 32,013 sale
quarters) follow after news in the highest news tercile (good news), still 26% of
sales (8,394 quarters) follow after news in the lowest tercile (bad news). This
is a significantly important fraction of all insider sale quarters. The fractions
for purchases are very similar. Out of all 10,394 purchase quarters, 27% follow
after good news and 43% after bad news.
Importantly, the future returns in Panel A show that insiders sell (buy)
profitably both following good and bad news, which contradicts a simple con-
trarian trading strategy. Namely, abnormal returns in Panel A are consistently
negative and significant after insider sales (–111 and –108 basis points at the
12-month horizon for good and bad news, respectively) and positive and sig-
nificant after insider purchases (965 and 628 BP, respectively). Note that the
post trading returns are a bit smaller (in absolute terms) for insider sales: for
bad news they are significant only for the 12-month horizon. Post trading
abnormal returns are much stronger in Panel B with market adjusted returns
suggesting that insider sales in larger firms, where insiders are awarded more
stocks and stock options and therefore have more shares to sell, are a bit
less associated with mispricing and are perhaps more driven by liquidity or
8As we cumulate all insider trading over the current quarter, we start measuring post
trading returns only at the end of the current quarter. At the same time, including the EA1
announcement effect is quite essential. For brevity, we do not report abnormal returns for
quarters with both insider purchases and sales. They are not different from returns reported
for quarters without any insider trading.
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diversification motives.9
Insert Table 1.3 about here.
In Panel A, we also report the cumulative EPS and cumulative UE over
the 4 earnings announcements following the current quarter (EA1 to EA4 as
in Figure 3.1). We see that quarters with insider purchases tend to have the
most negative future earnings (and future unexpected earnings) while insider
sale quarters are followed by the largest earnings. Future cumulative earn-
ings when insiders are not trading are also significantly negative and smaller
compared to sale quarters. This result seems to be inconsistent with insiders
trading on foreknowledge of future cash flows. Future earnings following in-
sider purchases versus sales should be larger rather than smaller for insiders
to profit on foreknowledge of future earnings news.
As a second test to better identify the mispricing mechanism, we consider
a quasi-experiment. Seyhun (1986) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) suggest that
insiders more familiar with the day-to-day operations of their firms should
trade on more valuable information. Following this argument, we conjecture
that the top executives, that is CEOs and CFOs, should be more attentive
(Alldredge and Cicero, 2015) and better identify situations of mispricing. In
Table 1.4, we report post insider trading abnormal returns as in Table 1.3
but now conditional on top executive trading for sale and purchase quarters.
Again, we report abnormal returns adjusted for size and B/M in Panel A and
for market returns in Panel B.
9Further unreported analysis confirms that insider sales after bad news in larger firms
(top tercile by total assets) are not profitable while in smaller firms (lower 2 terciles by total
assets) are associated with the average 6 and 12 month post trading returns of –134 and
–246 basis points, both significant at the one-percent level. A similar size pattern prevails
for sales after good news but not after no news.
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Insert Table 1.4 about here.
Panel A of Table 1.4 shows that quarters with top executive sales deliver
significantly more negative future abnormal returns (–60 and –123 BP over 6
and 12 months, respectively) relatively to quarters with sales of other insiders
(insignificant over 6 and 12 months). Intuitively following the results in Ta-
ble 1.3, the post trading returns conditional on top executives sales become
even more negative with both good and bad news. They drop to –90 and –96
BP over 6 months and –198 and –220 BP over 12 months after good and bad
news, respectively. Top executive sales are also quite profitable for intensive
trading quarters, that is in quarters that fall into the top tercile by the relative
fraction of all shares sold by insiders in the quarter to all shares outstanding.
They earn 82, 122 and 222 BP over 3, 6 and 12 months following the quarter
with their sales. Interestingly, the quarters with other insider selling, that
are conditional on no CEO or CFO sale transactions, are not associated with
significantly negative future returns. The results for top executive purchases
are very similar in nature. Post trading returns are significantly larger for top
executives relatively to other insiders and the differences are larger for quarters
following both good and bad news and when insiders buy intensively.10 The
results in Panel B with market adjusted returns are even stronger for both top
insider sales and purchases.
Our third test employs a regression framework that allows to implement
multiple controls in a single model. Table 1.5 reports the regression results.
In order to show that future returns are more negative (positive) after insider
sales (purchases) that follow both after good and bad earnings news relatively
10Note that the average 6 and 12-month size and B/M adjusted abnormal return for no
news is 290 and 787 BP, respectively, for top executives versus 218 and 638 BP, respectively,
for other insiders.
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to no insider trading, we regress the post trading abnormal returns for the
horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months adjusted for size and B/M portfolio returns
on interaction terms between the sale and purchase quarter dummies and
dummies for good, no and bad news.11 Quarters without any insider trading
is the reference category. We control for year fixed effects in all specifications
and for cumulative EPS over the next 4 earnings announcements (EA1 to EA4)
and size in Panel A and additionally for book to market ratio and past 12-
month abnormal return in Panels B and C. In all specifications, we report the
Hubert/White robust standard errors that are also clustered within firms.
The results in Panel A show that future returns are significantly more nega-
tive when insiders sell and positive when insiders buy and this is so both after
good and bad earnings news. The coefficients for the interaction terms with
insider sales (purchases) for good and bad news quarters are significantly neg-
ative (positive) for most of the monthly horizons, and higher in absolute terms
relatively to the coefficient for no news. These results are significant even af-
ter controlling for firm size and potential insider foreknowledge of future cash
flows (Future cumulative EPS). We consider controlling for future cumulative
earnings very important as it shows that insiders’ intuition for future earnings
does not affect the results. In fact, inclusion of the future cumulative earnings
makes the results somewhat stronger.
Insert Table 1.5 about here.
In Panel B, we control also for the book to market ratio and past 12-month
returns, the 2 variables used in the literature to detect contrarian trading (Jen-
ter, 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). The coefficients for the 2 contrarian
11The partitions are again defined based on terciles by the market reaction to EA0. We
use a window of (–23, +1) to account for leakage of information before the earnings news.
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variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the one-percent level
for all horizons. Firms with low book to market ratio and high past returns
deliver smaller future returns. As contrarian trading is based on selling of
high value firms with positive past returns and buying low value firms with
low past returns, if insiders rely on this type of trading strategy, our results
should be weaker for sales after high positive earnings announcement returns
(good news) and purchases after strong negative earnings announcement ab-
normal returns (bad news). We see this effect for sales. The coefficients for
sales in Panel B are less negative for good news relatively to Panel A, which
indicates that, indeed, after good news insiders sell more often higher value
firms. This could be attributed to diversification and/or liquidity reasons for
insider selling. However, the coefficients for sales after bad news still remain
strong an contradict plain contrarian trading. The results for purchases are
almost unaffected by inclusion of the book to market ratio and 12-month past
returns.
Panel C considers trading by top executives versus other insiders. We ex-
tend the model in Panel B by replacing the interaction terms for sales and
purchases (with good and bad news) by a richer set of interaction terms for
sales and purchases of top executives and other insiders’ sales and purchases.
The results confirm that sales and purchases of top executives are more prof-
itable. All the coefficients for top executive trading are larger in absolute
terms relatively to the coefficients for other insiders except top sales after
good news.12 We also perform two sets of robustness checks without reporting
the results: (i) we re-estimate all models using firm fixed effects; (ii) we use
12This is due to controlling for the book to market ratio and past returns that decrease
the magnitude and significance of the sale after good news coefficients as discussed in Panel
B above. It seems that top executives sell higher value firms when selling after good news.
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the market adjusted abnormal returns. The results remain unchanged.
In summary, the analysis of future abnormal returns in this section indicates
that insiders follow trading strategies that are more sophisticated than simple
contrarian trading strategies. We show that insider sales and purchases are
profitable, especially when insiders trade following strong market reaction to
earnings news regardless of the sign of the earnings surprise. The results are
consistent with insiders trading as a reaction to mispricings following earnings
announcements.
1.3 Estimation of mispricing
In this section, we show a more direct evidence for our hypothesis of insider
trading on mispricing after earnings announcements. To do so, we need to
estimate the deviations of stock prices from the fundamental firm value and
show that insiders tend to trade in line with the estimated pricing errors
and make larger profits when they do so. In line with this idea, we model
the ‘normal’ market reaction to earnings news and then estimate the ‘excess’
market reaction as the difference between the realized market reaction to an
earnings announcement and the fitted value of the ‘normal’ market reaction.
In the spirit of Hong et al. (2012), we predict the ‘normal’ market reaction to
earnings news using the following model:
ARi,q = β0 + β1EPSi,q + β2UEi,q + β3NUMANi,q + β4PastARi,q
+ β5MCAPi,q−1 + β6BMi,q−1 + β7V OLi,q−1 + αt + αi + ǫi,q
where ARi,q is the EA0 3-day buy and hold abnormal return using the size and
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B/M adjustment for firm i and quarter q, EPSi,q is the announced earnings per
share seasonally adjusted for the EPS in quarter EA
−4 and scaled by the closing
stock price 2 days before the announcement date, UEi,q is the unexpected
earnings or the difference between the announced EPS and the mean analyst
forecast also scaled by the closing stock price 2 days before the announcement
date, NUMANi,q is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts
following the stock, PastARi,q is the past 12-month abnormal return ending
on day –2 relative to EA0, MCAPi,q−1 is the natural logarithm of the market
capitalization one quarter lagged, BMi,q−1 is the book to market ratio one
quarter lagged, VOLi,q−1 is the variance of stock returns over one month ending
on day –24 relative to EA0, αt and αi are the year and firm fixed effects.
13
Using all firm-quarters in our data set, we estimate the coefficients of the
model. The fitted values then represent ‘normal’ market reaction given the
earnings news (EPS and UE) and controlling for other firm characteristics
and time and firm fixed effects.14 Consequently, the error terms represent the
deviations of the actual market reaction to the earnings announcement from
the predicted/fitted values. If the fitted values embody fair approximation
of the fundamental effect of the earnings news, then deviations from this fair
value should represent a reasonable proxy for pricing errors after earnings an-
nouncements. We also implicitly assume that the fitted value is a reasonable
13We adjust the model in Hong et al. (2012) in the following way: (i) we use a continuous
variable for EPS and UE instead of a dummy variable for high earnings surprise, continuous
variables for market capitalization, book to market ratio and volatility instead of 25 groups
for size, price to earnings ratio and volatility, (ii) we use number of analysts following the
firm instead of dispersion of analyst forecast to increase the size of the data set as dispersion
is reliably estimated only for large firms with more than 3 analysts following the firm, (iii)
we are not able to measure shortselling activity and presence of convertible debt, but these
variables reflect the special purpose of the Hong et al. paper and are not needed for our
purposes.
14We do not report the regression results, but all the explanatory variables are significant
and with the expected sign.
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approximation of insiders’ estimation of the fundamental firm value. We de-
note the deviation EXMR for EXcess Market Reaction to earnings announce-
ments.
An obvious drawback of EXMR is that it measures only mispricing resulting
from the earnings announcement itself and does not reflect possible mispricing
before the earnings announcement. Nevertheless, the inability to measure
mispricing before earnings announcements should lower our chances of finding
a significant relationship between insider trading and stock mispricing. If we
still find significant relationship between insider trading and mispricing, it
must be rather strong.
Linked to the second drawback, Berkman et al. (2009) suggest that new
information associated with earnings announcements tends to decrease rather
than increase pricing errors. The new information in earnings announcements,
which lowers mispricing, should be captured in unexpected earnings and, there-
fore, price adjustments towards the fundamental value associated with earn-
ings announcements should be incorporated in fitted values of the model and
not affect our EXMR measure. Nevertheless, any price adjustment of this
type at the earnings announcement, by definition, would be in the opposite
direction to the mispricing before the earnings announcement and so even if
market over-reacts in the direction of the price adjustment, the pricing error
picked up by our EXMR measure would go opposite to the original mispricing.
This effect would again weaken rather than strengthen our chances of finding
significant results.
The third drawback of the EXMR measure is associated with the fact that
models of earnings announcement abnormal returns, such as Hong et al. (2012)
document low R2, which then means that the error terms are highly correlated
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with the dependent variable. Indeed, the R2 of our estimated model is 2% and
the correlation between AR and EXMR is 95%. To reconcile the issue that
AR and EXMR indeed measure something else, we compare how well do the 2
measures predict future returns. To support EXMR as a distinctive measure
of mispricing, we should find that EXMR is associated with future abnormal
returns versus AR is not. Table 1.6 shows that EXMR is indeed a reasonable
measure of mispricing following earnings announcements. Panel A reports
mean monthly excess returns of portfolios by EXMR quintiles that are held
for 1, 3, 6 and 12 months.15 We see that, across all horizons, the mean monthly
excess returns are significantly higher when EXMR is the lowest (quintile 0
corresponding to underpricing) relatively to when EXMR is very high (quin-
tile 4 corresponding to overpricing). Panel B reports Jensen’s alphas when
regressing the monthly excess returns on 4 factors following Carhart (1997).
The alphas are significantly positive for quintile 0 that represents underpricing
and significantly negative for quintile 4 that represents overpricing suggesting
that underpricing leads to future positive returns and overpricing to future
negative returns. A trading strategy that goes long in stocks in the lowest
EXMR quintile (underpriced stocks) and short in the highest EXMR quintile
(overpriced stocks) earns also large and significantly positive alpha. Results in
both panels are consistent with EXMR reflecting mispricing associated with
earning announcements. In contrast, Panel C shows that a trading strategy
based on earnings announcement abnormal returns – going short in the highest
15For each quarter, we take EXMR based on earnings announcement EA0 and then put
stocks into one of 5 portfolios, based on EXMR quintile, in the month of earnings announce-
ment EA1 and keep it in the portfolio for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months. Means are equally weighted.
We form portfolios only at the end of the current earnings quarter (in the month of earnings
announcement EA1) because in the next subsection we want to allow for insider trading
during the quarter and gain comparable numbers.
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quintile and long in the lowest quintile of earnings announcement abnormal
returns – is not profitable. Jensen’s alphas for all horizons are very small and
insignificant.16 Comparing Panels B and C reinforces our mispricing measure.
Insert Table 1.6 about here.
1.3.1 Probability of insider trading
In this section we explore in a regression setting the question of whether in-
siders adjust their trading strategies in response to mispricing associated with
earnings announcements and how important is the mispricing relatively to the
book to market ratio and long-term past returns that have been identified as
important insider trading triggers in the literature (Jenter, 2005; Piotroski and
Roulstone, 2005). Again, we partition all quarters into 4 types depending on
insider trading direction in the quarter: (i) no insider trading, (ii) only insider
sales, (iii) only insider purchases and (iv) mix of both insider purchases and
sales. As we want to determine factors that predict insider trading activity in
the current quarter measured as 4 possible outcomes, a multinomial logistic
regression fits our set-up the best.
Table 1.7 presents the results. We treat no insider trading quarters as the
reference category and therefore report 3 sets of regression coefficients: for sale,
purchase and mix quarters. They should be interpreted relatively to quarters
with no insider trading. Concerning explanatory variables, we are primarily
interested in the effect of EXMR (the excess EA0 market reaction) together
with 12-month past return and book to market ratio. We also control for
16Note that we form trading portfolios only at the end of the current earning quarter (in
the month of EA1) rather than immediately after EA1. Therefore, our Jensen’s alphas are
not consistent with earnings momentum patterns documented in the literature.
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the fitted values of market reaction to the earnings announcement. Moreover,
we control for the firm size and EPS and UE corresponding to EA0.
17 We
also include future cumulative EPS and UE over EA1 up to EA4 to control
for insiders’ foreknowledge of future cash flows. In all specifications, we also
include year dummies, but we do not report them to save space. We compute
robust standard errors and allow them to cluster within firms. In order to
determine importance of the individual explanatory variables for predicting
insider trading, we standardize the explanatory variables by subtracting their
mean and scaling by their standard deviation.
Panel A of Table 1.7 shows a base model without including the EXMR mis-
pricing measure for comparison. The estimation results confirm that insider
sales and purchases are contrarian. The 12-month past return increases the
odds of insider sales and decreases the odds of insider purchases, while the
book to market ratio has, as expected, an opposite sign (though the coeffi-
cient for purchases is not significant).18 Further, insiders sell more often in
large firms and buy in small firms. Also in line with the contrarian trading
conjecture, earnings per share at EA0 increase the odds of insider sales and
decrease the odds of insider purchases. Unexpected earnings have the same
effect for insider sales, but are insignificant for insider purchases.19 Finally,
the last two explanatory variables measure the cumulative EPS and UE over
the four future earnings announcements (over EA1 to EA4) and control for
17As EPS and UE are also regressors when modeling AR, we check also specifications
without EPS and UE. They do not result in changed coefficients for the fitted market
reaction.
18Comparing marginal effects of the two variables (not reported) shows that the 12-month
past AR has a larger effect on the odds of insider sales and purchases relatively to the book
to market ratio.
19Note that dropping EPS from the regression results in significant UE coefficients with the
expected signs (not reported). Keeping them both in the model shows that EPS relatively
to UE has more explanatory power for predicting insider trading.
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insider’s foreknowledge of future earnings. Interestingly, the coefficient for the
future EPS is significantly positive for insider sales and significantly negative
for insider purchases, which contradicts insiders’ trading on foreknowledge of
earnings. To profit on foreknowledge, insiders should sell before negative news
and buy before positive news. This result suggests that insiders do not trade
pro-actively taking advantage of future earnings news, at least within 4 future
quarters. Future cumulative UE predicts only the odds of insider purchases
and the coefficient is in line with foreknowledge.20 However, the future UE
becomes positive for sales and insignificant for purchases if we drop the future
EPS from the model (not reported). The last column shows that mix quar-
ters are common for larger firms and resemble pure sale quarters but all the
coefficients are weaker.
Insert Table 1.7 about here.
In Panel B, we include all the regressors from Panel A and add EXMR
and the fitted value, the 2 components of the EA0 market reaction. Panel
B shows that EXMR, indeed, significantly affects the odds of insider trading.
The coefficient for EXMR is significant with the expected sign and relatively
large in magnitude. Positive deviations from the predicted market reaction to
EA0 increase the odds of insider sales, while negative deviations increase the
odds of insider purchases, which is consistent with insiders selling in response
to overpricing and buying in response to underpricing. The fitted market
reaction is significantly positive for insider sales and negative but insignificant
20We also include future cumulative return on assets (ROA) and earnings announcements
abnormal returns as independent variables and the evidence remains the same. Namely,
the coefficient for the future ROA is significantly positive for insider sales and negative but
insignificant for insider purchases, contradicting again trading on foreknowledge. Moreover,
the coefficients for future earnings announcements abnormal returns are not significant for
insider sales, and only weakly significant and positive for insider purchases.
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for purchases suggesting that insider trading also responds to simple contrarian
triggers contained in the market reaction to earnings announcements. This
effect is more important for sales rather than purchases, which is consistent
with insiders satisfying their liquidity or diversification needs for some of their
selling transactions. Even when selling for diversification or liquidity needs,
insiders prefer doing so when prices are high rather than low.
The coefficients for past returns and book to market ratio drop only slightly
after including the 2 components of earnings announcement market reaction,
especially for sales. Past returns still significantly predict the odds of insider
purchases and sales, which suggests that earnings versus past returns both
reflect mispricing and with little overlap. Insider trading is sensitive to both.
We are not able to measure deviations from fundamental firm value that cor-
respond to past return as we do for earnings announcement market reaction
due to lack of appropriate models and complicated set-up without precise tim-
ings. However, it is quite likely that the mispricing component for past returns
would also be an important predictor of insider purchanses and sales.
The interpretation of the economic impact of multinomial logit coefficients
is not straightforward as marginal effects are not constant but change as values
of all explanatory variables change. To better understand and compare the
economic effects of the two components of the market reaction and of past
abnormal returns and book to market ratio, we compute fitted values of prob-
abilities fixing all explanatory variables to their mean values and at the same
time letting one of the 4 explanatory variables at a time move 1 standard de-
viation around its mean. This allows us to determine the effect of 2 standard
deviation change of the given variable on the probability of insider sales and
purchases. The corresponding change in probability of sales is 11%, 8%, 12%
31
and –6% as a result of change of 2 standard deviations around the mean of
EXMR, fitted market reaction, past AR and book to market ratio, respec-
tively. For the probability of purchases, the corresponding changes are –5%,
–1%, –5% and 1%. These changes in probabilities show that the economic
effect of EXMR is comparable to the effect of the fitted market reaction and
past returns. The effect of the market to book ratio is considerably smaller.
The economic effects suggest that the impact of mipricing after earnings an-
nouncements on insider trading is economically meaningful.
Panel C decomposes the overall effect of EXMR conditional on good, no or
bad news. In line with section 1.2, we see that insider sales and purchases are
more likely both after good and bad earnings news. Even though the effect
of EXMR is stronger for good news for sales and bad news for purchases,
EXMR is still significant and large in magnitude also for insider sales with
bad news and insider purchases with good news.21 Thus, mispricing does not
induce insider trading only in situations that are consistent with contrarian
trading. For sales, EXMR is significant also with no news, but the coefficient is
significantly smaller relatively to the other 2 interaction terms. The economic
effects do not change much relatively to Panel B.
1.3.2 Calendar time portfolio returns with insider trad-
ing on mispricing
As a last step of our analysis, Table 1.8 shows Jensen’s alphas for trading
strategies conditional on insider trading and mispricing. We use the four-
factor model with horizons over 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. Each quarter, we put
21All the interaction terms are significantly different from each other for both insider sales
and purchases.
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stocks into 5x3 portfolios according to EXMR quitiles based on earnings an-
nouncement EA0 and insider trading (3 partitions based on insider purchases,
sales or no insider trading as defined above in section 1.3.1). Stocks are put in
the corresponding portfolio at the beginning of the month with the earnings
announcement EA1. Each monthly excess return of a portfolio is weighted by
the square root of the number of stocks in the portfolio in the month to reflect
clustering of insider trading in certain periods (Kothari and Warner, 2007).
According to our hypothesis, trading strategies that follow insider purchases
when stock is underpriced and insider sales when stock is overpriced should
lead to abnormal future profits. Accordingly, we consider 3 trading strategies
that compare (i) quarters with insider sales when the firm is in the top EXMR
quintile, (ii) quarters with insider purchases when the firm is in the bottom
EXMR quintile and (iii) quarters without any insider trading. Table 1.8 shows
that all 3 trading strategies are significantly profitable across all horizons and
Jensen’s alphas are economically large (for example ranging from 50 to 110
basis points per month with the 3 month investment horizon). Moreover,
the third trading strategy that goes long in undervalued stocks with insider
purchases and short in overvalued stocks with insider sales overperforms the
trading strategy in Table 1.6 that is conditioned only on mispricing and disre-
gards insider trading. This suggests that insiders are better able to pick stock
relatively to EXMR, our mispricing measure. Their perception of fundamental
firm value is better relatively to our proxy.22 Overall, section 1.3 suggests that
insider trading patters reflect mispricing after earnings announcements and
22We also analyze post insider trading buy and hold abnormal returns (as opposed to
Jensen’s alpha) over 1, 3, 6 and 12 months conditional on insider trading and mispricing
and confirm that insider purchases and sales in mispriced quarters are associated with
abnormal future returns. The buy and hold abnormal returns are computed the same way
as in section 1.2.
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that insider trading that takes into account this aspect is profitable.
1.4 Conclusions
The literature has shown that insiders trade in a contrarian fashion (Piotroski
and Roulstone, 2005; Jenter, 2005). Our paper provides new evidence suggest-
ing that insider selling (buying) patterns are associated with positive (nega-
tive) deviations of stock prices from their fundamental firm value rather than
plainly with high (low) stock prices. We focus on mispricing associated with
earnings announcements because mispricing gets more pronounced around
news releases (Engelberg et al., 2015). Also, based on existing models for
earnings announcements we are actually able to measure the expected market
reaction and the corresponding over- or under-reaction to the announcement.
Thus, we model the ‘normal’ market reaction to an earning announcement
and then compute the deviation of the realized abnormal return from the
model’s fitted value. If the model’s fitted value represents the fair effect of
the earning news, the deviation from this fair value should reflect mispricing.
Consistent with our hypothesis, insiders are more likely to sell after larger
positive deviations and buy after larger negative deviations of this measure.
The explanatory power of the mispricing measure in predicting insider trading
is high compared to the past 1-year abnormal return and book to market
ratio, the two measures that have been suggested in the literature as the
main determinants of insider trading (Jenter, 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone,
2005), but also relatively to the fitted market reaction. Importantly, we also
show that the Jensen’s alpha of trading strategies based on insider trading
and mispricing is significant and economically meaningful. Insider trading on
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mispricing after earnings announcements predicts future returns.
In addition, we also provide new evidence concerning the horse race be-
tween insiders trading passively on private interpretation of publicly disclosed
information versus trading actively on future earnings innovations. In contrast
to Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), our results show that the odds of neither
insider purchases nor sales are associated with 1-year ahead earnings innova-
tions in a way that would suggest insider trading on their foreknowledge of
future changes in earnings.
Altogether, our analysis suggests that insiders trade on public information.
They are attentive to their firms’ stock price deviations from the fundamental
firm value. They trade after public announcements of earnings when their
informational advantage is minimal and, therefore, the risk of prosecution fol-
lowing their trading is small. As insider trading is in line with future price
reversals back to fundamental values, it might help to signal and detect the
mispricing and, therefore, enhance stock market efficiency. In a broad per-
spective, our results are consistent with the view that U.S. insider trading
regulation is effective in minimizing insider trading on foreknowledge that
is harmful to information collection and price discovery of outside investors
(Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Leland, 1992). However, insiders are still able to
profit from their deep and intimate knowledge of their firms but in ways that
seem to enhance rather than harm stock price efficiency.
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1.5 Appendix
Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Any (insider) trades Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
with any insider trading transaction and 0 other-
wise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Bad news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the lowest tercile by EA0 3-day abnor-
mal return and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT,
CRPS
Book to market ratio Book value of equity corresponding to the previ-
ous quarter over the market cap 2 days before the
earnings announcement
COMPUSTAT
Book to market ratio
quintile
A number between 0 and 5 depending on the book
to market ratio with 0 referring to growth firms
and 5 to value firms. The cut-off points are as
defined on Kenneth French’s web site.
COMPUSTAT,
French’s web
site
CumEPS Sum of EPS over EA1 to EA4. COMPUSTAT
CumUE Sum of UE over EA1 to EA4. COMPUSTAT,
IBES
EA0 or EA1 AR Raw stock return over 3 days around EA0 or EA1
adjusted for the corresponding 5x5 size and book
to market portfolio return as downloaded from the
Kenneth French web site or the market portfolio
return.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
EPS (EA0 or EA1) Net earnings before extraordinary items per share
less the earnings per share four quarters back all
scaled by the closing stock price 2 days before the
announcement date. Corresponds to EA0 or EA1.
COMPUSTAT
EXMR (excess mar-
ket reaction)
The difference between the realized EA0 and the
estimated ‘normal’ abnormal return for EA0. The
estimation model is described in section 1.3.
COMPUSTAT,
IBES, CRPS
Fitted market reac-
tion
The estimated ‘normal’ abnormal return for EA0.
The model for earnings announcement abnormal
returns is described in section 1.3.
COMPUSTAT,
IBES, CRPS
Good news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the highest tercile by EA0 3-day ab-
normal return and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT,
CRPS
Intensive trading Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the highest tercile by the number of
shares traded by all insiders and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT,
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Market capitalization
(MCAP)
Stock price times the number of shares outstand-
ing 2 days before the earnings announcement date.
COMPUSTAT
Market capitalization
quintile
A number between 0 and 5 depending on the mar-
ket cap with 0 referring to the smallest size. The
cut-off points are as defined on Kenneth French’s
web site.
COMPUSTAT,
French’s web
site
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Mix of purchases &
sales (Mix quarter )
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for a quarter
with both insider purchases and sales and 0 oth-
erwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
No (insider) trades
(No IT quarter)
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
without any insider trading transactions and 0
otherwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
No news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the middle tercile by EA0 3-day ab-
normal return and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT,
CRPS
Number of analysts
(NUMAN)
The number of forecasts by different analysts con-
cerning the earnings announcement.
IBES
Number of transac-
tions
The total number of insider-purchase or insider-
sale days in a quarter. We cumulate all trades in
the same direction by an insider on the same day.
This means that insider purchase (sale) transac-
tion refers to a insider-day-purchase (sale).
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Only purchases Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
with insider trading when all insider transactions
in the quarter are purchases and 0 otherwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Only sales Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
with insider trading when all insider transactions
in the quarter are sales and 0 otherwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Other insiders’ sales
(purchases)
Quarters with sales (purchases) only by insiders
who are not CEOs or CFOs of the company.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
PastAR (PostAR) The raw stock return ending (beginning) 1 days
after (before) EA0 (EA1) adjusted for the corre-
sponding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio
return as downloaded from the Kenneth French
web site or the market portfolio return. Abnor-
mal returns are computed over the horizons of 1,
3, 6 and 12 months, which corresponds to 22, 64,
128 and 265 working days.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
Purchase quarter Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
with insider trading when all insider transactions
in the quarter are purchases and 0 otherwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Quarter Period between 2 earnings announcements. COMPUSTAT
ROA Net earnings before extraordinary items over total
assets.
COMPUSTAT
Sale quarter Dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a quarter
with insider trading when all insider transactions
in the quarter are sales and 0 otherwise.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization. COMPUSTAT
Shares traded Total number of shares purchased or sold by all
insiders as a fraction of all shares outstanding in
a quarter.
Thomson Fi-
nancial
Top executives’ sales
(purchases)
Quarters when CEOs or CFOs sell (buy) shares. Thomson Fi-
nancial
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
UE (EA0 or EA1) Unexpected earnings is the net earnings before ex-
traordinary items per share minus the mean ana-
lyst forecast all scaled by the closing stock price 2
days before the announcement date. Corresponds
to EA0 or EA1.
COMPUSTAT,
IBES
VOL Variance of stock returns over one month ending
on day –24 relative to EA0.
CRSP
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Table 1.1: Basic insider trading statistics
The table displays summary statistics for insider trading on the firm-quarter level. A quarter is defined as
the time between 2 earnings announcements. Each quarter is classified as one of the following: containing
(i) only insider purchases, (ii) only insider sales, (iii) both insider purchases and insider sales or (iv) no
insider trading transactions. A quarter is classified as Any trade if it contains at least 1 transaction
regardless of its direction. In Panel A, All quarters shows frequencies for the pool of all firm-quarters.
Number of transactions stands for the average of the number of all transactions (insider-days) in a quarter.
Shares traded shows the average total number of shares traded by all insiders in a quarter as a fraction
of all shares outstanding. Panel B shows the frequencies from the first line in Panel A, but partitioned
according to insider trading activity in the previous quarter.
Any No Only Only Mix
trades trades purchases sales purch.&sales
Panel A:
All quarters 42.4% 57.6% 10.0% 26.9% 5.5%
Number of transactions 5.22 3.16 5.60 7.09
Shares traded 0.43% 0.27% 0.44% 0.62%
Panel B:
No insider trading last quarter 25.1% 74.9% 8.4% 14.0% 2.8%
Only purchases last quarter 51.0% 49.0% 31.5% 12.0% 7.5%
Only sales last quarter 69.7% 30.3% 4.5% 57.6% 7.6%
Mix last quarter 73.1% 26.9% 13.8% 39.0% 20.3%
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Table 1.2: Basic statistics
The table displays earnings announcement summary statistics for all firm-quarters in our data set. Panel A
summarizes the earnings variables and valuations at the beginning of the quarter and shows the number
of observations, mean and standard deviation of the mean. Panel B reports abnormal returns before
(PastAR) and after (PostAR) the current quarter for all, sale, purchase and mix quarters, respectively.
Abnormal returns are computed as buy and hold returns and are adjusted for 5x5 size and book to
market portfolio returns. We indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent level as a, b and c,
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.5 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel A: # observations Mean S.e(mean)
ROA 127,619 -5.8% 0.08%
EPS 104,470 -2.2% 0.04%
Number of analysts 80,766 6.97 0.02
UE 77,807 -0.5% 0.02%
Market capitalization 103,849 2,426 22
Market cap quintile 103,602 0.93 0.004
Book to market ratio 99,020 0.63 0.002
Book to market quintile 99,020 1.65 0.005
Panel B: All Sale Purchase Mix
quarters quarters quarters quarters
# firm-quarters 101,725 32,074 10,458 6,450
1-year PastAR 2.25%a 16.38%a -14.40%a 7.79%a
6-month PastAR 0.64%a 9.57%a -11.01%a 3.35%a
3-month PastAR 0.26%a 5.97%a -7.67%a 0.55%c
1-month PastAR -0.24%a 3.03%a -5.58%a -0.53%
EA0 AR 0.02% 1.48%
a -2.18%a -0.14%
EA1 AR -0.01% 0.04% 0.21%
b 0.25%b
1-month PostAR -0.16%a -0.34%a 0.65%a 0.44%b
3-month PostAR 0.55%a -0.18% 2.06%a 1.29%a
6-month PostAR 1.25%a -0.19% 4.03%a 1.88%a
1-year PostAR 2.31%a -0.51%b 7.37%a 3.01%a
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Table 1.3: Post insider trading performance by earnings surprise
The table displays on quarterly basis the average future 3-day, 1, 3, 6 and 12-month buy and hold abnormal returns starting 1 day before EA1. It also shows
the average cumulative EPS and UE over EA1 up to EA4 and the number of quarters (observations) covered. All the averages are conditional on the 3-day EA0
abnormal return belonging to the highest tercile for good news, middle tercile for no news and the lowest tercile for bad news. All abnormal returns are computed
as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and are adjusted for a corresponding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio return in Panel A and for a equally weighted
market index return in Panel B. We indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent level as a, b and c, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.5
and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
3-day AR 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month Cum EPS Cum UE # quarters
EA1 PostAR PostAR PostAR PostAR EA1 − EA4 EA1 − EA4
Panel A: Size and B/M adjusted
Good news
sale quarters -0.14%c -0.89%a -0.56%a -0.50%c -1.11%a 0.009a -0.004a 12586
no IT quarters 0.11% -0.09% 1.38%a 3.14%a 4.69%a -0.070 -0.013a 16312
purchase quarters 0.54%a 1.11%a 3.66%a 6.84%a 9.65%a -0.132a -0.028a 2776
No news
sale quarters 0.23%a 0.03% 0.13% 0.20% 0.61% 0.011a -0.004a 11033
no IT quarters -0.02% -0.22%c 0.22% 0.79%a 2.15%a -0.059 -0.013a 17439
purchase quarters 0.29%c 0.69%b 1.19%b 2.41%a 6.84%a -0.118a -0.027a 3115
Bad news
sale quarters 0.10% 0.06% 0.09% -0.15% -1.08%b -0.035a -0.009a 8394
no IT quarters -0.41%a -0.48%a 0.28% 0.86%b 2.06%a -0.151 -0.025a 18718
purchase quarters -0.09% 0.30% 1.67%a 3.56%a 6.28%a -0.194a -0.031a 4503
Panel B: Market adjusted
Good news
sale quarters -0.18%b -1.02%a -1.38%a -2.04%a -3.42%a
no IT quarters 0.08% -0.05% 1.31%a 3.04%a 4.21%a
purchase quarters 0.49%b 1.37%a 4.17%a 7.19%a 10.25%a
No news
sale quarters 0.22%a 0.01% -0.58%a -1.03%a -1.19%a
no IT quarters -0.05% -0.23%c 0.08% 0.61%b 1.58%a
purchase quarters 0.28%c 0.73%b 1.18%b 2.16%a 6.29%a
Bad news
sale quarters 0.05% -0.07% -0.71%b -1.61%a -3.36%a
no IT quarters -0.46%a -0.46%a 0.26% 0.91%a 1.72%a
purchase quarters -0.15% 0.50% 1.91%a 3.92%a 6.61%a
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Table 1.4: Post insider trading performance: top executives versus other insiders
The table displays on quarterly basis the average future 3-day, 1, 3, 6 and 12-month buy and hold
abnormal returns starting 1 day before EA1 conditional on quarters with insider sales or insider purchases
and further partitions them depending on CEO/CFO trading in the quarter (Top executives) or no
CEO/CFO trading (Other insiders). Both groups are further conditioned on top and bottom terciles of
EA0 announcement abnormal return (good news/bad news) and top tercile of total number of shares sold
by all insiders in the quarter as a fraction of all shares outstanding (intensive trading). All abnormal
returns are computed as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and are adjusted for a corresponding 5x5
size and book to market portfolio return in Panel A and for a equally weighted market index return in
Panel B. We indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent level as a, b and c, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix 1.5 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
3-day AR 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month # quarters
EA1 PostAR PostAR PostAR PostAR
Panel A: Size and B/M adjusted
Top executives’ sales -0.02% -0.56%a -0.48%b -0.60%b -1.23%a 13404
good news -0.29%b -1.24%a -1.00%a -0.90%b -1.98%a 5695
bad news 0.12% -0.17% -0.35% -0.96%c -2.20%a 3167
intensive trading -0.21%c -1.03%a -0.82%a -1.22%a -2.22%a 6326
Other insiders’ sales 0.09% -0.19%c 0.02% 0.09% 0.00% 19055
good news 0.00% -0.61%a -0.19% -0.17% -0.39% 6913
bad news 0.09% 0.20% 0.35% 0.35% -0.40% 5246
intensive trading -0.01% -0.55%b 0.04% 0.62% 1.23% 4401
Top executives’ purchases 0.35%c 1.31%a 2.96%a 5.85%a 9.61%a 3706
good news 0.34% 2.05%a 5.66%a 10.55%a 14.04%a 868
bad news 0.13% 0.87% 2.88%a 5.50%a 8.52%a 1729
intensive trading -0.02% 1.52%b 5.34%a 8.98%a 17.61%a 1311
Other insiders’ purchases 0.14% 0.30% 1.59%a 3.09%a 6.21%a 7169
good news 0.63%a 0.68% 2.75%a 5.17%a 7.66%a 1928
bad news -0.23% -0.06% 0.93% 2.37%a 4.91%a 2797
intensive trading 0.05% 0.21% 1.46%c 2.30%b 6.61%a 2241
Panel B: Market adjusted
Top executives’ sales -0.05% -0.64%a -1.28%a -1.98%a -3.36%a 13447
good news -0.33%a -1.37%a -1.82%a -2.30%a -4.12%a 5695
bad news 0.08% -0.30% -1.23%a -2.57%a -4.74%a 3167
intensive trading -0.24%c -1.19%a -1.71%a -2.74%a -4.77%a 6339
Other insiders’ sales 0.05% -0.28%a -0.72%a -1.33%a -2.09%a 19129
good news -0.06% -0.73%a -1.00%a -1.82%a -2.84%a 6913
bad news 0.03% 0.07% -0.39% -1.04%b -2.52%a 5246
intensive trading -0.06% -0.71%a -0.65% -0.71% -1.15% 4415
Top executives’ purchases 0.30%c 1.65%a 3.73%a 6.96%a 11.00%a 3721
good news 0.32% 2.66%a 6.79%a 12.06%a 16.34%a 868
bad news 0.06% 1.27%b 3.58%a 6.65%a 9.86%a 1729
intensive trading -0.04% 2.14%a 7.04%a 12.11%a 21.65%a 1318
Other insiders’ purchases 0.09% 0.37% 1.56%a 2.81%a 5.77%a 7215
good news 0.57%b 0.78%c 2.99%a 5.00%a 7.48%a 1928
bad news -0.28% 0.03% 0.89% 2.24%b 4.61%a 2797
intensive trading 0.01% 0.48% 1.82%b 2.84%b 6.95%a 2257
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Table 1.5: Post insider trading performance: regression analysis
The table displays regression results for the 1, 3, 6 and 12-month post insider trading abnormal returns.
A quarter is marked as with insider purchases (sales) in case all insider trades in the current quarter are
purchases (sales) and as following a good, no or bad earnings news if it belongs to the top (bottom) tercile
by the 1-month abnormal return ending 1 day after EA0. All abnormal returns are computed as the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns adjusted for a corresponding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio return.
We report Hubert/White robust standard errors that are also clustered within firms. All variables are
defined in Appendix 1.5 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Year dummies are included
in the regressions but are not reported. We indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent level
as a, b and c, respectively.
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel A
Sales x good news -0.012a 0.002 -0.014a 0.003 -0.021a 0.004 -0.023a 0.006
Sales x no news -0.007a 0.001 -0.007a 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.006
Sales x bad news -0.001 0.002 -0.013a 0.003 -0.018a 0.005 -0.025a 0.008
Purchases x good news 0.015a 0.004 0.019b 0.007 0.040a 0.010 0.049a 0.017
Purchases x no news 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.017 0.013
Purchases x bad news 0.017a 0.003 0.029a 0.005 0.043a 0.008 0.077a 0.012
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.024
a 0.001 0.044a 0.002 0.063a 0.003 0.062a 0.005
Size -0.003a 0.001 -0.017a 0.001 -0.032a 0.002 -0.045a 0.004
# observations 88,336 87,293 86,556 83,598
R2 0.019 0.026 0.027 0.018
F-test 49.19 57.98 55.42 28.86
Panel B
Sales x good news -0.008a 0.002 -0.009a 0.003 -0.012a 0.004 -0.008 0.006
Sales x no news -0.006a 0.002 -0.007a 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.006
Sales x bad news -0.001 0.002 -0.011a 0.003 -0.014a 0.005 -0.017b 0.008
Purchases x good news 0.012b 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.034a 0.011 0.042b 0.018
Purchases x no news 0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.008 0.010 0.013
Purchases x bad news 0.016a 0.003 0.027a 0.006 0.039a 0.008 0.068a 0.013
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.028
a 0.001 0.053a 0.002 0.074a 0.003 0.079a 0.006
Size -0.001b 0.001 -0.013a 0.001 -0.023a 0.002 -0.031a 0.004
Book to market ratio 0.008a 0.001 0.013a 0.001 0.022a 0.002 0.033a 0.005
12-month PastAR -0.008a 0.001 -0.014a 0.001 -0.020a 0.002 -0.024a 0.003
# observations 77,089 76,710 76,090 73,619
R2 0.025 0.035 0.036 0.024
F-test 60.35 75.87 62.06 29.19
Panel C
Top sales x good news -0.010a 0.002 -0.009b 0.004 -0.008 0.005 -0.005 0.009
Other sales x good news -0.008a 0.002 -0.009a 0.003 -0.015a 0.005 -0.010 0.007
Sales x no news -0.007a 0.002 -0.007a 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.006
Other sales x bad news -0.002 0.002 -0.011a 0.004 -0.011c 0.006 -0.014 0.009
Top sales x bad news -0.000 0.003 -0.011b 0.005 -0.019b 0.008 -0.021c 0.012
Top purch. x good news 0.021b 0.010 0.024 0.016 0.071a 0.023 0.073b 0.036
Other purch. x good news 0.009c 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.012 0.029 0.019
Purchases x no news 0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.008 0.010 0.013
Other purch. x bad news 0.010b 0.004 0.019a 0.006 0.033a 0.010 0.063a 0.015
Top purch. x bad news 0.025a 0.006 0.040a 0.009 0.048a 0.013 0.075a 0.021
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.028
a 0.001 0.053a 0.002 0.075a 0.003 0.079a 0.006
Size -0.001b 0.001 -0.013a 0.001 -0.023a 0.002 -0.031a 0.004
Book to market ratio 0.008a 0.001 0.013a 0.001 0.022a 0.002 0.033a 0.005
12-month PastAR -0.008a 0.001 -0.014a 0.001 -0.020a 0.002 -0.024a 0.003
# observations 77,089 76,710 76,090 73,619
R2 0.025 0.035 0.036 0.024
F-test 49.10 61.55 50.44 23.66
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Table 1.6: EXMR as a measure of mispricing
This table shows results for calendar-time portfolio analysis across quintiles of EXMR (excess EA0 market
reaction) in Panels A and B and quintiles of earnings announcement abnormal return, AR, (EA0 market
reaction) over 4 different horizons. Each quarter, we assign stocks into five portfolios according to EXMR
(AR) quintiles and hold them in the fortfolios for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months from the month of EA1. We
calculate the portfolio return in a given month as the equally-weighted average of returns of all stocks in
the portfolio. In Panel A, we report average monthly portfolio returns by quintiles of EXMR. In Panels B
and C, we report the intercepts (alphas) of four-factor regression models across EXMR and AR quintiles,
respectively. We include all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at the time of portfolio
formation and non-empty observations for EXMR. Monthly returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five-
and ten-percent levels.
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month
horizon horizon horizon horizon
Panel A: Mean monthly excess returns
EXMR quintiles:
Quintile 0 (underpricing) 1.84% 1.39% 1.18% 1.03%
Quintile 1 1.35% 1.09% 1.03% 0.94%
Quintile 2 1.11% 0.88% 0.82% 0.76%
Quintile 3 0.97% 0.85% 0.88% 0.77%
Quintile 4 (overpricing) 0.80% 0.64% 0.69% 0.55%
Difference btw. Q0 and Q4 1.04%a 0.74%a 0.48%a 0.48%a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Panel B: Four-factor alphas
EXMR quintiles:
Quintile 0 (underpricing) 0.008a 0.005a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 1 0.003b 0.003a 0.002a 0.002a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 2 0.003a 0.002b 0.002b 0.002b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 3 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 4 (overpricing) -0.002b -0.002b -0.002c -0.002b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Long in Q0, short in Q4 0.011a 0.007a 0.005a 0.005a
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel C: Four-factor alphas
AR quintiles:
Quintile 0 (low market reaction) 0.003c 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 1 0.002b 0.002c 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 2 0.002a 0.002b 0.002b 0.002a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 3 0.002c 0.002c 0.002a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quintile 4 (high market reaction) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Long in Q0, short in Q4 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 1.7: Analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of insider trading.
This table reports estimation results for a multinomial logistic model. The dependent variable is a
categorical variable that equals 0 for quarters without any insider trading, 1 for all quarters with insider
sales only, 2 for all quarters with only insider purchases and 3 for mix quarters. No IT quarters is the
reference category and so the table reports 3 sets of estimated coefficients: for sale, purchase and mix
quarters. The coefficients should be interpreted relatively to the reference category of no IT quarters. We
normalize the explanatory variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The
book to market ratio and size are lagged one quarter. We report Hubert/White robust standard errors
and allow them to cluster within firms. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.5 and are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Year dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and
c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Sale qrtr Purchase qrtr Mixed qrtr
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel A
Constant -1.374a 0.028 -2.069a 0.035 -3.087a 0.056
12-month PastAR 0.301a 0.014 -0.256a 0.026 0.190a 0.022
Book to market ratio -0.114a 0.027 -0.023 0.024 -0.061 0.041
Size 0.428a 0.023 -0.177a 0.033 0.464a 0.039
EPS(EA0) 0.156
a 0.034 -0.130a 0.018 -0.028 0.042
UE(EA0) 0.070
a 0.022 0.005 0.016 -0.050c 0.027
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.256
a 0.028 -0.049b 0.022 0.077b 0.038
CumUE(EA1-EA4) -0.007 0.020 0.040
b 0.018 -0.020 0.027
# observations 60,897
χ2 4936
Pseudo R2 7.72%
Panel B
Constant -1.399a 0.029 -2.101a 0.036 -3.091a 0.057
EXMR 0.240a 0.010 -0.224a 0.016 0.045b 0.018
Fitted market reaction 0.209a 0.020 -0.008 0.023 0.081b 0.032
12-month PastAR 0.279a 0.014 -0.201a 0.024 0.180a 0.022
Book to market ratio -0.151a 0.027 -0.011 0.025 -0.075c 0.042
Size 0.428a 0.023 -0.182a 0.034 0.459a 0.040
EPS(EA0) 0.108
a 0.033 -0.143a 0.020 -0.025 0.048
UE(EA0) -0.022 0.023 0.004 0.019 -0.078
b 0.033
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.222
a 0.028 -0.047b 0.023 0.067c 0.040
CumUE(EA1-EA4) -0.006 0.023 0.041
b 0.019 -0.021 0.029
# observations 60,269
χ2 5543
Pseudo R2 8.47%
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Sale qrtr Purchase qrtr Mixed qrtr
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel C
Constant -1.422a 0.029 -2.127a 0.037 -3.145a 0.059
EXMR x good news 0.309a 0.017 -0.208a 0.028 0.171a 0.030
EXMR x no news 0.170a 0.024 0.016 0.037 0.022 0.043
EXMR x bad news 0.203a 0.018 -0.307a 0.024 -0.056c 0.029
Fitted market reaction 0.204a 0.020 0.002 0.023 0.077b 0.032
12-month PastAR 0.275a 0.014 -0.195a 0.024 0.176a 0.022
Book to market ratio -0.153a 0.027 -0.008 0.025 -0.073c 0.042
Size 0.432a 0.023 -0.178a 0.034 0.468a 0.040
EPS(EA0) 0.108
a 0.033 -0.143a 0.020 -0.024 0.047
UE(EA0) -0.023 0.023 0.001 0.019 -0.081
b 0.033
CumEPS(EA1-EA4) 0.221
a 0.028 -0.044c 0.023 0.068c 0.040
CumUE(EA1-EA4) -0.006 0.023 0.041
b 0.019 -0.022 0.029
# observations 60,269
χ2 5608
Pseudo R2 8.55%
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Table 1.8: Performance of insider trading on mispricing
This table reports intercepts (alphas) of four-factor regression models that regress monthly excess returns
from a long-minus-short portfolio strategy on the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart
(1997) momentum factor. The trading strategies are conditioned on EXMR quintiles and insiders trading
in the quarter. Each quarter, we assign stocks into five portfolios depending on EXMR quintiles and
further partition each of the portfolios based on insiders selling, buying or not trading at all in the
quarter. We put stocks in the corresponding portfolio in the month of earnings announcement EA1 and
keep it there for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months. We calculate the monthly portfolio return as the weighted average
return of all the stocks in the portfolio. We weight by the square root of the total number of firms
included in each of the portfolios to reflect clustering of insider trading in certain periods. We include
all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at portfolio formation. No IT qrtr is a portfolio
including all stocks without any insider trading in the given quarter. Sale qrtr & quintile 0 (4) represents
a portfolio of stocks in the bottom (top) EXMR quintile when insiders sell in the quarter. Purchase qrtr
& quintile 0 (4) represents a portfolio of stocks in the bottom (top) EXMR quintile when insiders buy in
the quarter. Monthly returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Portfolio strategies (Long−Short) 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Post EA1 Post EA1 Post EA1 Post EA1
No IT qrtr – Sale qrtr & quintile 4 0.006a 0.005a 0.003a 0.003b
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Purchase qrtr & quintile 0 – No IT qrtr 0.011a 0.007a 0.006a 0.004a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Purchase qrtr & quintile 0 – Sale qrtr & quintile 4 0.017a 0.011a 0.009a 0.007a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
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Figure 1.1: Timings of earnings announcements and related abnormal returns
The figure shows the exact timings of earnings announcements and related abnormal returns relatively
to the current quarter with insider transactions. The current quarter is defined as the period between
2 earnings announcements. Earnings announcement abnormal returns are always computed over 3 days
around the earnings announcement date. 1, 3, 6 and 12-month returns start (end) 2 days after (before)
the earnings announcement.
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Chapter 2
Insiders trading and market
sentiment during earnings
announcements
Corporate insiders are executives, directors or beneficial owners of more than
10% of the company stocks. Insiders are considered to be informed traders as
they know their companies better than any analyst in the market and their
trades show predictability of future abnormal returns.1 However, while most
of the robust evidence of returns following insider transactions is centered
on stock purchases, the literature finds little evidence that insider sales are
informative about future firm performance (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng
et al., 2003; Jenter, 2005). The main argument for these findings is that insiders
could sell for reasons other than foreknowledge of material information, such as
1See for example Jaffe (1974); Seyhun (1986, 1998); Lin and Howe (1990); Rozeff and
Zaman (1998); Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Jeng et al. (2003); Marin and Olivier (2008);
Jagolinzer (2009); Cohen et al. (2012).
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liquidity or diversification.2 The evidence by Cohen et al. (2012) is a notable
exception. They show that performing simple screening to insider trading
frequencies, both insider purchases and sales are profitable and predict future
returns. Cohen et al. (2012) conclude that their findings support the view
that some insider sales are opportunistic and are driven by foreknowledge of
future material information, and others are routine and are motivated mostly
by liquidity or diversification.
If stock prices reflect all publicly available information, the evidence re-
ferred above means that a significant portion of insiders do not respect legal
prohibitions about trading on non-public material information when selling.
In sharp contrast, another stream of the literature argues that insiders do
not use material information, but their trades reflect contrarian beliefs about
market valuations3 (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Jenter, 2005). This means that insiders do
not use much valid inside information when trading other than the informa-
tion that is already incorporated into stock prices. As a consequence, under
this view insider sales are not profitable and do not predict future returns.
This literature establishes that insiders time very well their transactions and
trade against current investor sentiment by recognizing when their stocks are
mispriced by the market.4
2See for example Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng et al. (2003), Fidrmuc et al. (2006),
Cheng et al. (2007) Brochet (2010) among others
3Under this view, insiders trade against the naive perception of investors that firms’ that
performed well (poor) in the past, value firms (growth), will continue to do so in the future.
So a naive investor will buy value firms more, leading them to be overvalued and sell growth
firms more leading them to be undervalued. The usual measures to capture this investor
sentiment are past-returns and book to market ratio.
4Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) show that insider trades are consistent with both views,
that is, trading on foreknowledge of future firm’s performance and trading against current
investors’ sentiment, although their evidence is stronger for the second view.
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In this chapter, we provide more comprehensive evidence that insiders sell
against investors’ sentiment by analyzing their trading strategies during pub-
lic news announcements. In particular, we highlight the link between insider
selling strategies, the market reaction to earnings announcements and stock
mispricing through market sentiment. A positive shock in market sentiment
is associated with a high demand for a stock from the most optimistic in-
vestors (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Miller (1977) shows that stocks are more
overpriced when investors’ opinions about firm’s value diverge more and short
sales constraints are binding. This is because with high divergence in investors’
opinions and binding short sale constraints, investors with pessimistic valua-
tions do not sell the stock and prices reflect valuations of the most optimistic
side of investors.5 As a result of the overpricing, stock prices drop in the
future.
We conjecture that insiders exploit high market sentiment during earnings
announcements and tend to sell when market reaction to an earnings news
is associated with higher divergence in investors’ opinions about their firms’
value. The divergence in investors’ opinions comes from investors’ differential
interpretations of the news released in the earnings announcements (Kandel
and Pearson, 1995; Brown et al., 2009; Engelberg et al., 2012). We argue
that by selling in firms that experience an increase in investors’ disagreement
during the earnings news insiders take advantage of market sentiment, trade
profitably and at the same time minimize their own legal jeopardy. Moreover,
even when our analysis is centered around insider selling strategies, we also
consider insider purchases as a complement. As the predictions in Miller (1977)
5Miller (1977) is the first establishing the link between divergence in investor’s opinions
and mispriced stocks, but after him there a great deal of articles testing his predictions. See
for example Banerjee (2011) and Diether et al. (2002) for a comprehensive review.
51
model are formulated to explain overvaluation, we expect insiders buying less
or not buying at all under his framework.
For a large sample of U.S. firms from January 2003 until December 2013
we show that insiders are more likely to sell stocks after earnings announce-
ments that are associated with an increase in divergence in investors’ opinions
upon the news release and more binding short sale constraints. This suggests
that insiders are more likely to trade when their stocks become overvalued as
a result of the earnings news. Moreover, we show that when selling stocks
with higher divergence in investors’ opinions insider sales show strong future
return predictability. This evidence is consistent with the idea that insiders
may not be using much valid inside information when trading after earnings
announcements. In the absence of material future information, insiders can
always benefit more by selling their company’s stocks and taking positions in a
well-diversified portfolio (Jenter, 2005). However, if insiders disagree with the
market concerning the valuation of their firms, their incentives to sell might
change significantly. We argue that insiders are so eager to sell that they take
each opportunity to do so. Given stringent U.S. insider trading regulation and
high legal jeopardy, insiders are often trading immediately after releases of
price sensitive information rather than before (Huddart et al., 2007). Use of
information after it was publicly released provides higher protection against
legal jeopardy.
Our main finding is that insiders are more likely to sell in firms that exhibit
a large increase in divergence in investors’ opinions during earnings announce-
ments. Therefore, a key feature of the empirical design is how we measure
divergence in investors’ opinions. The usual measure that literature relies on
is dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. However, this measure doesn’t capture
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investors’ disagreement during the short window of earnings announcements.
Moreover, small firms are generally not covered by many analysts, implying
important biases of the measure. Due to these important limitations of disper-
sion in analysts’ forecasts, we propose an alternative measure: absolute order
imbalance defined as the absolute value of the difference between daily buy an
sell orders scaled by the total volume (Aktas et al., 2007). We validate this
measure using the setup in Berkman et al. (2009), who show that stocks with
higher divergence in investors’ opinions (using dispersion in analysts’ forecasts)
and higher short sale constraints before earnings announcements earn signif-
icantly lower returns when the earnings news is released (3 days around the
earnings announcement). We are able to replicate their main results with order
imbalance, but we also extend their evidence by showing that an increase in
divergence in investors’ opinions during earnings announcements is associated
with a stronger market reaction to the news.
We then explore return predictability of insider sales. We show that firms
with insider sales in a given quarter show significantly lower future abnormal
returns after 1 month, especially when these firms exhibit a large increase
in investors’ disagreement. In particular, a strategy that goes long in stocks
with no insider trading and short stocks with insider sales generates positive
abnormal returns after 1, 3, 6 and even 12 months of a quarter where insiders
trade.
Further, we analyze whether insiders sell more intensively after earnings
announcements to take advantage of market sentiment. We conjecture that
if insiders better interpret the earnings news than other investors and make
profits, they would be willing to trade more shares in order to pre-empt the
rest from extracting the benefits. Our results confirm that insiders sell more
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intensively when the divergence in investors’ opinions and the market reaction
to earnings news are higher.
To provide further support to our results we evaluate whether alternative
measures of overvaluation show consistency with our main finding. Miller
(1977) argues that overvaluation could also occur because some stocks attract
more investors’ attention than others and therefore prices will also reflect the
valuations of the more optimistic investors who investigate about the stocks.
We take trading volume and firms beating analysts’ forecasts as measures
for investors’ attention. We show that insiders are more likely to sell when
investors’ attention is high during earnings announcements.
Lastly, even when our results indicate that insiders trade on the information
released at the earnings announcements, it’s possible that they may also be
selling on foreknowledge of future material information. For instance, Lust-
garten and Mande (1995) show that insiders trade on private information about
future earnings announcements. Consequently, we test whether insider sales
are driven by foreknowledge of future cash flows and we find no evidence that
this is the case. In particular, firms with insider sales do not show a decline
in future fundamental information, even when considering future information
of one year ahead.
Overall, our analysis is consistent with a conclusion that some profitable
insider selling is motivated by public information (Kolasinski and Li, 2010;
Alldredge and Cicero, 2015). This is in line with recent evidence on attentive
insider trading (Alldredge and Cicero, 2015) that argues that insiders are at-
tentive to interpreting new public information and tend to take advantage of
situations when the market is inattentive to this news. In other words, insider
selling activities are motivated by their ability to better interpret and process
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publicly available information. Better information processing and interpre-
tation skills, as well as intimate and deep knowledge of their firms provides
insiders with an advantage even after earnings news is released to the public
domain.
Our evidence has also important policy implications as it’s still unclear to
which extend insider transactions are beneficial for the stock market. Argu-
ments against insider trading state that insider transactions could crowd out
information collection from outside investors and so deter the informational
efficiency of the market (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Fernandes and Ferreira,
2009). Our results that insider sales are motivated by their skills to better
analyze public information suggest that some insider trading is beneficial for
the market. Our findings are in line with early studies showing that insider
trading increases informational efficiency of the market (Manne, 1966; Carlton
and Fischel, 1983). This is because by trading on their superior interpretation
of public news, insiders help to incorporate that information more accurately
into stock prices.
Alldredge and Cicero (2015) study insider trading when firms disclose con-
centrated business connections with other companies. They show that insiders
sell profitably based on public information about their main customers. All-
dredge and Cicero (2015) argue that their results are suggestive that insiders
are attentive to the information released at public news announcements. We
are able to extend their evidence by focusing on public news that is more fre-
quent and determinant for insiders.6 More importantly, our results are differ-
ent as we show that insiders actively exploit situations when outside investors
6Our analysis show that almost 60% of insider sales occur within 1 month of the earnings
announcement date.
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misinterpret the news and trade, rather than occasions when outside investors
are inattentive to profitable opportunities. Kolasinski and Li (2010) finds evi-
dence that insiders buy more and sell less when their firms have underreacted
to earnings news. More specifically, they show that net insider purchases fol-
low after positive market reaction to earnings announcement when earnings
surprise is low. However, our results are different as they are not conditional
to the direction of the news. Therefore, we contribute to their evidence by
showing that insiders are selling their stocks when are likely to be overpriced
after the news release, suggesting that insiders may be selling when the market
has overreacted to positive news and underreacted to negative news.
Our findings complement the evidence of Jenter (2005). He shows that in-
siders’ contrarian trading is consistent with the intuitive idea that managers
in low market valuation firms (value firms) view their stocks as undervalued
and managers in high market valuation firms (growth firms) view their stocks
as overvalued, suggesting that insiders are exploiting the value effect. In par-
ticular, he assumes that insider trades are motivated by mispricing and shows
different results from managerial decisions that are consistent with this as-
sumption. He also finds little evidence that managers earn significantly excess
returns with their trades. We extend his evidence by showing more directly
that insiders sell when their stocks are more prone of overvaluation as a result
of high market sentiment during earnings announcements. We show that insid-
ers are selling more frequently and intensively stocks that exhibit an increase
in disagreement and more binding short sale constraints. More importantly,
as a result of this trading strategy insider sales show strong future return
predictability.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce the
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main hypotheses and related literature. In Section 2.2, we describe our data
and the construction of the main variables, and we also validate our measure
of divergence in investors’ opinions. Section 2.3 contains our main results.
Section 2.4 and 2.5 provide a robustness check and explore an alternative
explanation. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Related literature
A large body of literature studies the trading motives of corporate insiders.
Early studies agree that insiders trade on material information not yet con-
veyed to the market as their transactions show predictability of future ab-
normal returns (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986, 1992, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee,
2001; Jeng et al., 2003). Most of this evidence, however, focuses on the abnor-
mal returns to firms in relation to aggregate measures of insider trades over
well-defined periods (Cohen et al., 2012), and therefore they do not permit to
evaluate whether their trades are in line with trading in anticipation of future
relevant information that has not yet been revealed to the public. Further-
more, these findings are generally more consistent with insider purchases as
insiders could sell for other reasons, such as liquidity or diversification.
Other papers document that insiders use their foreknowledge of material
information when trading by showing that they make profitable trades in a
contrarian fashion in anticipation of future corporate events not yet disclosed
to the market (Noe, 1999; Ke et al., 2003; Cheng et al., 2007). However, the
reasons behind their contrarian trading pattern are also challenged in the lit-
erature. For example, Jenter (2005) argues that managers may not use much
valid inside information in their decisions above and beyond the information
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contained in observable firm characteristics such as size and book-to-market.
This stream of the literature argues that insiders trade on mispricing and so
on different interpretation of already disclosed information (Sivakumar and
Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Jen-
ter, 2005). Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) show that insider trades are con-
sistent with both views, that is, trading on foreknowledge of future firm’s
performance and trading against current investors’ sentiment, although their
evidence is stronger for the second view.
More recently, Kolasinski and Li (2010) and Alldredge and Cicero (2015)
argue that insiders are skillful investors who interpret new public informa-
tion better than the rest. Similarly, we argue that insiders’ motivation to sell
at the earnings announcements comes for their ability to better analyze the
fundamental information contained in the news and take advantage of situa-
tions when the market misinterprets it. Insiders sell when market sentiment is
high during earnings announcements and stock prices deviate away from firms’
fundamental values.
Miller (1977) shows that stocks are more overpriced when investors’ opin-
ions about firm’s value diverge more, provided that short sales constraints are
binding. This is because with high divergence in investors’ opinions and bind-
ing short sale constraints, stock prices reflect valuations of the most optimistic
investors who push the demand for the stock up and so cause overpricing. As
a result of the overpricing, stock prices drop in the future. Underpricing, in
contrast, is not explicit under Miller’s model and so it’s difficult to establish
an association between divergence in investors’ opinions and undervaluation
under his framework.
We conjecture that insiders recognize and take advantage of mispricing as a
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result of high market sentiment originated in the earnings announcements and
so insider trading is associated to changes in divergence in investors’ opinion
upon the news release. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this chapter is that
insiders are more likely to sell shares of their firms after earnings announce-
ments that are associated with an increase in divergence in investors’ opinions
and binding short sale constraints. In contrast, we predict insiders buying less
or not buying at all in stocks with these characteristics.
Miller’s model has been extensively tested.7 Berkman et al. (2009) is the
closest to our analysis as they test the model in a context of earnings announce-
ments. They show that stocks with higher divergence in investors’ opinions
and higher short sale constraints before the earnings announcements earn sig-
nificantly lower returns upon release of the earnings news (3 days around
the earnings announcement). They argue that this result is consistent with
Miller’s (1977) model, as stocks with high disagreement and binding short sale
constraints prior to the announcement date are more prone to be overpriced
and, therefore stock prices should adjust back to fundamental values as a re-
sult of the news. This price adjustment then is expressed as lower earnings
announcements abnormal returns.
One important assumption embedded in Berkman et al. (2009) analysis is
that the release of information in the earnings announcements reduces diver-
gence in investors’ opinions. In contrast with this assumption, Brown et al.
(2009) suggest that public information such as earnings announcements not
only attracts investors’ attention, but also increases divergence in investors’
opinions. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Brown et al. (2009) argue that quar-
7See for example Diether et al. (2002); Goetzmann and Massa (2005); Boehme et al.
(2006); Banerjee (2011)
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terly earnings announcements allow investors to make their own judgements
about firms’ value and, therefore, to generate their own private information.
The interaction between investors’ prior beliefs and a new public signal might
result in investors disagreeing about the interpretation of the news and there-
fore divergence in investors’ opinions might increase rather than decrease fol-
lowing earnings announcements (Barron et al., 2005; Fleming and Remolona,
1999; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997; Lee et al., 1993).
2.2 Data
By law, US corporate insiders must report their transactions in the company
stock with the SEC by filing forms 3, 4 and 5 specified by the Security Exchange
Act of 1934. Thomsom Financial Insider Filings contain all insider activity as
reported in the forms. It covers detailed information about the transactions
and the insiders including the trading date, announcement date, insider’s name
and role in the firm, number of shares traded, transaction price and transaction
type (purchase or sale).
Our sample covers 11 years of insider transactions from Thomsom Financial
Insider Filling. We start our data set as of January 2003 to include only insider
transactions that are reported under the more timely new rules of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.8 The last year covered is 2013. We merge all transactions
within one day of the same director in the same direction (purchases/sales),
but keep transactions if in different direction even on the same day. In total,
we have 479,957 individual insider transactions split between purchases and
sales. Our analysis is built around earnings announcements and so we associate
8Since August 2002 the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act accelerated the reporting deadline for in-
sider ownership reports to no more than 2 days after the transaction date.
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every insider transaction to a quarterly earnings announcement. We denote
the period between 2 earnings announcements as a quarter and aggregate all
insider transactions on this quarterly level. Figure 2.1 shows our setup, timings
and notation. We denote the two earnings announcements at the beginning
and end of the current quarter as EA0 and EA1, respectively. We classify
each firm-quarter as one of the following types: (i) without any insider trading
(No IT ), (ii) containing only insider purchases (Only P), (iii) containing only
insider sales (Only S ) and (iv) containing both insider purchases and sales
(Mix ).
Insert Figure 2.1 about here.
Our data set includes all firm-quarters with data available in COMPUSTAT.
Stock and market returns are downloaded from CRSP and the benchmarks
for size and B/M portfolio returns are downloaded from Kenneth French’s
web page. Other firm characteristics we use are firms’ size, book to market,
earnings surprises and past returns which are all defined in the Appendix.
We calculate abnormal returns at the earnings announcement date and after
a quarterly earnings announcements (See Figure 2.1). We use the 4 factor
model (Carhart, 1997) as a benchkmark and measure abnormal returns as the
buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal over the period of interest: BHARi,t =
[Πt2t=t1(1+Ri,t)− 1]− [Π
t2
t=t1(1 +E(Ri,t)− 1)], where Ri,t is the realized return
on day t.9
9We also use the 3 factor model Fama and French (1992) and the market model for
robustness purposes and the results remain unchanged.
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2.2.1 Measuring divergence in investors’ opinions and
short sale constraints
Measuring divergence in investors’ opinions represents a challenge (Berkman
et al., 2009). The variable most widely used in the literature so far is dispersion
in analysts’ forecasts derived from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System
(I/B/E/S). However, there are important drawbacks associated with this vari-
able. First, dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is an indirect measure as it reflects
divergent opinions of analysts rather than investors (Bamber et al., 2011; Di-
ether et al., 2002). Second, small firms are generally not covered by many
analysts, which might imply important biases of the measure. In fact, smaller
firms suffer higher information asymmetries, thus, earnings announcements in
smaller firms might be associated with stronger investors’ reaction and diver-
gence of opinions. Finally, and importantly for our analysis, the measure does
not allow to capture divergence in investors’ opinions during the short window
of earnings announcements. Analysts’ forecasts reflect expectations concern-
ing the earnings news and so the measure captures analysts’ divergence before
the earnings announcement rather than the effect on investors’ disagreement
as a result of the news publication. We are more interested in the latter rather
than the former.
To overcome these issues, we borrow a measure from the market microstruc-
ture literature and use daily order imbalance proposed by Aktas et al. (2007).
During earnings announcements when investors’ valuations of firms diverge,
this disagreement is reflected in the form of imbalances between buy and sell
orders as investors trade on the basis of their information (Brown et al., 2009).
Daily order imbalance (OIBvol) is the absolute value of the difference between
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the volume of buyer initiated versus seller initiated trades made during one
trading day, scaled by the total volume on the trading day:
OIBvoli,t = |Bvoli,t − Svoli,t|/(Bvoli,t + Svoli,t) (2.1)
where Bvoli,t (Svoli,t) stands for the daily number of shares bought (sold) for
each firm i on day t. Intuitively, the lower the order imbalance, the closer is the
volume of buyer versus seller initiated trades, which reflects high polarization
and so high divergence in investors’ opinion. We use high frequency data from
NYSE Trades and Quotes database (TAQ) to extract the necessary intraday
transactions. We apply the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify trades
and quotes as buyer or seller initiated.
As we want to observe how changes in divergence in investors’ opinions affect
insiders decision to trade, we construct a measure of market adjusted order
imbalance following a similar approach to Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006). First,
we calculate daily order imbalance from 43 days before to 43 days after the
announcement date. Second, we adjust it for a market-wide order imbalance
defined as the equally weighted average order imbalance over all firms in our
sample.10 This calculation is as follows:
OIBvoli,q(t1,t2) =
{
t2∑
t=t1
[OIBvoli,t − OIBvolmkt,t]
}/
T (2.2)
Where i, mkt, q and t represent a firm, the market, a quarter and a day
around an earnings announcement date respectively (t = 0 is the earnings
10We also calculate market order imbalance as the value weighted OIBvol for all the firms
in our sample 43 days before and after the earnings announcements date. The results remain
the same.
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date as reported on COMPUSTAT). T is the number of days for which we
are computing the average. We define three important periods around the
announcement date which outline the final step in the construction of the
measure: (i) (-4,+1) is our earnings announcement window, (ii) (-14,-5) as
the pre-earnings announcement window, and (iii) (-43,-15) as the non-event
window. Our announcement window starts 4 days before to take into count
the run-up period where investors could trade in the direction of the news.11
Hence, OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q corresponds to the average daily market adjusted or-
der imbalance at the earnings announcement period in quarter q for firm i.
We also consider a pre-earnings announcement period to control for Berkman
et al. (2009) findings. Furthermore, although our definition for a non-event
window may look arbitrary, we believe is a reasonable period considering that
on average no relevant information would affect every firm at the same time
during this period.
For our last step, we acknowledge that firms with high level of disagreement
at the earnings announcement may reasonable have a high level of disagree-
ment overall. So, OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q may be capturing general cross sectional
differences across the firms in our sample that are not attributable to investors’
response to the earnings announcements. Hence, we subtract from the daily
market adjusted order imbalance at the earnings announcements (-4,+1) and
at the pre-earnings announcement period (-14,-5) the whole sample daily mar-
ket adjusted order imbalance at the non-event window (-43,-15). Equations 2.3
11We also run all our results by computing changes in order imbalance at the window
(0,+1) and the results are a little weaker in magnitude, but the association is the same.
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and 2.4 describes the procedure:
∆OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q = OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q −OIBvol(−43,−15)i (2.3)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5)i,q = OIBvol(−14,−5)i,q −OIBvol(−43,−15)i (2.4)
As for the raw order imbalance, intuitively, the lower the changes in order
imbalance reflect an abnormal increase in divergence in investors’ opinion dur-
ing the period contrasted. ∆OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q and ∆OIBvol(−14,−5)i,q constitute
our main measures of divergence in investors’ opinions that we use through-
out the chapter. However, in order to validate order imbalance as a measure
that indeed captures divergence in investors’ opinion, we also use dispersion
in analysts’ forecast as a benchmark. Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is the
standard deviation of quarterly earnings per share forecasts for the current
earnings announcements that are issued in the period between the last earn-
ings announcements and two days prior to the current earnings announcement
date, divided by the absolute value of the median analyst forecast.
To measure short sale constraints we employ two variables used in the lit-
erature. First, as institutional investors provide the majority of stock lend-
ing in the market, firms with low institutional ownership have low supply of
stocks available for lending and, therefore, should have higher short sale con-
straints (Berkman et al., 2009). Institutional ownership (INSOWN) is defined
as the fraction of shares held by institutional investors prior to the earnings an-
nouncement scaled by the number of shares outstanding. We get institutional
ownership data from FactSet.
The second measure we employ is relative short interest (RSI) defined as
the level of short interest for a firm in a certain month scaled by its number
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of shares outstanding. Short interest corresponds to the monthly quantity of
shares that are held short for a given firm, as a result, RSI is the percentage
of each firm’s shares that are held short. Intuitively, the higher is the level of
shares shorted for a stock, the higher is the unobserved demand for shorting
it as well (Figlewski, 1981; Boehme et al., 2006). This means that stocks with
higher levels of relative short interest are more difficult to short in the margin,
so they are more likely to have binding short sale constraints.12
2.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows the spread of insider transactions across quarters in our sam-
ple. We see that insiders are quite active shortly after earnings news. Around
60% of all insiders transactions in our sample take place within the first month
after earnings announcements and about 30% of all transactions occur within
the first 10 trading days. This pattern is consistent with insiders concentrat-
ing their trading after the earnings are released to the public to minimize legal
jeopardy (Huddart et al., 2007).
Insert Table 2.1 about here.
Table 2.2 summarizes differences across quarters types by insider trading.
Panel A shows that we have 170,296 firm-quarters in our sample, from which
73,783 (43.33%) have no insider transactions (No IT ) and 96,513 (56.67%)
have at least one insider trade. Quarters with insider sales only (Only S ) are
12Despite these arguments, one might state that a stock with high levels of observed short
interest must be relatively unconstrained rather than highly constrained. Boehme et al.
(2006) provide an exhaustive analysis examining the empirical relation between RSI and
the stock lending fees and find a large positive correlation between them. As firms with
higher levels of short interest also exhibit higher lending fees, they conclude that stocks
with high levels of short interest are more difficult to short in the margin. Therefore, these
firms must have more binding short sale constraints.
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relatively frequent compared to purchases (Only P). While 33.36% of quarters
contain only insiders sales, 13.4% only purchases. Quarters with mix of insid-
ers’ purchases and sales (Mix ) are less frequent (9.91% of quarters). Also, on
average insiders sell more shares than they buy. The relative number of shares
per-quarter they sell is 0.6% as opposed to 0.45% they purchase.
In Panel B, the overall average dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (DISP in
column 1) is very similar to Berkman et al. (2009). However, we see important
differences in firm characteristics across the quarters. First, No IT and Only
P have relatively higher DISP than quarters with Only S and Mix suggesting
that quarters where insiders buy versus sell have higher disagreement prior
an earnings announcements. This is not reflected by the level of order imbal-
ance pre-earnings announcement (OIBvol(−14,−5)) which is the highest in quar-
ters with purchases suggesting agreement among investors. Also, it remains
the highest during the earnings announcements (OIBvol(−4,+1)). For Only S
quarters, in contrast, order imbalance is the lowest both prior (OIBvol(−14,−5))
and during the earnings announcements (OIBvol(−4,+1)) indicating higher dis-
agreement.
Insert Table 2.2 about here.
Second, our measure of changes in market adjusted order imbalance de-
creases for all quarters during earnings announcements suggesting that di-
vergence in investors’ opinion increases upon the news release (a decrease in
∆OIBvol(−4,+1)). Also, while Only S quarters exhibit the largest increase,
Only P quarters show the lowest. Importantly, this is in line with the argu-
ment that earnings announcements could increase rather than reduce investors’
disagreement as their interpretation of the same piece of information may differ
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significantly (Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Brown et al., 2009; Engelberg et al.,
2012). Finally, ∆OIBvol(−14,−5) shows that the overall disagreement decreases
before the news and decreases even more in Only P quarters. The opposite
stands in Only S and Mix quarters. Therefore, while for Only S quarters the
level of disagreement is higher before and during the news, for Only P quarters
is lower. This reinforces the need of using changes for these measures relatively
to a non-event window as we do.
Further, the average firm in our sample has a market capitalization of USD
2,656 million. In line with the literature, insiders sell more on larger firms and
buy more in smaller firms (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). Similarly, book
to market ratio indicates that insiders sell high valuation firms (growth firms)
and buy low valuation firms (value firms) (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter,
2005). Looking at the stock returns in Panel C, we see the contrarian behavior
of insiders documented in the literature. Insider sale quarters exhibit higher
past returns, positive news at the current quarter (marked by EA0) and lower
future returns. In contrast, insider purchase quarters show lower past returns,
a negative market reaction and higher future returns.
2.2.3 Order imbalance vs. dispersion in analysts’ fore-
casts
In this section we aim to validate order imbalance as a measure of divergence
in investors’ opinion. We perform 2 tests. First, we replicate Berkman et al.
(2009) to check order imbalance relative to dispersion in analysts’ forecasts in
capturing divergence in investors’ opinion in the context of earnings announce-
ments. Second, we examine the cross-sectional variation in post-earnings an-
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nouncements returns by different levels of order imbalance.
For the first test, we examine the association between divergence in in-
vestors’ opinion and abnormal returns in the three days around earnings an-
nouncements. While controlling for short sale constraints and other variables
that could be associated to earnings announcements abnormal returns. The
model we test is as follows:
EA0abnormalreti,q = αi,q + β1DIV Gi,q + β4SHSCi,q + β5SIZEi,q
+ β6BtoMKTi,q + β7∆EPSi,q
+ β8PastRET (1year)i,q + εi,q
(2.5)
Where i identifies a firm and q a quarter. DIVG stands for divergence in
investors’ opinions comprising the 3 measures we have and use interchange-
ably across the specifications: (i) dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (DISP), (ii)
changes in order imbalance prior to the announcement (∆OIBvol(−14,−5)) and
(iii) changes in order imbalance during the earnings news (∆OIBvol(−4,+1)).
SHSC refers to the 2 measures for short sale constraints: (i) institutional
ownership (INSOWN ) and (ii) relative short interest (RSI ). We estimate this
model by performing a pooled OLS regression and then by controlling for firm
and time fixed effects. All variables are standardized by subtracting their mean
and scaling them by their standard deviation to determine the relative associ-
ation of the individual explanatory variables on the earnings announcements
abnormal returns. The results are reported in Table 2.3.
Insert Table 2.3 about here.
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Columns 1 and 2 replicate Berkman et al. (2009) findings with the 2 alter-
native measures of short sale constraints. We see a significantly negative coef-
ficient for dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (DISP) and relative short interest,
along with a significantly positive coefficient for institutional ownership (IN-
SOWN ). Thus, market reaction to earnings announcements is lower in quarters
with high divergence in investors’ opinions before earnings announcements and
more binding short sale constraints.13 Berkman et al. (2009) argue that this
result is consistent with Miller’s (1977) model because stocks with high dis-
agreement and binding short sale constraints before earnings announcements
are more prone to be overpriced. As result, stock prices adjust downwards
upon the news release.
In columns 3 and 4 we replace dispersion in analysts’ forecast (DISP) with
our 2 order imbalance measures. We see that, consistent with Berkman et al.
(2009), the coefficient for ∆OIBvol(−14,−5) is positive and significant while IN-
SOWN and RSI remain almost unchanged relative to columns 1 and 2. Higher
divergence in opinions among investors before earnings announcements (lower
∆OIBvol(−14,−5)) is associated with lower market reaction to the earning news.
We also include ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) measuring investors’ divergence in opinions
during earnings announcements and see that increases in disagreement (a re-
duction in ∆OIBvol(−4,+1)) due to the publication of earnings are associated
with higher earnings announcements abnormal returns. This result supports
the view that earnings announcements could increase investors’ disagreement
(Brown et al., 2009; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997) which is central to our hypoth-
13Recall that intuitively stocks with lower INSOWN have more binding short selling
constraints. The opposite, however, works for RSI therefore we expect a negative coefficient
for INSOWN and a positive coefficient for RSI.
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esis.14
In columns 5 to 8 we re-run the same specifications as in columns 1 to
4, but now controlling for firm and time fixed effects. The inclusion of fixed
effects has an important effect on the coefficient for dispersion in analysts’
forecasts (DISP). Even though the negative coefficient remains its statistical
and economic significance drops remarkably. Also, the coefficient for institu-
tional ownership (INSOWN ) changes sign and becomes significantly negative,
while the coefficient for relative short interest (RSI ) keeps its sign and signif-
icance and increases a little in magnitude (column 6). These results highlight
the inclusion of fixed effects to estimate the specifications as time invariant
effects could bias the estimation of the coefficients in the model.15 Finally, we
see that our order imbalance measures ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) and ∆OIBvol(−14,−5)
in columns 7 and 8 remain with the expected sign and significance even when
including firm and time fixed effects.
In our second test, we examine monthly returns on calendar time portfolios
formed by sorting stocks at different levels of order imbalance. If order imbal-
ance reasonably captures divergence in investors’ opinions, stocks with lower
levels of order imbalance (higher divergence in investors’ opinions) should earn
lower future returns. To do this, each quarter we assign stocks into five portfo-
lios based on quintiles of average changes in order imbalance at different time
windows, and hold them in the portfolios for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months after the
14However, it goes against Berkman et al. (2009) assumption that divergence in investors’
opinions decreases once earnings news is released.
15The inclusion of fixed effects produce significant differences relative to the results doc-
umented by Berkman et al. (2009). One difference is that they estimate their model using
Fama and McBeth regressions. However, running the specifications using Fama and McBeth
produce almost identical results to our pooled OLS in columns 1 to 4. Fixed effects control
for the time invariant component of dispersion in analyst’s forecasts. Once this fixed com-
ponent is eliminated the association of this variable and earnings announcements abnormal
returns disappears.
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earnings announcement EA1 (see Figure 2.1).
16 We calculate portfolio returns
in a given month as an equally-weighted average of returns of all stocks in
the portfolio. We only include stocks that have non-missing price at the end
of each quarter and have stock price greater than $5 at portfolio formation.
This criterion ensures that returns are not driven by illiquid stocks (Cohen
and Frazzini, 2008). Finally, we compute Jensen’s alpha from a time-series
regression that regress monthly excess returns of a long-minus-short portfolio
strategy on the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997)
momentum factor.
Table 2.4 shows Jensen’s aphas for trading strategies of a zero-cost portfolio
that holds long stocks at the top quintile of changes in order imbalance and sells
short stocks at the bottom quintile. Intuitively, stocks in the bottom quintile of
changes in order imbalance exhibit larger increases in divergence in investors’
opinions and, therefore are more prone to overpricing. This investment rule
should earn zero abnormal returns in an efficient market.
Insert Table 2.4 about here.
In general, we find that this strategy gives positive abnormal returns at the
different time horizons. That is, after controlling for the size, book to market
ratio and momentum factors, stocks with a large increase in disagreement
(bottom quintile of ∆OIBvol) around the earnings announcements tend to
have lower future returns than do stocks with a reduction in disagreement (top
quintile of ∆OIBvol). In particular, we see that a long-short strategy based on
16We start calculating portfolio returns after EA1 instead of EA0 because of 2 reasons:
(1) our setup aggregates insider trading to a quarter and, therefore, we allow for the market
to adjust to their trades. (2) According to Miller (1977), usually disagreement narrows over
time, as new information comes and uncertainty is resolved, but it takes the market some
time adjust to it.
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changes in order imbalance in the 5 days around the earnings announcements
(-4,+1) generates an average 1.1% monthly abnormal returns at 1, 3, 6 and
12 months after EA1.
17 Similarly, a long-short strategy based on changes in
order during the earnings announcements (0,+1) generates an average 0.4% to
0.6% monthly abnormal returns at 3, 6 and 12 months after EA1.
Overall, these results not only validate order imbalance as a good measure
of divergence in investors’ opinions, but also expand Berkman et al. (2009)
evidence. On the one hand, we show consistency with their main results
where high divergence in investors’ opinions before earnings announcement is
associated with lower returns on average at the announcement date (positive
coefficient of ∆OIBvol(−14,−5)). On the other hand, however, we provide new
evidence showing that an increase in disagreement during the earnings an-
nouncements is associated with higher market reaction to the news (negative
coefficient of ∆OIBvol(−4,+1)). Therefore, we believe there are big advan-
tages in using order imbalance which is its precise timeliness that allows us
to distinguish between investor’s divergence in opinions before versus during
the earnings announcements and so test their different effect on earnings an-
nouncement abnormal returns.
17These results are consistent with the findings of Diether et al. (2002). They show that
a portfolio of stocks in the highest quintile of disagreement, measured through dispersion
in analysts’ forecasts, under-performs a portfolio of stocks in the lowest quintile of that
measure. Our setup is slightly different as our sample is structured around earnings an-
nouncements, but both findings are in the same direction.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Determinants of insider trading after earnings an-
nouncements
In this section we test whether insiders adjust their trading strategies in re-
sponse to divergence in investors’ opinions originated in the earnings announce-
ments. In particular, we aim to determine which set of factors predict insider
trading activity in each quarter after earnings are made public. We do this in
a regression framework that takes each quarter type as the dependent variable
and our measures of divergence in investors’ opinions as explanatory variables.
The model we test is as follows:
OUTCi,q = αi,q + β1∆OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q + β2∆OIBvol(−14,−5)i,q
+ β3RSIi,q + β4EA0abnormalreti,q + β5SIZEi, q
+ β6BtoMKTi, q + β7∆EPSi,q
+ β8PastRET (1year)i,q + εi,q
(2.6)
Where OUTCi,q is each a categorical variable representing each of the out-
comes for insider trading (Only S, Only P, Mix and No IT ) as described in
section 2.2. All the other variables are defined in the Appendix. To estimate
this model we use a multimonial logistic regression as it fits our set-up the
best. We take no insider trading (No IT ) as the reference category and, there-
fore, report three sets of regression coefficients: for purchase, sale and mixed
quarters. They have to be interpreted relatively to a No IT quarter. In all
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specifications, we also include year dummies, but we do not report them to
save space. We compute robust standard errors and allow them to cluster
within firms. In order to determine importance of the individual explanatory
variables for predicting insider trading, we standardize the explanatory vari-
ables by subtracting their mean and scaling by their standard deviation. The
standardization means that the units of the regression coefficients are now the
same and therefore are directly comparable across variables. The results are
reported in Table 2.5.
Insert Table 2.5 about here.
Panel A contains the base model, without including our order imbalance
measures and relative short interest. The results confirms the well established
finding in the literature of insiders contrarian behavior when trading (Sivaku-
mar and Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone,
2005; Jenter, 2005). In particular, more positive past returns and changes in
earnings per share increase the odds of insiders selling and decrease the odds
of insiders buying in a given quarter. Similarly, while insiders are more likely
to sell when the market reaction to earnings announcement is higher, they
are more likely to buy when the market reaction is lower. Also, the book to
market ratio indicates that insiders are more likely to sell (buy) high (low)
valuation stocks, which is in line with Jenter (2005) results. Moreover, insid-
ers sell more often in large firms and buy in small firms which has been also
widely documented in the literature. The last column shows that mix quarters
are common for larger firms and resembles pure sale quarters, however, all the
coefficients are weaker.
In Panel B we add the order imbalance measures and RSI as explanatory
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variables. We see that ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) significantly affects the odds of insider
selling but not buying. As expected an increase in divergence in investors’
opinions, expressed as reduction in ∆OIBvol(−4,+1), significantly increases the
likelihood of insiders selling. Also, ∆OIBvol(−14,−5) doesn’t predict insider
trading activity at all, suggesting that changes in disagreement in the pre-
earnings announcement period doesn’t play any role for insiders’ decision to
trade. The coefficient for RSI is significantly positive for sale quarters and
negative but insignificant for purchases, indicating that short sale constraints
increase the odds of insiders selling but not buying.
Lastly, in Panel C we add institutional ownership (INSOWN ) as a measure
of short sale constraints and the results remain almost unchanged relatively to
Panel B. However, the coefficient for INSOWN is significantly positive for sale
quarters, which contradicts the results for RSI in Panel B and goes against our
predictions.18 In our view, this result strongly indicates that INSOWN is cor-
related with insider sales for reasons other than short sale constraints around
earnings announcements. In fact, INSOWN is significantly and positively cor-
related with firm’s size in our sample. The large drop in the coefficient for
firms’ size in Panel C confirms this.19 Insiders sell in larger firms where insti-
tutional ownership is higher and, therefore, INSOWN may not be such a good
measure of short sale constraints in our setup. Moreover, data for INSOWN
is quarterly and, therefore, it has less variation compared to relative short in-
terest RSI, which constitutes a very relevant drawback to test our hypothesis.
These results along with the evidence in Table 2.3 indicate, in our view, that
18A positive coefficient for INSOWN indicates that insiders are more likely to sell after
earnings news in stocks with high institutional ownership, that is, stocks with lower short
sale constraints.
19The correlation coefficient is around 60% and significant at 1% level for quarters with
insider sales.
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INSOWN is not a good proxy for short sale constraints in the short window
of earnings announcements. Therefore, in the following analysis we center our
attention on RSI.
Importantly, the results in Panel A and B show consistency with our con-
jecture of insiders selling in response high market sentiment during earnings
announcements. That is, insiders are more likely to sell shares on stocks expe-
riencing an increase in divergence in investors’ opinion over the news release
and more binding short sale constraints. As for purchases, neither changes in
order imbalance during and prior the earnings announcements date nor RSI
seem to affect insiders likelihood of buying, suggesting that insiders do not
tend to buy in response to overvaluation.
2.3.2 Future returns
In the previous section we show that indeed insiders sales are associated with
high divergence in investors’ opinions originated in the earnings announce-
ments. Even when this association suggests that insiders are more likely to
sell stocks that become overvalued after the publication of earnings, this ev-
idence doesn’t constitute a definite proof for this prediction by itself. If in-
siders sell overpriced stocks in a given quarter, these firms should earn lower
future returns afterwards. To test this hypothesis we employ the calendar time
portfolios analysis and sort stocks according to the order imbalance measures
conditioning on insider trading.
As in section 2.2.3, we construct portfolios by quintiles of order imbalance
around the earnings announcements, but now we also condition on stocks
where insiders sell or buy in a given quarter. Specifically, the strategies we
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evaluate are the following: (1) go long in stocks with no insider trading in
a given quarter and sell short stocks with only insider sales across different
quintiles of changes in order imbalance during the earnings announcements,
and (2) hold stocks with only insider purchases across different quintiles of
changes in order imbalance during the earnings announcements and sell short
stocks with no insider trading in each quarter. If insiders do trade in overpric-
ing generated by disagreement over the earnings announcements, they should
earn higher abnormal returns in lower order imbalance quintiles when selling
and highest order imbalance quintiles when buying.
Insert Table 2.6 about here.
Table 2.6 reports Jensen’s alphas for these strategies. For the first strat-
egy Jensen’s alphas are higher in lower ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) quintiles for all time
horizons. Also, alphas are consistently the highest for the first quintile, which
marks stocks that exhibit the higher divergence in investors’ opinions and,
therefore, are more prone to be overpriced. The alphas then monotonically
decrease for the remaining quintiles. This result indicates that a simple strat-
egy of buying stocks with no insider trading and shorting stocks with insiders
sales after earnings announcements generate positive abnormal returns, but
especially for stocks that exhibit a higher increase in divergence in investors’
opinions during the earnings announcement. This pattern in returns shows
consistency with our conjecture of insiders selling stocks that have become
overpriced as a result of an increase in divergence in investors’ opinions during
the earnings announcements.
In sharp contrast, a trading strategy based on insider purchases is associ-
ated with positive and significant abnormal returns only for the highest quintile
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of order imbalance and over longer horizons. The significantly positive coef-
ficient for quintile 5 indicates that insiders earn significantly higher returns
buying stocks that exhibit a reduction in disagreement during the earnings
announcements. We consider these stocks as the least likely to be overpriced
and therefore, this result is consistent with our conjecture that insiders are
buying less in response of overpricing. However, the fact that by buying these
stocks insiders are able to earn higher returns may suggests that a subset of
insiders are purchasing in response to undervaluation. In line with this argu-
ment, Kolasinski and Li (2010) show that insiders buy more shares in stocks
that underreact to positive news than in stocks that underreact to negative
news.
2.3.3 Intensity of insider trading.
In this section we explore insider intensity for trading after earnings announce-
ments. We conjecture that insiders trade more shares of their company’s stocks
when investors’ opinions diverge more as a result of the news. We use the av-
erage number of shares traded by insiders (Relsharestr i,q) in a given quarter
as our dependent variable and we scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
We include only quarters with insider sales or purchases because we are inter-
ested in quarters where insiders provide a clear signal with their trades. As a
consequence, our dependent variable in column 1 takes the form of a response
variable which is greater than 0 in quarters with only insider sales and zero
otherwise. The same applies for quarters with only purchases in column 2.
Therefore, we estimate our model as Tobit. The independent variables (Xi,q)
are the same as in equation 2.6 and they are defined in the Appendix. The
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model we test is as follows:
Relsharestr
(OnlyS,OnlyP )
i,q = αi,q + β1∆OIBvol(−4,+1)i,q
+ β2∆OIBvol(−14,−5)i,q + β3SHSCi,q
+ β4Xi,q + εi,q
(2.7)
Table 2.7 reports results. For sale quarters (column (1) of Table 2.7), the
negative coefficient for ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) indicates that insiders tend to sell more
shares in firms that experience a larger increase in divergence in investors’
opinions during the earnings announcements (a reduction in ∆OIBvol(−4,+1)).
Insiders do not only sell more often but also tend to sell more shares when in-
vestors disagree more on the interpretation of the earnings news. For purchase
quarters, in contrast, the coefficient for ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) is positive and weakly
significant. Insiders tend to buy less shares the increase in disagreement dur-
ing earnings announcements is larger, which is consistent with our conjecture
that insiders buy less when their firms are more prone to overpricing. The co-
efficient for RSI is significantly positive in quarters with sales suggesting that
insiders sell more intensively in firms with more binding short sale constraints.
Although the coefficient for RSI is also positive and significant for purchases
quarters, the magnitude is larger for sale quarters.
Insert Table 2.7 about here.
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2.4 Investors’ attention
Miller (1977) argues that overvaluation could also occur because some stocks
attract investors’ attention more than others and, as a result, stock prices
reflect valuations of the more optimistic investors who investigate about the
stocks. One type of public event that usually attracts investors’ attention
is the earnings announcement. Brown et al. (2009) argue that earning sur-
prises usually capture attention from the media making stocks more visible
to individual investors. Higher visibility increases the set of potential buyers
but not necessarily the set of potential sellers, which result in higher stock
prices (Barber and Odean, 2008). In line with this idea, Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2003) show that individual investors are net buyers after positive news and
Hou et al. (2009) find that individual investors’ attention can intensify market
overreaction after earnings announcements.
Accordingly, we conjecture that insiders are more (less) likely to sell (buy)
in quarters with an increase in investors’ attention during earnings announce-
ments. We measure investors’ attention in two ways. First, trading volume
is likely to be higher than usual when news reaches investors (Barber and
Odean, 2008), so we take changes in daily turnover during the earnings an-
nouncements as the first measure of investors’ attention (∆TO). We take the
average number of shares traded two days around the earnings announcements
(0,+1) scaled by the number of shares outstanding and adjust it relatively to
the period prior to the earnings announcement (from days -30 to -5).
For the second measure of investors’ attention we follow Brown et al. (2009)
who argue that positive earnings surprises get a considerable amount of atten-
tion from the media making stocks more visible for individual investors. As a
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result, firms that beat analysts’ forecasts represent attractive buying opportu-
nities for individual investors who are more likely to purchase them. We define
Beat firms as a binary variable equal to 1 if the reported earnings per share
for the current quarter is greater than the consensus analysts’ forecasts and
0 otherwise. The consensus in analysts’ forecasts is measured as the median
earnings per share predicted by analysts in the period prior to the earnings
announcements. Consequently, we test the following model:
OUTCi,q = αi,q + β1EA0abnormalreti,q
+ β4ATTi,q + β7SIZEi, q + β7BtoMKTi, q
+ β9PastRET (1year)i,q + εi,q
(2.8)
Where i identifies a firm and q a quarter. The framework is the same
as in Section 2.3.1 where we analyze factors that predict insider trading, but
here we add the attention measures as the main explanatory variable instead of
order imbalance. As before OUTCi,q is a categorical variable representing the 4
possible outcome quarters: (i) no insider trading (No IT), (ii) only insider sales
(Only S), (iii) only insider purchases (Only P) and (iii) both insider purchases
and sale (Mix). The remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. As in the
previous section we estimate this model using multinomial logistic regression
and take no insider trading (No IT) as the reference category. The results are
reported in Table 2.8.
Insert Table 2.8 about here.
in line with our predictions, insiders are more likely to sell when investors’
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attention is high. In particular, Panel A shows the specification including
changes in daily turnover (∆TO) as the measure of attention. The positive and
significant coefficient for ∆TO indicates that an increase in turnover during
the earnings announcements rises the odds of insiders selling in the current
quarter. The results in in Panel B are similar to Panel A when we include firms’
beating analysts’ forecasts (Beat). More specifically, insiders are more likely
to sell on quarters when their firms beat the analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore,
for purchases quarters in column 2 the coefficient for ∆TO is insignificant
and the coefficient for Beat is significantly negative suggesting that insiders
are less likely to buy when their firms become overpriced during earnings
announcements.
2.5 Could insiders be selling on foreknowledge?
A stream of the literature argues that insiders trade on foreknowledge in an-
ticipation of events that revert firms’ future performance (Ke et al., 2003;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Cheng et al., 2007). We believe this is unlikely
in our setup as we show that a large fraction of insider sales occurs during
the first month after earnings announcements, and so it’s hard to justify that
their trades are based on information other than the news. However, one could
argue that insiders in possession of a negative future information could delay
their sales to moments when they rise less suspicion about trading on material
information, such as after the earnings announcements. Also, our calendar
portfolio analysis in Section 2.3 shows that stocks with insider sales exhibit
significantly lower future returns, and this returns are long lasting even af-
ter 12 months. The fact that stock prices continue adjusting downwards may
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also suggests trading on foreknowledge. Therefore, in the current section we
provide an additional test to contrast this view.
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) argue that insider trading on foreknowledge
is consistent with trading on future fundamental information that could affect
prices. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) take changes in firm’s returns on assets
(ROA) as a measure of future fundamental information. We expect that if
insider sales after earnings announcements are driven by foreknowledge, then
there should be a negative association between quarters with only insider sales
and future fundamental information. We take future return on assets (ROA)
and future earnings per share (EPS), and we regress them on our categorical
variable that indicates firm-quarter with insider sales only. More specifically,
we take the cumulative return on assets (PostROA) and earnings per share
(PostEPS) from the next quarter (q+1) until (q+4) as dependent variables.
Additionally, we use changes on return on assets (∆ROAq+1/q) and earnings
per share (∆EPSq+1/q) of the next quarter (q+1) relative to the current quarter
(q). We control for our divergence in investors’ opinions measure. The results
are in Table 2.9
Insert Table 2.9 about here.
We do not find evidence that insider sales are based on foreknowledge of
future (one year ahead) cash flows. The positive and significant coefficient for
Only S in columns (1) and (2) suggests that firms with insider sales in a given
quarter have significantly higher ROA and EPS in the following 4 quarters rel-
ative to firms with purchases, mix or no insider trading. Similarly, in columns
(3) and (4) firms with insider sales in a given quarter have significantly higher
ROA and EPS in the next quarter.
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The negative and significant coefficient for ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) in column (1)
indicates that firms with a large increase in divergence in investors’ opinions
during earnings announcements exhibit higher ROA in the following 4 quar-
ters. Also, the negative coefficient for the interaction term shows that the
association between ∆OIBvol(−4,+1) and ROA is stronger in quarters with
insider sales. Thus, stocks more prone to be overpriced during earnings an-
nouncements and stocks with insider sales are not necessarily less profitable
afterwards, but still show lower future abnormal returns according to our re-
sults in Table 2.6. These results support our argument that insiders take
advantage of market sentiment during earnings announcements. This is be-
cause prices adjust downwards for these firms even when future fundamental
financial information is positive.
2.6 Conclusions
Insiders sales are generally less associated to foreknowledge of future material
information than insider purchases. This is because insiders could sell for a
variety of reasons, such as liquidity or diversification. One stream of the liter-
ature, however, highlights the contrarian nature of insider trading and argues
that insiders time very well their transactions and trade against current in-
vestor sentiment by recognizing when their stocks are mispriced by the market
(Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roul-
stone, 2005; Jenter, 2005). This means that insiders do not use much valid
inside information when trading but the information that is already incorpo-
rated into stock prices.
The current chapter provides new evidence that insider sell against in-
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vestors’ sentiment by studying insider selling strategies during earnings an-
nouncements. We show that insiders sell more frequently and intensively on
stocks that become more overpriced as a result of high market sentiment orig-
inated at the earnings announcements. In line with Miller (1977) model, we
show that insiders sales are associated with an increase in divergence in in-
vestors’ opinions and more binding short sale constraints. As a result of the
overpricing, insider sales show predictability of future returns.
Our evidence has 3 parts. First, in an multinomial logistic regression pre-
dicting the odds of insider buying and selling we show that insiders are more
likely to sell after earnings announcements that are associated with an in-
crease in divergence in investors’ opinions upon the news release. Additionally,
the likelihood of insiders selling is higher for stocks with binding short sales
constraints. Second, we show that the Jensen’s alphas of trading strategies
based on insider trading and divergence in investors’ opinions are statistically
and economically meaningful. Insider selling on mispricing after earnings an-
nouncements predicts future returns. Finally, insiders also sell more shares of
their company’s stocks to trade in situations where stocks become mispriced
during the earnings announcements.
Overall, our results suggest that some profitable insider selling is motivated
by public information (Kolasinski and Li, 2010; Alldredge and Cicero, 2015).
Insiders can better interpret the information released in public news announce-
ments and take advantage of situations when market misinterpret the news.
By trading after the information is made public insiders not only trade prof-
itable, but at the same time avoid legal jeopardy.
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2.7 Appendix
Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
ATT Investors’ attention over the earnings announce-
ment. We measure investors’ attention in two
ways: (a) changes in daily turnover at the earn-
ings announcements date (∆TO(0,+1)). (b) A bi-
nary variable equal to 1 if the reported EPS in
First Call for a given quarter is greater than the
consensus analyst forecast the earnings announce-
ment; and 0 otherwise. Daily turnover is com-
puted as the average number of shares traded in
the two days around the earnings announcements
(0,+1) scaled by the number of shares outstand-
ing. Then, we determine changes in daily turnover
relatively to the period prior to the earnings an-
nouncement (from trading day -30 to -5). The
consensus analyst forecast is measured as the me-
dian of the EPS predicted by analyst forecast in
the period before to the earnings announcements.
CRSP and
I/B/E/S.
BtoMKT Book value of equity corresponding to the previ-
ous quarter over the market cap 2 days before the
earnings announcement.
COMPUSTAT
DISP Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Corresponds to
the standard deviation of quarterly earnings per
share (EPS) forecasts for the current earnings an-
nouncements that are issued in the period be-
tween the last earnings announcements and two
days prior to the current earnings announcement
date, divided by the absolute value of the median
analyst forecast.
I/B/E/S
EA0(1) abnormal ret. Buy and Hold abnormal stock return over 3 days
(−1,+1) around the earnings announcement date
at EA0 or EA1 (See Figure 2.1). The abnormal
returns are estimated as the difference between
the observed return and the returns of a bench-
mark at that date. The 4 factors model is used as
a benchmark which take into account the market
risk along with size and book to market risk fac-
tors (Fama and French, 1992), and also includes
momentum as risk factor (Cahart, 1997).
CRSP,
French’s
web site
Future abnormal re-
turns
Buy and Hold abnormal stock returns beginning
1 day after EA1 adjusted for the 4 factor model
which is used as the benchmark. Abnormal re-
turns are computed over the horizons of 1, 3, 6
and 12 months, which corresponds to 22, 64, 128
and 265 working days.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
INSOWN Institutional ownership. It’s measured as the frac-
tion of the company’s shares held by institutional
investors prior to the earnings announcement, as
reported in FactSet Ownership database. We set
INSOWN to zero if no ownership data are avail-
able for a firm-quarter during the 180 days prior
to the earnings announcement. We set INSOWN
to missing if it is greater than ore qual to one.
FactSet
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) Average changes in daily market adjusted order
imbalance over 5 days around the earnings an-
nouncements (−4,+1) relative to a non-event pe-
riod (trading days -43 to -15). Order imbalance
is the absolute difference between the the vol-
ume of buyer initiated trades versus seller ini-
tiated trades made over one trading day scaled
by the total number of trades that trading day:
OIBvol = |Bvol − Svol|/(Bvol + Svol). Intu-
itively, the lower the order imbalance the higher
the divergence in investors’ opinions. Daily order
imbalance is adjusted for a market-wide order im-
balance defined as the equally weighted average
order imbalance for all firms in our sample. We
apply Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify
trades and quotes as buyer and seller initiated.
TAQ data
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) Average changes in daily order imbalance in the
period pre-earnings announcement relative to the
period prior the publication of earnings (trading
days -43 to -15). Order imbalance is the abso-
lute difference between the the volume of buyer
initiated trades versus seller initiated trades made
over one trading day scaled by the total number
of trades that trading day: OIBvol = |Bvol −
Svol|/(Bvol + Svol). Intuitively, the lower the
order imbalance the higher the divergence in in-
vestors’ opinions. Daily order imbalance is ad-
justed for a market-wide order imbalance defined
as the equally weighted average order imbalance
for all firms in our sample. We apply Lee and
Ready (1991) algorithm to classify trades and
quotes as buyer and seller initiated.
TAQ data
OUTC Categorical variable that equals 0 for quarters
without any insider trading (No IT), 1 for all quar-
ters with insider sales only (Only S), 2 for all quar-
ters with only insider purchases (Only P) and 3 for
mixed quarters (Mix).
Thomsom Fi-
nancial
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
PastRET(1 year) Raw stock return over 1 year ending 2 days before
the last earnings announcement date adjusted for
1-year returns over the same period on the corre-
sponding to the value weighted portfolio as down-
loaded from CRSP database.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
RSI Stands for relative short interest ratio. Short ratio
is the fraction of shares held short in the month
of the earnings announcements (short interest)
scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
CRSP
SIZE The logarithm of the Market capitalization. The
market cap is the stock price times the number
of shares outstanding 2 days before the earnings
announcement date.
COMPUSTAT
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Table 2.1: Distribution of insider transactions in our sample per quarter type.
This table displays the number of insider transactions corresponding to the most recent earnings announcement relative to a given quarter. A quarter is marked
as only insider sales (Only S) if all insider trades are sales for a given quarter, only insider purchases (Only P) in case all insider trades are purchases, and
(Mix) if insiders both purchase and sell during the quarter. The figures are categorized according to the number of working days that pass between the earnings
announcements and the occurrence of a insider transaction, 5-,10- days, 1-, 2-, and 3-months. The # of insider transactions are cumulated over the days after the
earnings announcements when they occurred.
Only S Only P Mix Total
Days after EA0 # of trans. % % acum. # of trans. % % acum. # of trans. % % acum. # of trans.
0 to 5 days 49,622 17.00% 17.00% 14,808 19.70% 19.70% 18,334 16.09% 16.09% 82,764
6 to 10 days 42,046 14.41% 31.41% 12,187 16.21% 35.90% 16,676 14.64% 30.73% 70,909
2 weeks to 1 month 78,917 27.04% 58.45% 21,014 27.95% 63.85% 31,311 27.49% 58.22% 131,242
2nd month 85,637 29.34% 87.80% 19,151 25.47% 89.33% 32,734 28.74% 86.96% 137,522
3th month 35,617 12.20% 100.00% 8,026 10.67% 100.00% 14,857 13.04% 100.00% 57,521
Total 291,838 75,187 113,911 479,957
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics.
This table reports average characteristics for the firms in our sample categorized by quarter type. Panel
A shows number of quarters, number of transactions and number of shares traded by insiders scaled by
the number of shares outstanding. Panel B and C reports means for the main variables used throughout
the chapter. All variables are defined in the Appendix. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five-
and ten-percent levels.
All quarters Only S Only P Mix No IT
Panel A: Insider trading characteristics
# of quarters 170,296 56,816 22,828 16,869 73,783
# of transactions 479,957 290,859 75,187 113,911 -
relative shares traded 0.61% 0.60% 0.45% 0.86% 0.00%
Panel B: Firm characteristics
DISP 0.239 0.191 0.305 0.210 0.294
OIBvol(−14,−5) 22.92% 16.68% 29.26% 21.57% 26.41%
OIBvol(−4,+1) 21.81% 15.68% 28.09% 20.59% 25.20%
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) 0.19% -0.38% 0.72% -0.13% 0.56%
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) -0.80% -1.22% -0.37% -0.99% -0.53%
INSOWN 51.28% 66.34% 42.84% 55.41% 40.90%
RSI 5.09% 6.30% 4.41% 5.55% 4.23%
Size 2,656 4,193 1,274 3,806 1,635
BtoMKT 0.648 0.502 0.808 0.597 0.732
∆EPS -0.27% 0.18% -0.99% -0.12% -0.44%
Panel C: Returns
Past abnormal ret. (1 year) 6.99%a 17.22%a -6.29%a 9.73%a 2.60%a
EA0 abnormal ret. -0.02% 1.11%
a -1.46%a -0.11%c -0.44%a
EA1 abnormal ret. -0.03% -0.02% 0.14%
b 0.12%c -0.13%a
Future abnormal returns 1m -0.57%a -1.1%a 0.55%a -0.29%a -0.57%a
2m -0.78%a -1.96%a 0.91%a -0.71%a -0.41%a
3m -1.31%a -2.96%a 0.86%a -1.56%a -0.64%a
6m -2.95%a -6.09%a 0.88%b -3.43%a -1.59%a
12m -7.75%a -13.34%a -0.76%c -8.37%a -5.43%a
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Table 2.3: Panel regressions testing Miller (1977) model over the earnings an-
nouncements.
This table reports the association between divergence in investors’ opinion, our proxies for short sale
constraints and earnings announcements abnormal returns. The dependent variable is the abnormal
return in the three days around the earnings announcements (EA0 abnormal ret.). We control for the
effect of firms’ size (SIZE), book to market ratio (BtoMKT), earning surprises (∆EPS) and past year
returns (PastRET(1 year)) which are all defined in the Appendix. We estimate the model using pooled
OLS and OLS controlling by firm and time fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parenthesis.
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent
levels.
Variables Pred. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DISP (-) -0.017a -0.015a -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) (+) 0.068
a 0.069a 0.044a 0.044a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) (-) -0.046
a -0.043a -0.053a -0.050a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
INSOWN (+) 0.041a 0.038a -0.035b -0.024c
(0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013)
RSI (-) -0.013a -0.014a -0.019a -0.019a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
SIZE -0.009b 0.005 -0.002 0.030a -0.503a -0.532a -0.445a -0.414a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020)
BtoMKT 0.006 0.002 0.020a 0.016a -0.053a -0.058a -0.029a -0.031a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
EPSch 0.030a 0.028a 0.033a 0.029a 0.028a 0.026a 0.033a 0.028a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Past RET (1 year) -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.011b -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.011 0.009 0.028a 0.003 0.165a 0.165a -0.012 -0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
# Observations 82,527 87,684 117,856 130,342 82,527 87,684 117,856 130,342
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.014
Firm FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
Year FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
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Table 2.4: Calendar time portfolio analysis with order imbalance.
This table reports the intercepts (alphas) for trading strategies of zero-cost portfolios that hold stocks at
the top quintile and sell short stocks at the bottom quintile of changes in order imbalance (∆OIBvol).
The portfolios are formed based on changes in order imbalance at 2 different time windows during the
earnings announcements (-4,+1) and (0,+1). The alphas correspond to the abnormal return of a rolling
strategy that goes long in the top quintile of ∆OIBvol (stocks less prone to be overpriced) and goes
short in the bottom quintile of ∆OIBvol (stocks more prone to overpriced). To form the portfolios,
each quarter we assign stocks into five portfolios according to ∆OIBvol quintiles and hold them in the
portfolios for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months after EA1. We calculate the portfolio return in a given month as the
equally-weighted average of returns of all stocks in the portfolio. We include all available stocks with
stock price greater than $5 at the time of portfolio formation. Monthly returns are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the
one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Four-factor alphas
L/S strategies [quintile 5 - quintile 1] 1m 3m 6m 12m
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) 0.011
a 0.011a 0.011a 0.010a
(6.874) (8.009) (8.644) (8.921)
∆OIBvol(0,+1) 0.002 0.004
a 0.006a 0.006a
(1.360) (3.783) (5.533) (6.503)
93
Table 2.5: Analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of insider trading.
This table reports estimation results for a multinomial logistic model. The dependent variable is a
categorical variable that equals 0 for quarters without any insider trading (No IT), 1 for all quarters with
insider sales only (Only S), 2 for all quarters with only insider purchases (Only P) and 3 for mix quarters
(MIX). No IT quarters is the reference category and so this table reports 3 sets of estimated coefficients:
for sale, purchase and mix quarters. The coefficients should be interpreted relatively to the reference
category (No IT). We normalize the explanatory variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation. We report Hubert/White robust standard errors and allow them to cluster within
firms. All variables are defined in the and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Year dummies
are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and
ten-percent levels.
Only S Only P Mix
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel A
EA0 abnormal ret. 0.257
a (0.007) -0.119a (0.008) 0.061a (0.010)
∆EPS 0.031a (0.007) -0.019b (0.008) 0.032a (0.009)
BtoMKT -0.332a (0.021) 0.055a (0.016) -0.096a (0.022)
PastRET(1 year) 0.152a (0.009) -0.138a (0.013) 0.069a (0.013)
SIZE 0.732a (0.021) -0.133a (0.023) 0.515a (0.026)
Constant -0.055c (0.029) -1.447a (0.041) -1.221a (0.040)
# Observations 153,306
χ2 6294
PseudoR2 0.0762
Panel B
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) -0.036
a (0.009) -0.002 (0.010) -0.008 (0.012)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) 0.003 (0.009) -0.008 (0.010) 0.011 (0.013)
RSI 0.087a (0.020) 0.031 (0.021) 0.045b (0.023)
EA0 abnormal ret. 0.267
a (0.008) -0.127a (0.009) 0.064a (0.010)
∆EPS 0.033a (0.008) -0.023a (0.009) 0.029a (0.010)
BtoMKT -0.346a (0.023) 0.057a (0.017) -0.087a (0.024)
PastRET(1 year) 0.160a (0.010) -0.135a (0.015) 0.080a (0.014)
SIZE 0.710a (0.023) -0.149a (0.025) 0.500a (0.029)
Constant -0.048 (0.037) -1.368a (0.053) -1.186a (0.050)
# Observations 130,344
χ2 5798
PseudoR2 0.0773
continued on next page
94
continued from previous page
Only S Only P Mix
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel C
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) -0.044
a (0.010) -0.004 (0.010) -0.010 (0.012)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) 0.000 (0.010) -0.003 (0.011) 0.015 (0.014)
INSOWN 0.598a (0.026) 0.016 (0.032) 0.175a (0.033)
EA0 abnormal ret. 0.263
a (0.008) -0.127a (0.009) 0.064a (0.011)
∆EPS 0.031a (0.008) -0.022b (0.010) 0.024b (0.011)
BtoMKT -0.327a (0.022) 0.040b (0.018) -0.103a (0.024)
PastRET(1 year) 0.196a (0.011) -0.146a (0.015) 0.092a (0.015)
SIZE 0.396a (0.028) -0.145a (0.033) 0.382a (0.034)
Constant 0.120a (0.035) -1.316a (0.048) -1.051a (0.046)
# Observations 117,857
χ2 6332
PseudoR2 0.0902
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Table 2.6: Post-insider trading return analysis.
This table reports the intercepts (alphas) for trading strategies of zero-cost portfolios built on quintiles of changes in order imbalance (∆OIBvol) and conditional on
whether insiders sell or buy in a given quarter. In particular, the alphas evaluate the following strategy: (1) hold stocks with no insider trading in a given quarter
and sells short stocks with only insider sales at different levels of changes in order imbalance, and (2) hold stocks with only insider purchases at different levels of
changes in order imbalance and sell short stocks with no insider trading in each quarter. To form the portfolios, each quarter we assign stocks into five portfolios
according to ∆OIBvol and conditioning on insider trading, and hold them in the portfolios for 1, 3, 6 or 12 months after EA1. We calculate the portfolio return in
a given month as the equally-weighted average of returns of all stocks in the portfolio. We include all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at the time
of portfolio formation. Monthly returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance
at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Strategies No IT(all qrtrs) - Only S (per OIBvol quintile) Only P (per OIBvol quintile) - No IT(all qrtrs)
Portfolios based on Horizon Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
∆OIBvol(−4,+1)
1m 0.008a 0.008a 0.006a 0.006a 0.004c 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.004
(3.476) (4.210) (3.543) (3.229) (1.890) (1.046) (0.626) (1.410) (-0.074) (1.441)
3m 0.008a 0.007a 0.004a 0.004b 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005b 0.003 0.006b
(4.479) (4.570) (3.179) (2.498) (0.732) (1.236) (0.198) (2.394) (1.453) (2.494)
6m 0.007a 0.006a 0.005a 0.003c -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.008a
(4.670) (4.339) (3.632) (1.910) (-0.270) (0.196) (0.111) (1.432) (1.396) (3.731)
12m 0.007a 0.006a 0.004a 0.002c -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003c 0.007a
(4.472) (3.943) (3.436) (1.731) (-0.665) (0.476) (-0.998) (0.281) (1.720) (3.732)
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Table 2.7: Analysis of factors associated with insiders’ intensity for trading.
This table reports the association between our main explanatory variables and insiders’ intensity after
earnings announcements. The dependent variable in column 1 isRelsharestr(Saleqrtr), which is the relative
number of shares sold by insiders in quarters with only insider sales and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in column 2 is Relsharestr(Purchaseqrtr), which is the relative number of shares bought by insiders
in quarters with only insider purchases and zero otherwise. As both dependent variables take the form
of a response variable, we estimate the specifications using Tobit regressions. We report robust standard
errors in parenthesis. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized by
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-,
five- and ten-percent levels.
Relsharestr
(1) (2)
Variables Sale qrtr Purchase qrtr
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) -0.304
a 0.091c
(0.078) (0.049)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) 0.130 0.006
(0.084) (0.053)
RSI 0.520a 0.282a
(0.059) (0.051)
EA0 abnormal ret. 3.085
a -1.329a
(0.071) (0.051)
∆EPS 0.011a -0.007a
(0.002) (0.002)
BtoMKT -0.559a 0.114a
(0.014) (0.008)
Past RET (1 year) 0.443a -0.192a
(0.010) (0.009)
SIZE 0.156a -0.134a
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -1.673a -0.425a
(0.026) (0.018)
# Observations 130,344 130,344
Log Likelihood -126,558 -51,720
χ2 11,212 5,995
PseudoR2 0.0424 0.0548
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Table 2.8: Analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of insider trading: in-
vestor’s attention.
This table reports estimation results for a multinomial logistic model including investors’ attention as an
additional factor. Investors’ attention is measured as changes in daily turnover (∆TO) in Panel A and as
firms beating the analysts’ forecast in the current quarter in Panel B. Beat is dummy variable indicating
firms beating the analysts’ forecast in the current quarter. The dependent variable is a categorical variable
that equals 0 for quarters without any insider trading (No IT ), 1 for all quarters with insider sales only
(Only S), 2 for all quarters with only insider purchases (Only P) and 3 for mixed quarters (Mix). No IT
quarters is the reference category and so we have 3 sets of estimated coefficients but we only report the
ones we are more interested: purchase and sale quarters. The coefficients should be interpreted relatively
to the reference category of No IT quarters. All variables are defined in Appendix. We winsorize the
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardize them by subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation. We report Hubert/White robust standard errors and allow them to cluster
within firms. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels. Standard errors in
the parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3)
Only S Only P Mix
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Panel A
∆TO(0,+1) 0.063
a (0.010) -0.017 (0.011) -0.011 (0.014)
RSI 0.078a (0.020) 0.036c (0.021) 0.046b (0.023)
EA0 abnormal ret 0.264
a (0.007) -0.131a (0.009) 0.063a (0.011)
∆EPS 0.033a (0.008) -0.024a (0.009) 0.029a (0.010)
BtoMKT -0.342a (0.023) 0.057a (0.017) -0.088a (0.024)
PastRET(1 year) 0.153a (0.010) -0.132a (0.015) 0.081a (0.014)
SIZE 0.712a (0.023) -0.147a (0.025) 0.499a (0.029)
Constant -0.032 (0.037) -1.371a (0.053) -1.190a (0.049)
Observations 130,359
χ2 5885
PseudoR2 0.0776
Panel B
Beat 0.300a (0.021) -0.153a (0.026) 0.058b (0.027)
RSI 0.045a (0.016) 0.011 (0.019) 0.015 (0.021)
EA0 abnormal ret 0.236
a (0.009) -0.152a (0.012) 0.053a (0.012)
∆EPS 0.024a (0.009) -0.018 (0.011) 0.028b (0.012)
BtoMKT -0.377a (0.026) 0.084a (0.020) -0.095a (0.029)
PastRET(1 year) 0.182a (0.013) -0.135a (0.020) 0.106a (0.017)
SIZE 0.623a (0.025) -0.177a (0.031) 0.463a (0.035)
Constant -0.035 (0.045) -1.165a (0.067) -1.059a (0.060)
Observations 97,662
χ2 5194
PseudoR2 0.0706
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Table 2.9: Panel regressions on future fundamental information (return on assets
and earnings per share).
This table reports fixed effects panel regressions of measures of future firm performance on insiders sales
and divergence in investors’ opinions. The dependent variables PostROA and PostEPS are the cumulative
return on assets and earnings per share from the next quarter (q+1) until (q+4). Similarly, ∆ROA and
∆EPS are changes on return on assets, earnings per share and earnings announcements abnormal returns
of the next quarter (q+1) relative to the current quarter (q). Only S is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a
firm-quarter with insider sales only. The remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. All variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at
the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables PostROA PostEPS ∆ROAq+1/q ∆EPSq+1/q
Only S 0.084a 0.141a 0.023a 0.029a
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
∆OIBvol(−4,+1) -0.018
a -0.004 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
∆OIBvol(−4,+1)×Only S -0.008
b 0.004 0.010c -0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
∆OIBvol(−14,−5) -0.015
a -0.004c -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.020b -0.046a 0.009 0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 143,082 136,949 149,430 148,930
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
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Figure 2.1: Timings of earnings announcements and related abnormal returns.
The figure shows the exact timings of earnings announcements and related abnormal returns relatively
to the current quarter with insider transactions. The current quarter is defined as the period between
2 earnings announcements. Earnings announcement abnormal returns are always computed over 3 days
around the earnings announcement date. 1, 3, 6 and 12-month returns start (end) 2 days after (before)
the earnings announcement.
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Chapter 3
Insiders versus short sellers:
informed traders’ competition
around earnings announcements
Corporate insiders and short sellers are both considered to be informed traders
in the literature. There is extensive evidence that both possess superior infor-
mation as their trades are profitable.1 However, little bearing exists on how
the 2 informed traders interact in the financial markets and the implications of
their interaction concerning information dissemination. The theoretical liter-
ature shows that when two or more informed investors compete for trading on
the same information, this information is incorporated into stock prices faster.
This is because informed traders then trade more aggressively to pre-empt the
other traders from extracting their profits (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992;
1See for example Seyhun (1998) and Jeng et al. (2003) for a detailed review of the early
evidence on the side of insiders, and Cohen et al. (2007) and Korczak et al. (2010) for a
more recent one. For the side of short sellers see Diether et al. (2009) or Engelberg et al.
(2012)
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Shin, 1996; Back et al., 2000). Without competition, informed investors are
motivated to trade slowly and in small quantities in order not to affect prices
and maximize their profits (Kyle, 1985). In line with these arguments, Massa
et al. (2015) show that facing short sellers’ potential trading, insiders tend to
accelerate their trading activities in order to pre-empt short sellers.
The primary aim of this chapter is to study the interaction between in-
siders and short sellers in the context of earnings announcements and to test
whether their trading activities are affected by competition or not. We focus
on the period around earnings announcements following recent stringent ev-
idence that both insiders and short sellers are skillful information processors
who can better interpret publicly available information (Kolasinski and Li,
2010; Engelberg et al., 2012; Alldredge and Cicero, 2015). Broadly speaking,
this literature shows that a significant portion of insiders and short sellers
superior trading advantage arises from trading on news events, such as earn-
ings announcements. Earnings announcements are regular and frequent events
that capture high attention from the media and allow investors to make their
own interpretations about firms’ value and, therefore, to generate their own
private information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Kandel and Pearson, 1995;
Brown et al., 2009; Engelberg et al., 2012). The interaction between the 2
types of informed traders concerning a new public signal conveyed in earnings
announcements provides a unique setup to study the nature of the competition
and its consequences for stock price efficiency.
The main research question of this chapter then is whether insiders and
short sellers compete for trading on superior information processing of pub-
licly available information. On a sample of U.S. firms from July 2006 until
December 2013, we show that in line with the superior information process-
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ing hypothesis, both insiders and short sellers trades are concentrated right
after rather than before earnings announcements. Furthermore, both types
of informed traders trade intensively in the same stocks suggesting that they
are competing for trading on their superior information processing. In fact,
once insiders decide to sell after earnings news, they trade together with short
sellers in about 83% of firm-quarters with insider sales in our sample. As a
result of the competition, prices adjust faster in stocks in which they trade
together relatively to stocks in which they trade alone.
Our analysis has four parts. First, we explore insiders’ and short sellers’
trading patterns around earnings announcements. We show that insiders and
short sellers sell intensively 5 days after the earnings news. In fact, the av-
erage shares sold by insiders is around 45% higher in the first 5 days after
the announcement date relative to the average shares sold in the subsequent
20 days. Likewise, the average short sales is about 12% higher at the same
period. Interestingly, short sellers seem to anticipate insiders’ information pro-
cessing. While short sellers’ peak of trading is concentrated at the earnings
announcement date, insiders’ sales peak at the 3rd day after the news release.
The peak in insider sales at day +3, however, is consistent with blackout peri-
ods during which insiders are not allowed to trade (Bettis et al., 2000; Cohen
et al., 2012). Although we are not able to directly test for the presence of these
blackout windows, our results strongly suggest that the blackout periods are
the primary reason for insider trading delays after earnings announcements.
Second, we test whether insiders’ and short sellers’ intensive trading after
the earnings news is consistent with competition for trading on the same public
signal. Massa et al. (2015) show that higher past short selling potential is
positively associated with higher frequency and intensity of insider sales in a
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given month, implying that the 2 types of informed traders compete for trading
on the same private information. In line with Massa et al. (2015), we show
that higher short selling potential before earnings announcements increases
significantly the odds of insiders’ and short sellers’ trading intensively in the
same stocks after the earnings announcement date. Moreover, short selling
potential decreases the likelihood of insiders selling intensively while short
sellers trade with low intensity. This suggests that insiders are less likely to
compete when they do not perceive short sellers’ threat.
Third, we explore stock return predictability. We show that both insider
sales and short sales after earnings announcements are associated with lower
future returns, and this is irrespective of whether insiders and short sellers
trade in the same stocks or not. However, in line with the 2 types of in-
formed traders competing with each other, stock returns are more negative
faster in stocks with intensive trading by both types together relative to cases
in which one type trade intensively and the other doesn’t. Also, returns are
lower faster in stocks with intensive trading by both insider and short sell-
ers regardless of the direction of the earnings news, but price adjustment is
concentrated in stocks with positive and negative news. This suggests further
that both informed traders seem to be trading in stocks in which the market
has overreacted to positive news and underreacted to negative news.
Finally, we check whether instead of competition, the large stock price cor-
rection we observe for firms in which insiders and short sellers trade inten-
sively together is concentrated in stocks that exhibit larger mispricing during
the earnings news. Insiders and short sellers could be selling stocks for which
the market felt too enthusiastic about and, as a result, these stocks experience
high buying pressure that pushes prices up causing large overpricing. Hence,
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we test whether low post earnings returns in firms with intensive trading by
both insider and short sellers are concentrated in stocks that exhibit higher
buying pressure right after the news. We find that irrespective of the level of
buying pressure, stocks with high intensity of both types of informed traders
together show lower future abnormal returns. Further, we also run the same
test using dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as an alternative measure that cap-
tures different levels of overpricing.2 In line with our findings, even for different
levels of dispersion in analysts’ forecats, price adjustment is faster in stocks in
which insiders and short sellers compete for trading.
Our results are important as we document that part of the trading ad-
vantage of insiders and short sellers comes due to their superior information
processing skills. We show that both types of informed traders use their skills
to process public news better and trade profitably. This is line with recent
evidence studying short sales or insider trades separetely.3 We extend this
literature by showing that very frequently both types of informed investors
compete for trading on the same information. More importantly, as a result
of the competition both traders tend to accelerate their trading decisions and
trade faster making stock prices more efficient.
We are not the first analyzing the trading decisions of insiders and short
sellers together, but we are the first to do so in the context of public news
announcements. Massa et al. (2015) are the closest to our analysis, but they
focus on trading decisions by insiders who possess material information that
2Miller (1977) shows that stocks are more overpriced when investors’ opinions about
firm’s value diverge more, provided that short sales constraints are biding. In line with
Miller (1977), Diether et al. (2002) use dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a measure of
investors’ disagreement and show that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts
earn lower future returns.
3See Engelberg et al. (2012) for the side of short sellers, and Kolasinski and Li (2010)
and Alldredge and Cicero (2015) for the side of insiders.
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is not yet disclosed to the market. In a theoretical and empirical analysis,
they show that facing higher short selling potential, insiders trade more shares
(as a fraction of their stakes) and more frequently. However, even when short
selling potential may reasonable indicates that short sellers are more likely to
trade afterwards, it does not represent a direct proof that indeed this is the
case. We go one step further in our empirical analysis and show more directly
that insiders and short sellers trade very frequently and intensively when short
selling potential is high.
Moreover, Massa et al. (2015) model assumes that insiders and short sell-
ers always possess the same private information. As a result, competition is
triggered simply by the presence of short sellers (or higher likelihood of their
presence) that fully threatenes insiders’ profitable trades.4 Thus, Massa et al.
(2015) fail to take into account situations where insiders’ and short sellers’ pos-
sess different signals (or uncorrelated signals), as in Back et al. (2000) model.
Our setup allows us to perform more detailed analysis of the interaction be-
tween a public signal and insiders’ and short sellers’ trading decisions. We are
able to show that, in line with Back et al. (2000), when insiders and short sell-
ers disagree on their information processing, stocks prices adjust slower than
in cases where they share the same information.
Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2013) study short selling activity surrounding in-
sider trades to explore the source of short sellers trading advantage. They find
that short selling done by non market makers increases by 26% on insider sell-
ing days. Also, the increase in short selling occurs on the days when insiders
trade and not when their trades are announced suggesting that short sellers
could be trading on private information. Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2013)
4Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) make the same assumption.
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show that short sellers’ trading in anticipation of insider sales is consistent
with both trading on private information and their ability to better analyze
publicly available information. Our main objective is different as we seek to
determine whether the 2 types of informed traders have better skills analyz-
ing public news (or better information processing) and whether their trading
decisions are affected by competition. However, in line with their results we
show that short sellers seem to anticipate insiders when trading after earning
announcements, but we attribute this pattern to blackout periods that some
firms establish to their insiders. More importantly, we are able to extend
their findings by showing that not only short sellers but also insiders trade on
superior information processing.
We contribute to the insider trading literature in two important ways. First,
we contribute to the discussion on whether insider trades are motivated by fore-
knowledge of future material information (Ke et al., 2003; Cheng et al., 2007)
or by their ability to recognize when their stocks are mispriced (Piotroski and
Roulstone, 2005; Jenter, 2005). Our results are difficult to reconcile with the
first view. This is due to our setup is designed to analyze trading decisions of
both informed traders around earnings announcements. We show that both
insiders’ and short sellers’ trades are concentrated on the news days or later
and, therefore, their trades are more likey to be associated with information
obtained due to their superior information processing skills rather than fore-
knowledge of future material information. Also, the fact that insiders trade
together with short sellers provides a strong argument that insider trades are
associated to the earnings news, as short sellers usually follow short-term trad-
ing strategies.5
5Diether et al. (2009) argue that short sellers cover their positions very rapidly. Diether
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Second, the empirical literature finds little evidence that insider sales are
profitable (Jeng et al., 2003; Jenter, 2005). The main argument for these
findings is that insiders could trade for reasons other than foreknowledge of
material information, such as liquidity or diversification (Lakonishok and Lee,
2001; Cheng et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2012). The evidence by Cohen et al.
(2012) is a notable exception. They show that performing simple screening
to insider trading frequencies, both insider purchases and sales are profitable.
Cohen et al. (2012) conclude that their findings support the view that some
insider trades are driven by foreknowledge of future material information. An-
other exception is Alldredge and Cicero (2015) who study insider trading when
firms disclose having concentrated business relationships with other companies.
They show that insiders sell profitably based on public information about their
main customers. Alldredge and Cicero (2015) argue that their results are sug-
gestive that insiders are attentive to the information released at public news
announcements. Our results support the evidence of Alldredge and Cicero
(2015). More importantly, we are able to extend the literature by showing
that insiders sales that are affected by competition with short sellers after
earnings announcements show strong return predictability.
We also contribute to the literature about competition between informed
traders. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions of Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992) and Massa et al. (2015), but more closely related to
Back et al. (2000). Back et al. (2000) show that when 2 or more informed
investors have correlated private information (or signal), they tend to trade
more aggressively in order to pre-empt the other informed traders from ex-
(2008) finds that 50% of the lending contracts in their sample are closed out in 11 trading
days.
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tracting their benefits. Thus, stock prices adjust faster to their trades making
them more efficient. In line with their predictions, we show that when insiders
and short sellers trade together after earnings announcements prices adjust
faster than in stocks where they trade alone.
The remainder of the chapter proceed as follows. Section 3.1 provides a
brief background and discusses our main testable implications. Section 3.2
describes the databases we use and provides summary statistics. Section 3.3
shows our main analysis and findings. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Background and testable implications
An informed trader in Kyle (1985) model trades in such a way that his private
information is incorporated into stock prices gradually. This is because market
makers cannot distinguish trades made by an informed investor from trades
made by noisy traders. Consequently, an informed investor maximize her
profits when there are more noisy traders in the market providing the informed
trader with the perfect camouflage for her profitable trades.
The situation changes in the presence of 2 or more informed investors.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) study how market depth and efficiency
changes when varying the number of informed traders in the market. They
develop a multiperiod auction model with multiple informed traders and find a
unique linear equilibrium in which informed traders trade aggressively. Even
with only 2 informed traders nearly all the common private information is
incorporated into stock prices almost immediately. In line with Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992), Massa et al. (2015) predict that insiders and short
sellers compete for trading on private information. In particular, Massa et al.
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(2015) show that insiders in possession of negative material information are
motivated to sell faster and intensively when facing potential short selling.
Nevertheless, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Massa et al. (2015)
assume that all informed traders have the same private information (or per-
fectly correlated signal) and, therefore, ignore cases in where their opinion
about firms’ value diverge (uncorrelated signal). In a step forward, Back et al.
(2000) show that Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) equilibrium holds only
in cases when traders have correlated signals, otherwise aggregate trading is
less intense and the information is revealed slowly. Therefore, whether com-
petition among informed traders leads to more intensive trading and quicker
private information revelation depends crucially on how correlated are the
signals distributed between the informed investors.
The main research question of this chapter is whether insiders and short
sellers compete for trading on superior information processing of the news re-
leased in earnings announcements. Although all the models described above
are framed around trading decisions based on foreknowledge of future mate-
rial information, the predictions are equally valid in the context of processing
public information. We argue that the main driver of competition between
informed traders at the earnings announcements comes for their ability to
better analyze the fundamental information contained in the news. In par-
ticular, when stock prices deviate away from firms’ fundamental values, both
insiders and short sellers are motivated to trade. However, a monopolistic
informed trader has an incentive to spread her trading in order not to alter
prices and maximize her profits (Kyle, 1985). This is especially true in the
context of earnings announcements when investors’ attention is high providing
the informed trader with the perfect camouflage for her trades (Brown et al.,
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2009).6 Therefore, in the absence of short sellers (insiders), insiders (short
sellers) have all incentives to delay their trading as they could make profitable
trades.
Massa et al. (2015) use the supply of shares available for lending as a mea-
sure that captures short selling potential. Although a higher supply of shares
available for lending is an indication that short sellers are likely to trade, the
link is somewhat loose. Hence, Massa et al. (2015) are not able to observe
whether insiders and short sellers are indeed trading at the same time over
the same information. Our setup permits to overcome these difficulties as we
are able to clearly distinguish different trading decisions of insiders and short
sellers during earnings announcements. Namely, we are able to identify cases
where both types trade intensively together in the same stocks, cases with
intensive insider selling and low or no short selling, cases with intensive short
selling and low or no insider selling and cases when there is little or no insider
or short selling activity.
We take cases in which insiders and short sellers trade intensively in the
same stocks at the same time as a more direct indication of competition. Also,
we consider cases with insider selling (short selling) and low or no short sell-
ing (insider selling) as indicative of a more monopolistic behaviour. If this is
the case, in line with Massa et al. (2015), there should be a positive associa-
tion between short selling potential before the news and competition between
insiders and short sellers after the announcement date. In particular, we con-
6According to Brown et al. (2009), earnings announcements generally captures high
attention from uninformed investors. This is due to pervasive discussion of firm’s earnings
news in the financial media (Barber and Odean, 2008; Brown et al., 2009). Therefore,
uniformed investors are likely to trade intensively at the earnings announcements, as they
generally trade in stocks that garner their attention (Barber and Odean, 2008; Frieder and
Subrahmanyam, 2005; Grullon et al., 2004).
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jecture that insiders and short sellers are more likely to trade intensively in the
same stocks shortly after earnings announcements when the supply of lending
shares is higher before the announcement date. In contrast, low short selling
potential should be associated with a more monopolistic behavior of insiders.
Therefore, we predict a negative a association between short selling potential
trading and insider selling intensively without short sellers. Our first testable
implication is as follows:
Insider and short sellers are more likely to trade intensively in the same stocks
after earnings announcements when the supply of lendable shares is higher be-
fore the news release. Also, insiders are more likely to trade without short
sellers in firms with a low supply of lendable shares before the news release.
We next turn to profitability of insiders’ and short sellers’ trades and its
implications for information dissemination. The literature is split concerning
whether news events, such as earnings announcements, could represent prof-
itable trading opportunities for informed investors. On the one hand, the pub-
lication of earnings are associated with a reduction in information asymmetry
diminishing the chances of profitable trades by informed investors (Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1987; Korajczyk et al., 1991; Berkman et al., 2009). On the
other hand, quarterly earnings announcements allow investors to make their
own judgements about firm value and, therefore, to generate their own pri-
vate information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Brown et al., 2009; Engelberg
et al., 2012). As investors disagree about interpretation of the public news,
information asymmetry increases presenting profitable trading opportunities
for informed investors.
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In line with the second view, we argue that both insiders and short sell-
ers recognize when stocks become mispriced during earnings announcements.
Thus, we predict significantly lower future abnormal returns for stocks where
these 2 types informed traders sell intensively. However, competition adds an
extra ingredient to the analysis. We expect that in firms where insiders and
short sellers trade intensively together after the news release, post earnings
announcements abnormal returns are more negative faster relative to firms
where only short sellers or insiders trade alone. The second testable implica-
tion is as follows:
Post earnings announcements abnormal returns are lower for firms with in-
sider sales and/or short sales. However, post earnings announcements ab-
normal returns are lower faster for firms where insiders and short sellers sell
intensively together after earnings announcements than in firms where only
short sellers or only insiders sell.
3.2 Data
We obtain data from several sources. Insider trading data is from Thomsom
Financial Insider Filings which contains all insider activity as reported in the
forms 3, 4 and 5 specified by the Security Exchange Act of 1934. It covers
detailed information about the transactions and the insiders including the
trading date, announcement date, insiders name and role in the firm, number
of shares traded, transaction price and transaction type (purchase or sale).
Data on equity lending loans and supply is from Markit (who acquired Data
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Explorers), which collects this information daily from 125 large custodians and
32 prime brokers in the securities lending industry. The data cover more than
85% of the securities lending market. A more detailed description of the data
can be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010). We also obtain financial statement
data from COMPUSTAT, stock returns from CRSP, analysts’ forecasts from
I/B/E/S and high frequency data from NYSE Trades and Quotes database
(TAQ).
Altogether, our sample comprises security-level daily information from July,
2006 to December, 2013. Because, our analysis is built around earnings an-
nouncements, we aggregate all insider trading and short selling activity around
quarterly earnings announcements.7 We obtain quarterly earnings announce-
ments from the COMPUSTAT quarterly data file and delete firm-quarters for
which no COMPUSTAT data are available. For each earnings announcement,
we define three time periods: (i) the earnings announcement period: the period
beginning on working day -1 and ending on day +1, (ii) the informed trader
response period: the period beginning on working day 0 and ending either
after day +5 or day +20. (iii) the future return period, which is closely linked
to the informed trader response period ending, and finishes after 6 months.
Consequently, the period runs over day +5 up to day +130 or alternatively
over +20 until +145. Figure 3.1 describes the setup graphically.
Insert Figure 3.1 about here.
We base our analysis on 2 measures. The relative number of shares sold
by insiders (INsales) and the daily number of stocks on loan (Onloan), both
7As there could be more than one insider transaction per day, before aggregating the data
we merge all insider transactions within one day of the same director in the same direction
(purchases/sales), but we keep transactions if in different direction even on the same day.
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scaled by the number of shares outstanding. For the Onloan measure, we take
shorting transactions with a start date at the most recent business day.8
An important feature of our dataset is that it allows to distinguish different
trading decisions of insiders and short sellers after earnings announcements.
Namely, we are able to identify cases where both types trade intensively to-
gether in the same stocks, cases with intensive insider selling and low or no
short selling, cases with intensive short selling and low or no insider selling
and cases when there is little or no insider or short selling activity. This iden-
tification is very relevant to our purposes as we consider firms where both
insider and short sellers trade intensively together as a strong indication of
competition, but also because in cases where neither of them trade or trade in
small quantities constitute very important benchmark categories. Hence, we
classify each firm-quarter in our sample as one the following types:
• Onloan&INsales is a firm-quarter with both intensive short selling and
intensive insider selling activity during the informed trading response
period (see Figure 3.1). Namely, it is a firm-quarter with short sell-
ing activity in the top 2 terciles and insider selling activity above the
median of the number of shares traded by both types after an earning
announcement.
• Only Onloan is a firm-quarter with intensive short selling and little or
no insider selling during the informed trading response period. In par-
ticular, is a firm-quarter with short selling activity in the 2 top terciles
of the number of shares shorted and with insider selling activity below
8Markit has data also on the daily number of stocks that are on loan at different start
dates, such as at 3, 7 and 30 days. We believe new stocks on loan is a better fit to our
purposes as we want to analyze short sales that are more likely to be attributed to the
earnings announcements.
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the median of the number of shares sold by insiders after earnings an-
nouncements.
• Only INsales is a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little
or no short sales during the informed trading response period. More
specifically, it is a firm-quarter with insider selling activity above the
median of the number of shares sold by insider and with short selling
activity in the bottom tercile of the number of shares shorted after an
earning announcement.
• Low informed trading is a firm-quarter with low or no insider and short
selling activity during the informed trading response period. Namely,
it is a firm-quarter with insider selling activity below the median of
the number of shares sold by insiders and with short selling activity
in the bottom tercile of the number of shares shorted after earnings
announcements.
We define cut-off points at the median for insider sales and terciles for short
sales because selling activity by insiders is much less frequent and intense than
short sales. Although the cutoff points may look arbitrary, we believe is a
reasonable approximation to capture different levels of trading intensity after
earnings announcements. Table 3.1 describes our sample of firm-quarters and
the number of shares traded by insiders and short sellers in each category.
In Panel A, we categorize each firm-quarter with the trading activity during
the whole trading response period (0,+20) and in Panel B during the 6 days
immediately after the announcement date (0,+5).
In total we have 102,149 firm-quarters. In 28.5% of all firm-quarters insiders
and short sellers coincide in their intensive trading. In Panel A, while firm-
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quarters with intensive short selling only are the most frequent (around 40% of
the firm-quarters in our sample), firm-quarters with intensive insider sales only
are the least frequent (around 6% of the quarters). Quite striking is the fact
that conditional on insiders trading, insiders sell in the same stocks with short
sellers in about 83% of the firm-quarters in our sample. Firm-quarters with
low intensity of both insider and short sales are relatively high in frequency,
representing 25% of the sample. This distribution changes a little in Panel B,
where the categories are defined based on trading activity until day +5. While
the firm-quarters with Onloan&INsales are less frequent compared to Panel A,
firm-quarters with Only Onloan are higher. These differences comes from the
exchange between these two categories in Panels A and B. That is, for example,
firm-quarters classified as Only Onloan in Panel B (when considering trading
activity until day +5), move to Onloan&INsales in Panel A (when considering
trading activity until day +20) because insiders continue selling after day +5
of the announcement date.
Looking at the intensity of trading, we see that insiders and short sellers
trade more intensively together (Onloan&INsales) than in cases when they
trade separated. In Panel A, trading together short sellers sell around 0.22% of
the company stocks and insiders 0.007%, while when trading separately these
figures are 0.17% and 0.006%, respectively. These differences are stronger in
Panel B, especially for insiders who sell around 0.009% of their company stocks
when short sellers are also selling.
Insert Table 3.1 about here.
Other variables we use throughout the analysis are the number of shares
available for lending scaled by the shares outstanding (Lendable) and the pos-
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itive component of daily order imbalance (Oimb+). The first measures short
selling potential (Massa et al., 2015) and the second captures firms’ buying
pressure (Diether et al., 2009). Buy order imbalance is computed as the daily
buys minus sells scaled by the daily volume.9 We also use abnormal returns
during and after a quarterly earnings announcements. Abnormal returns are
calculated as the difference between the buy and hold raw return and its cor-
responding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio return over a certain period
of time BHARi,t = [Π
t2
t=t1(1 + Ri,t)− 1]− [Π
t2
t=t1(1 + E(Ri,t))− 1], where Ri,t
is the realized return on day t. Other standard variables we use are firm size,
book to market, earnings per share and dispersion in analysts’ forecast, which
are all defined in the Appendix.
In Table 3.2 we summarize the characteristics of our sample. Panel A
provides summary statistics for all firms and Panel B summarizes differences
across our categorical variable for informed trading. Panel A shows that the
average firm in our sample has a market capitalization of 2.97 billion USD, a
book-to-market ratio of 0.69 and a negative change in earnings per share of
-0.37%. Also, the firms in our sample have on average 18% of its total shares
outstanding in the inventory available for borrowing (Lendable), but with a
high standard deviation (12%) which indicates an active equity lending market
in the US and a significant variation among firms across the years (These
numbers are very similar to what Massa et al. (2015) reported). Moreover,
the average firm in our data has 0.002% of its shares outstanding sold by
insiders and 0.15% shorted by short sellers.
9Buy and sells orders are defined using Lee and Ready (1991)
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Insert Table 3.2 about here.
Panel B shows differences in firm’s characteristics across the informed trad-
ing categories. Stocks where insiders and short sellers trade intensively to-
gether (Onloan&INsales) are on average larger in size (4.8 billion USD), more
profitable (B/M ratio of 0.46), and have a larger fraction of its total shares out-
standing available for borrowing (26.3%) than stocks in the other 3 categories.
Stocks with only insider sales (Only INsales) share similar characteristics to
stocks with Onloan&INsales. In particular, Only INsales stocks are large on
average (4.4 billion USD) and have lower B/M ratio (0.64) relative to stocks
with only short sales or stocks with low informed trading. Note that the av-
erage Lendable for these stocks is the lowest relative to the other categories
(15%). In contrast, stocks where short sellers trade alone are smaller (2.9
billion USD) and less profitable on average relative to Onloan&INsales (B/M
ratio of 0.65).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Informed trading patterns around earnings an-
nouncements
In this section we provide an overview on how insider and short selling trades
are distributed around the earnings announcements. Figure 3.2 plots the rel-
ative number of shares sold by insiders (INsales) and the relative number of
stocks on loan (Onloan) in the days surrounding the announcement date. As
the size of insider sales is considerably smaller relative to the size of short
sales, we place the range of Onloan values in the left axis and of INsales on
119
the right axis to make trading patterns comparable. We see that the earnings
announcement date significantly affects insiders’ and short sellers’ trading pat-
terns. In line with Engelberg et al. (2012), short sales increase slightly before
the announcement date, but rise sharply at day 0 and stay relatively high for
a few days. Insider sales, in contrast, show a minor increase on day 0, peak
significantly at day +3 and then remains high for several days. Surprisingly,
short sellers seem to be faster in timing their sales relatively to insiders. How-
ever, the peak in insider sales at day +3 is likely associated with blackout
windows, which are firm specific explicit periods when insiders are not allowed
to trade (Bettis et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2012).
Insert Figure 3.2 about here.
In Figure 3.3 we partition all earnings announcements into GOOD, BAD
and NO news according the earnings announcements abnormal returns. Hence,
firms with GOOD, BAD and NO news are firms with a 3-day earnings an-
nouncements abnormal return (window (-1,+1)) in the top, lowest and middle
tercile of the returns for all the quarters respectively. Figure 3.3 shows that
short sellers increase their trading activity at the announcement date for both
GOOD and BAD news stocks. Insiders, in contrast, are much more active
sellers after GOOD news relative to BAD news confirming the well known
contrarian pattern of insider sales (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994). Impor-
tantly, short sellers seem to trade before insiders regardless of the direction
of the news and the peak for insider sales remains at day +3. This evidence
gives more support to the idea that the anticipation of short sellers is driven
by the presence of blackout periods.
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Insert Figure 3.3 about here.
Finally, Figure 3.4 partitions the sample by the informed trading categories:
based on trading activity until day +20 in Panel A and until day +5 in Panel B.
As in the figures above, short selling activity peaks at day 0 when short sellers
trade alone (Only Onloan) or together with insiders (Onloan&INsales). Still,
short sellers trade a little more intensively when insiders are selling intensively
at the same time. Similarly, when insiders are selling their sales peak at day +3
regardless of short sellers trading. The decreasing pattern for insider sales is a
little more gradual when they trade alone (Only INsales) than when trading
together with short sellers (Onloan&INsales), suggesting that insiders tend
to spread their trades when they do not face competition. Furthermore, the
fact that insider sales peak at day +3 also when trading together with short
sellers and regardless of the direction of the news suggests the presence of
blackout periods for insiders. This is because even in cases when they have
every reason to trade sooner as they face competition with short sellers, they
only start trading on day +3 (on average). This pattern strongly suggest the
existence of imposed trading constraints.
In Panel B the categories are based on trading activity until day +5. The
patterns just described for insider sales and short sales in Panel A remain
very similar to Panel B. However, we observe subtle differences in insider sales
patterns. In Panel B, the intensity of trading by insiders in the days following
the news is stronger than in Panel A. In particular, while in Panel A the
relative number of shares sold by insiders in firms with short sales peak to a
little more than 0.01% at day +3, in Panel B this figure is about 0.03%. This
is natural as in Panel A the categories are based on trading intensity until day
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+20, so the lower peak reflects that insider sales continue occurring frequently
after day +5, but much less intensively pushing the average intensity until day
+5 down. Therefore, the informed trading category based on trading intensity
until day +5 depicts a more clear picture about what happens in the first days
after the announcement date.
Insert Figure 3.4 about here.
Clearly, Figures 3.2 to 3.4 show that short sellers trade before insiders do
on average, suggesting that short sellers are faster information processors than
insiders. This is quite counterintuitive. Insiders have access to better informa-
tion easily than outsiders do about the prospects of their firms, and therefore
is quite natural to assume that insiders are faster. In fact, one important as-
sumption in Massa et al. (2015) model is that insiders are more informed than
short sellers and therefore insiders trade faster in the presence of short sellers.
The fact that insiders seem to be following short sellers is surprising even for
us, but we strongly believe that this anticipation pattern is driven by the ban
periods referred above. Although we are not able to test this formally, the
graphs provide a suggestive evidence in support of the ban periods.10
Furthermore, our results are in line with the evidence by Bettis et al. (2000).
They survey 1,915 firms members of the American Society of Corporate Sec-
retaries regarding corporate policies and restrictions on insider trading. They
find that 78% of the firms on their sample had explicit blackout periods, and
the most common policy established by these firms was disallowing trading by
insiders at all times except during a trading window that is open during the
period 3 through 12 trading days after the quarterly earnings announcement.
10Ideally we would have information about firms’ policies regarding insider trading, but
these policies are firm specific and this information is not publicly available.
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3.3.2 Competition for trading.
Section 3.3.1 shows that both insiders and short sellers trade after earnings
announcements the same company’s stocks in around 29% of our sample. Also,
both insiders and short sellers tend to trade together intensively shortly after
the announcement date. Although, this is an indication that both may be
competing to trade over the same firms’ stocks, this section is oriented to test
this evidence more formally.
The first test we perform follows a similar approach as Massa et al. (2015).
In particular, we analyze whether short selling potential trading before earn-
ings announcements predicts insider and short selling activity after the news
release. As in Massa et al. (2015), we use the supply of shares available for
lending (Lendable) as a measure that captures short selling potential. We con-
jecture that insiders and short sellers are more likely to trade aggressively over
the same company’s stocks when Lendable is higher before the announcement
date. In contrast, high Lendable, so higher short selling potential, should have
a negative or at least insignificant effect over insiders’ likelihood to trade alone.
This is because in the absence of short sellers insiders are more willing to delay
trading (Kyle, 1985).
As we want to determine whether Lendable predicts insider and short sell-
ing activity after an earnings announcements, we use our categorization of
informed trading as the dependent variable. Recall that this variable has 4
possible outcomes, which are: (i) Onloan&INsales, (ii) Only Onloan, (iii) Only
INsales and (iv) Low informed trading. Consequently, we run a multinomial
logistic regression as it fits our set-up best. The dependent variable is a cat-
egorical variable including the referred outcomes based on trading intensity 5
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days after an earnings announcement.11 We take Low informed trading as the
reference category and, therefore, report three sets of regression coefficients.
They have to be interpreted relatively to the Low informed trading category.
In all specifications, we also include year dummies, but we do not report them
to save space. We compute robust standard errors and allow them to cluster
within firms. In order to determine importance of the individual explana-
tory variables for each outcome, we standardize the explanatory variables by
subtracting their mean and scaling by their standard deviation. The standard-
ization means that the units of the regression coefficients are now the same and
therefore are directly comparable across variables. The results are reported in
Table 3.3.
Insert Table 3.3 about here.
In line with Massa et al. (2015), insiders and short sellers are more likely to
trade intensively in the same stocks for firms with higher short selling potential
(Lendable) relative to firms with low intensity of insider or short sale trans-
actions (Low informed trading). Unsurprisingly, Lendable also increases the
odds of short selling trading intensively alone (Only Onloan), reflecting that
short sellers trade in firms with lower shorting constraints. Finally, even when
Lendable increases significantly the relative probability of insider selling inten-
sively alone (Only INsales), this probability is significantly lower compared to
the other outcomes.12
11We also run the same specification with the dependent variable based on trading in-
tensity until 20 days after an earnings announcement, but we don’t report it to save space.
The results remain unchanged.
12A wald-test for the difference between the coefficients equals to zero strongly rejects the
null at 1% level.
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As the coefficients in a multinomial logistic regression are relative to the base
category, they are a little difficult to interpret. Therefore, we also compute the
marginal effect that our independent variables have over each outcome sepa-
rately. This not only allows to have the unconditional probability of Lendable
over each category, but also it gives a better approximation to compare the
magnitudes of the probabilities across the outcomes. The results are reported
at the bottom in Table 3.3. We confirm, for example, that Lendable increases
the odds of insiders and short sellers trading together (Onloan&INsales) and
this probability is significantly higher than for the other 2 outcomes. More
importantly, note that the average marginal effect of Lendable is significantly
negative for firms with only insider sales (Only INsales). This indicates, in
line with our predictions, that low short selling potential is associated with
a more monopolistic behavior of insiders. In particular, 1 standard deviation
increase in the relative number of Lendable shares is associated with a 2.3%
reduction in the probability of insiders selling alone after the earnings news.
Looking a the remaining control variables we also see interesting results.
First, while insiders and short sellers are more likely to trade together in
stocks with more positive news than with more negative news, the opposite
goes for short sellers trading alone. In particular, while the relative proba-
bility of GOOD news firms is significantly higher than BAD news over the
Onloan&INsales outcome, the reverse holds for the Only Onloan category.
The marginal effects confirm these results. While the marginal effect of pos-
itive news firms significantly increases the likelihood of Onloan&INsales, it
significantly reduces the probability of Only Onloan. In contrast, the marginal
effect of negative news significantly reduces the odds of Onloan&INsales and
increases the probability of Only Onloan.
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The results also suggests that when insiders and short sellers trade together,
they trade on average as contrarians as opposed to cases where only short
sellers trade. The 6-month past return increases the odds of both types trading
together (Onloan&INsales) and decreases the odds of short sellers trading
alone (Only ITsales). Also, in line with the contrarian behavior, the negative
coefficient for book to market ratio indicates that insiders and short sellers are
more likely to sell high valuation stocks (Jenter, 2005), and this probability
is higher than for short sellers trading alone (Only Onloan). This result is
reinforced by the marginal effects. The average marginal effect of book to
market is positive in firms Only Onloan, suggesting that short sellers are likely
to trade alone in low valuation stocks. Firms with only insider sales tend to
mimic the pattern of firms with both insider and short sale transactions. This
is no surprising as the literature documents insiders contrarian behavior when
trading (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski
and Roulstone, 2005; Jenter, 2005).
3.3.3 Predictability of post earnings announcements re-
turns.
In this section we explore the second testable implication of the chapter which
has two branches. Our first aim is to analyze whether insiders and short
sellers are informed traders who can make profitable trades at the earnings
announcements. Our second aim is to show that, consistent with insiders and
short sellers trading for competition, post earnings returns adjust faster in
firms where both trade intensively together than in firms where each of them
trade alone.
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To test these conjectures we run panel regressions of post-earnings an-
nouncements buy and hold abnormal returns (PostBHAR) on our categorical
variable of informed trading. Returns are adjusted for the corresponding 5x5
size and book to market portfolio return and are compounded over different
time horizons after earnings announcements (see Figure 3.1). The results are
reported in Table 3.4. Panel A includes specifications for all the firms-quarters
considering post earnings announcement returns beginning at day +20 (sub-
sequent return period 1 in Figure 3.1) and Panel B displays post earnings
returns starting at day +5 (subsequent return period 2 in Figure 3.1). We
include Lendable as a control variable in all the specifications.
Insert Table 3.4 about here.
Consistent with our predictions, Panel A shows that post earnings an-
nouncements abnormal returns are significantly lower for all our categories,
suggesting that both insiders and short sellers are able to make profitable
trades after the news. Also in line with our conjectures, abnormal returns
are significantly more negative faster in stocks where insiders and short sellers
trade intensively together than for firms where both trade alone. In particular,
abnormal returns in stocks with both insider and short sales (Onloan&INsales)
are 7.5% lower than in stocks with Low informed trading at the first month
after the announcement date (+20,+40), and continue to be lower after 2, 3
and 6 months. Stocks with Only Onloan are also significantly lower after the
1st month, but the magnitude of the adjustment is smaller relative to On-
loan&INsales. In contrast, stocks with Only INsales are significantly lower
only after the 2nd of the announcement date. Furthermore, Lendable is asso-
ciated with lower future returns in all specifications. The significantly negative
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coefficient in column 1 of Panel A indicates that a 1% increase in the relative
stocks available to lend before the earnings announcement is associated with
4.5% reduction in the post-earnings abnormal returns.
The results in Panel B show even stronger support to our conjectures. In
particular, while abnormal returns in Onloan&INsales stocks are 5.3% lower
immediately after the announcement date, returns in stocks with Only Onloan
and Only INsales start to be significantly lower at the 2nd and at the 3rd
month, respectively. Overall, these results suggest that stock prices adjust
significantly faster in stocks where both insiders and short sellers compete for
trading than in stocks where they don’t. Also, in line with Massa et al. (2015),
stocks with higher short selling potential before the news, which we show in
the previous section leads to higher competition, show lower future returns.
We are able to extend their results by showing that in cases where short selling
potential do not lead to competition, abnormal returns adjust slowly.
Importantly, the results in Table 3.4 show consistency with the theoretical
predictions of (Back et al., 2000). That is, when insider and short sellers trade
intensively in the same stocks (as in stock with Onloan&INsales stocks), they
share the same opinion about those firm’s value, therefore prices adjust faster
than in cases where their opinions diverge (stocks with Only Onloan or Only
INsales).
Next, we extend this analysis further and partition our sample by the di-
rection of the news. For brevity purposes we only report results considering
subsequent abnormal returns after day +5, but the results hold the same mea-
suring returns after day +20. The results are reported in Table 3.5. Abnormal
returns are significantly lower in stocks with intensive trading by both insider
and short sellers (Onloan&INsales) irrespective of the direction of the news.
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However, the strong price adjustment is concentrated mainly in stocks with
positive and negative news, and in a minor level in stocks with no news. This
suggests that when trading together insiders and short sellers trade in stocks
with a strong market reaction to earnings announcement. Moreover, as future
abnormal returns are significantly lower after both GOOD and BAD news,
this result indicates that insiders and short sellers are likely to be trading
in stocks that experience an overreaction to positive news and underreaction
to negative news. Finally, in line with our predictions, abnormal returns are
lower faster in stocks with Onloan&INsales than in stocks with Only Onloan
or Only INsales) for both GOOD news and BAD news stocks.
Insert Table 3.5 about here.
3.3.4 Robustness and alternative explanations.
In the previous section we show that stock prices adjust faster in firms where
insiders and short sellers trade intensively together, suggesting that they com-
pete for trading on the same information. However, one could argue that
the large price adjustment could be driven by the level of overpricing rather
than by competition. In particular, if some firms become more overpriced,
it’s natural to expect that price correction should be stronger for these firms
irrespective of whether insiders and short sellers trade intensively together
or not. In contrast, if insiders and short sellers compete because they share
similar private information (signal), then regardless of the level of mispricing,
their trading together should lead to post earnings announcements abnormal
returns being more negative sooner.
Controlling for different levels of overpricing is not simple, but we approach
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the challenge in two ways. First, following Diether et al. (2009), we distinguish
different levels of overpricing using the positive component of order imbal-
ance shortly after the earnings news (Oimb+(0,+5)). This measure captures
temporary buying pressure: the larger the buying pressure the higher mar-
ket sentiment and, therefore, the larger overpricing potential. Second, we take
dispersion in analyst forecast derived from the Institutional Brokers Estimates
System (I/B/E/S) as a measure of divergence in investors’ opinions. Diether
et al. (2002) show that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts
earn significantly lower future returns. This is because with high divergence
in investors’ opinions, stock prices reflect valuations of the most optimistic
investors who push the demand for the stock up and so cause overpricing. By
using both measures (Oimb+(0,+5) and DISP), we expect to find that the
low future abnormal returns in firms where insiders and short sellers trade
together sustain across different levels of Oimb+(0,+5) and DISP.
We compute Oimb+(0,+5) as the average buy order imbalance of a firm
from day 0 to day 5 after the earnings announcements. Buy order imbalance
is computed as the daily volume of buys scaled by the daily total volume.13 In
Panel A of Table 3.6 we show the distribution of post earnings announcement
abnormal returns by quartiles of Oimb+(0,+5). We see that, future abnormal
returns are consistently lower for higher levels of Oimb+(0,+5), except for the
1st quartile. This is because the first quartile of Oimb+(0,+5) contains stocks
with the smallest buying pressure and, therefore, the selling pressure for these
stocks is high, which is naturally associated with negative future abnormal
returns.
In Panel B of Table 3.6 we regress post earnings announcements abnor-
13Buy and sells orders are defined using Lee and Ready (1991)
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mal returns on our categorical variable for informed trading by quartiles of
Oimb+(0,+5). The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns
from 5 until 46 days after the announcement and therefore this results are
directly comparable to column (2) in Panel B of Table 3.4. The results con-
firm our conclusions in section 3.3.3. Abnormal returns are more negative in
quarters where insiders and short sellers compete, and this is irrespective of
the initial mispricing. In particular, abnormal returns are significantly more
negative in Onloan&INsales quarters for quartiles 2, 3 and 4 of Oimb+(0,+5).
Also, abnormal returns are negative, but insignificant for quartile 1, where
stocks are less subject to overpricing. In contrast, the negative abnormal
returns for Only INsales and Only Onloan are mainly concentrated at the
highest Oimb+(0,+5) quartile, suggesting that the large price adjustment in
firms with only insider sales or short sales is due to stocks that are more prone
of overpricing.
Insert Table 3.6 about here.
Table 3.7 reports the results for dispersion in analysts’ forecast (DISP).
Panel A shows the distribution of post earnings announcement abnormal re-
turns by quartiles of DISP. Although stocks in quartile 4 display lower future
abnormal returns than the rest of the quartiles, the pattern is not monotonic
as expected from the evidence of Diether et al. (2002). However, our results are
not directy comparable to Diether et al. (2002) findings, as their setup is not
based on earnings announcements and they take a monthly frequency of re-
turns to test their predictions. In constrast, we take a much shorter term view
when compounding returns which could diminish the possibility of getting the
same results.
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Insert Table 3.7 about here.
In addition, there are important disadvantages associated to the use dis-
persion in analysts’ forecasts. First, small firms are generally not covered by
many analysts, which might imply important biases of the measure. In fact,
smaller firms suffer higher information asymmetries, thus, earnings announce-
ments in smaller firms might be associated with stronger investors’ reaction
and divergence of opinions. And second, the measure does not allow to cap-
ture divergence in investors’ opinions during the short window of earnings an-
nouncements. Analysts’ forecasts reflect expectations concerning the earnings
news and so the measure captures analysts’ divergence before the earnings an-
nouncement rather than the effect on investors’ disagreement as a result of the
news publication. We are more interest in the latter rather than the former.
In spite of the drawbacks of using DISP, its disadvantages should lower
our chances of finding a significant relationship between insiders’ and short
sellers’ intensive trading and lower future returns. However, if this association
holds even at different levels of DISP, it must be rather strong. The results in
Panel B confirm these conjectures.14 In particular, abnormal returns are more
negative in quarters where insiders and short sellers trade together, and this
holds for all the quartiles of DISP but the first.
14Note that the sample size shrinks significantly relative to the results in Panel B of
Table 3.6.
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3.4 Conclusions
We study the interation between 2 types of informed traders, corporate insiders
and short sellers, around earnings announcements. For a quarterly sample of
U.S. firms from 2006 until 2013, we test whether insiders and short sellers
compete for trading on superior information processing of the news released
in earnings announcements.
Our analysis has 4 branches. First, in line with the information processing
hypothesis both insiders and short sellers trade intensively right after rather
than before the earnings announcements date. Also, their trades are profitable
as future stock returns are significantly lower. Second, insiders and short
sellers sell intensively the same stocks shortly after the announcement date
very frequently (around 29% of the firm-quarters in our sample). Consistent
with the competition hypothesis (Massa et al., 2015), we show that high short
selling potential before the earnings news significantly increases the likelihood
of insiders and short sellers trading intensively in the same stocks. Moreover,
low short selling potential is associated with a more monopolistic behavior of
insiders. Third, also in line with the competition hypothesis, stock prices are
significantly more negative faster in stocks with intensive insider and short
selling, shortly after the news release, than in stocks with intensive trading by
each type alone. Finally, we confirm that the large price adjustment in stocks
with intensive insider and short selling is driven by competition rather than
the level of overpricing.
Overall, our evidence shows that both insiders and short sellers make prof-
itable trades based on analyzing publicly available information better than
other investors. The 2 types of informed traders use their skills to interpret
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new public information better and exploit situations when the market misin-
tepret this information. Importantly, insiders and short sellers compete for
trading on their superior information processing skills very frequently. As a
result of the competition, stock prices adjust faster to their trades than in
cases where they do not compete.
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3.5 Appendix
Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
BAD news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the lowest (top) tercile of the 3-day
earnings announcements abnormal return (EA ab-
normal returns) and 0 otherwise
CRSP,
French’s
web site
B/M Book value of equity corresponding to the previ-
ous quarter over the market cap 2 days before the
earnings announcement.
COMPUSTAT
DISP Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Corresponds to
the standard deviation of quarterly earnings per
share (EPS) forecasts for the current earnings an-
nouncements that are issued in the period be-
tween the last earnings announcements and two
days prior to the current earnings announcement
date, divided by the absolute value of the median
analyst forecast.
I/B/E/S
∆EPS Net earnings before extraordinary items per share
less the earnings per share in the same quarter 1
year before scaled by the share price 2 days before
the earnings announcements.
COMPUSTAT
EA abnormal returns Buy and Hold abnormal stock return over 3
days around the last earnings announcement date
(−1,+1). The abnormal returns are estimated as
the difference between the observed return and the
returns of a benchmark at that date. The 4 factors
model is used as a benchmark which take into ac-
count the market risk along with size and book to
market risk factors (Fama and French, 1992), and
also includes momentum as risk factor (Cahart,
1997).
CRSP,
French’s
web site
GOOD news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the top tercile of the 3-day earnings an-
nouncements abnormal return (EA abnormal re-
turns) and 0 otherwise
CRSP,
French’s
web site
INsales Average number of shares sold by insiders scaled
by the number of shares outstanding. INsales is
averaged over the two informed trading response
periods, namely (0,+5) and (0,+20)
Thomsom Fi-
nancial
Lendable Average daily number of shares available for lend-
ing before earnings announcements (trading days
-30 to -3) scaled by the number of shares outstand-
ing.
Markit(Dataexplorers).
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Low informed trading Category indicating a firm-quarter with low or no
insider and short selling activity during the in-
formed trading response period (see Figure 3.1).
So, it’s a firm-quarter with insider selling activity
below the median of the number of shares sold by
insider and with short selling activity in the bot-
tom tercile of the number of shares shorted after
an earning announcement.
Markit and
Thomsom
Financial
NO news Dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-
quarters in the middle tercile of the 3-day earn-
ings announcements abnormal return (EA abnor-
mal returns) and 0 otherwise
CRSP,
French’s
web site
Oimb+(0,+5) Daily buy order imbalance averaged over the in-
formed trading response period between day 0 and
day +5 after an earnings announcement. Buy or-
der imbalance is computed as the daily buys scaled
by the daily volume. Buy and sells orders are de-
fined using Lee and Ready (1991).
TAQ data
Onloan Average number of shares shorted within 1 busi-
ness day scaled by the number of shares out-
standing. Onloan is averaged over the two in-
formed trading response periods, namely (0,+5)
and (0,+20)
Markit
Onloan&INsales Category indicating a firm-quarter with high in-
tensity of insider sales together with short sales
during the informed trading response period (see
Figure 3.1). It corresponds to a firm-quarter with
short selling activity in the top 2 terciles and in-
sider selling activity above the median of the num-
ber of shares traded by both types after an earning
announcement.
Markit and
Thomsom
Financial
Only INsales Category indicating a firm-quarter with intensive
insider selling and little or no short sales during
the informed trading response period (see Fig-
ure 3.1). More specifically, it’s a firm-quarter with
insider selling activity above the median of the
number of shares sold by insider and with short
selling activity in the bottom tercile of the number
of shares shorted after an earning announcement.
Markit and
Thomsom
Financial
Only Onloan Category indicating a firm-quarter with intensive
short selling activity and little or no insider sales
during the informed trading response period (see
Figure 3.1). In particular, it’s a firm-quarter with
short selling activity in the 2 top terciles of the
number of shares shorted and with insider selling
activity below the median of the number of shares
sold by insiders after an earning announcement.
Markit and
Thomsom
Financial
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
PastRET(6m) Market adjusted stock return over 6 months
ending 1 month before an earnings announce-
ment. Returns are adjusted using the correspond-
ing value weighted portfolio as downloaded from
CRSP database.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
PostBHAR(t1,t2) The raw buy and hold stock return beginning t1
and ending t2 days after earnings announcement
date adjusted for the corresponding 5x5 size and
book to market portfolio return as downloaded
from the Kenneth French web site or the market
portfolio return.
CRSP,
French’s
web site
Size The logarithm of the Market capitalization. The
market cap is the stock price times the number
of shares outstanding 2 days before the earnings
announcement date.
COMPUSTAT
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Table 3.1: Distribution of insider sales and short sales in our sample per type of
informed trading activity.
Distribution of trading activity for insiders and short sellers across all the firm quarters in our sample.
In Panel A we consider trading activity from day 0 until 20 days after the earnings announcement date
(0,+20), and in Panel B until 5 days (0,+5). Onloan&Insales is a firm-quarter with high intensity of
insider sales together with short sales during the informed trading response period. Only Onloan is a
firm-quarter with intensive short selling activity and little or no insider sales during the informed trading
response period. Only INsales is a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little or no short sales
during the informed trading response period. Low informed trading is a firm-quarter with low or no
insider and short selling activity during the informed trading response period.
Firm quarters Relative shares traded
# firm quarters % of total Insider sales Short sales
Panel A: Trading activity from day 0 to day +20
Onloan&INsales 29,062 28.5% 0.007% 0.220%
Only Onloan 41,296 40.4% 0.000% 0.197%
Only INsales 5,976 5.9% 0.006% 0.019%
Low informed trading 25,815 25.3% 0.000% 0.012%
Total 102,149
Panel B: Trading activity from day 0 to day +5
Onloan&INsales 14,921 14.6% 0.009% 0.221%
Only Onloan 55,426 54.3% 0.001% 0.198%
Only INsales 2,392 2.3% 0.007% 0.030%
Low informed trading 29,410 28.8% 0.001% 0.018%
Total 102,149
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Table 3.2: Average firm characteristic by type of informed trading activity.
This table reports summary statistics for all the firms in our sample and partitioned by our category of
informed trading. The informed trading category is based on trading activity from day 0 until day +5.
Onloan&Insales is a firm-quarter with high intensity of insider sales together with short sales during the
informed trading response period. Only Onloan is a firm-quarter with intensive short selling activity and
little or no insider sales during the informed trading response period. Only INsales is a firm-quarter with
intensive insider selling and little or no short sales during the informed trading response period. Low
informed trading is a firm-quarter with low or no insider and short selling activity during the informed
trading response period. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: summary stats for all firms
Variables # obs. mean standard dev. p25 p50 p75
Onloan 102,149 0.149% 0.192% 0.025% 0.086% 0.196%
INsales 102,149 0.002% 0.008% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001%
Lendable 102,149 18.571% 12.098% 7.808% 18.796% 27.979%
Size (millions) 102,149 2,967.45 7,246.55 133.14 530.58 2,096.18
B/M 96,945 0.685 0.534 0.316 0.562 0.907
∆EPS 101,759 -0.37% 8.05% -0.82% 0.07% 0.71%
Oimb+(0,+5) 100,746 8.63% 7.59% 3.57% 6.15% 11.06%
DISP 63,474 0.259 0.549 0.042 0.087 0.210
PastRET(6m) 102,149 0.01% 4.58% -2.46% -0.11% 2.38%
EA abnormal returns 102,149 0.142% 9.830% -3.903% -0.094% 3.862%
PostBHAR(+5,+25) 93,382 -0.512% 9.961% -5.780% -0.526% 4.543%
PostBHAR(+5,+46) 93,382 -0.390% 14.205% -8.149% -0.545% 6.913%
PostBHAR(+5,+67) 93,382 -0.659% 17.769% -10.667% -0.897% 8.635%
PostBHAR(+20,+40) 93,382 0.011% 10.151% -5.432% -0.176% 5.103%
PostBHAR(+20,+61) 93,382 -0.128% 14.448% -8.027% -0.299% 7.234%
PostBHAR(+20,+82) 93,382 -0.598% 18.140% -10.830% -0.847% 8.777%
Panel B: means by informed trading category
Variables All firms Onloan&Insales Only Onloan Only INsales Low informed trading
Lendable 18.571% 26.297% 22.262% 15.007% 7.994%
Size (millions) 2,967.45 4,810.25 2,910.64 4,448.09 2,003.01
B/M 0.685 0.461 0.650 0.637 0.877
∆EPS -0.37% 0.22% -0.50% 0.28% -0.51%
Oimb+(0,+5) 8.630% 5.633% 6.431% 10.909% 13.966%
DISP 0.259 0.201 0.271 0.183 0.305
PastRET(6m) 0.008% 1.264% -0.084% 0.883% -0.532%
EA abnormal returns 0.142% 2.295% -0.432% 1.863% -0.007%
PostBHAR(+5,+25) -0.512% -0.188% -0.202% -0.311% -1.246%
PostBHAR(+5,+46) -0.390% 0.207% 0.067% 0.117% -1.560%
PostBHAR(+5,+67) -0.659% -0.016% -0.275% -0.277% -1.693%
PostBHAR(+20,+40) 0.011% 0.463% 0.358% 0.254% -0.880%
PostBHAR(+20,+61) -0.128% 0.350% 0.151% 0.207% -0.902%
PostBHAR(+20,+82) -0.598% 0.096% -0.310% -0.225% -1.484%
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Table 3.3: Multinomial logistic regression: insider and short selling activity after
earnings announcements.
This table reports a multinomial logistic regression of insiders and short sellers trading patterns right after
an earnings announcement. The dependent variable is categorical variable based on short and insider
selling intensity 5 days after the earnings announcement date. Hence, this variable is equals to 0 for a
firm-quarter with low or no insider and short selling activity during the informed trading response period
Low informed trading ; is equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with high intensity of insider sales together with
short sales during the informed trading response period Onloan&INsales, equals to 2 for a firm-quarter
with intensive short selling activity and little or no insider sales during the informed trading response
period Only Onloan, and equals to 3 for a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little or no short
sales during the informed trading response period Only INsales. The remaining variables are defined in
the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and
c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
VARIABLES Onloan&INsales Only Onloan Only INsales
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Lendable 1.920a (0.035) 1.510a (0.030) 0.772a (0.042)
BAD news 0.083b (0.035) 0.438a (0.026) -0.292a (0.060)
GOOD news 0.710a (0.033) 0.294a (0.025) 0.328a (0.052)
Size 0.827a (0.037) 0.489a (0.030) 0.371a (0.040)
B/M -0.790a (0.033) -0.265a (0.019) -0.226a (0.033)
PastRET(6m) 0.239a (0.015) -0.037a (0.011) 0.196a (0.022)
∆EPS -0.020 (0.016) -0.037a (0.011) -0.003 (0.025)
Constant -1.451a (0.057) 0.252a (0.041) -1.633a (0.067)
# Observations 95,855
Firm FE yes
Year FE yes
χ2 9547
PseudoR2 0.243
Average marginal effects on each outcome
Lendable 0.121a (0.003) 0.073a (0.003) -0.023a (0.002)
BAD news -0.029a (0.004) 0.080a (0.004) -0.021a (0.002)
GOOD news 0.039a (0.004) -0.007a (0.004) -0.001 (0.002)
Size 0.069a (0.003) -0.005 (0.004) 0.003c (0.002)
B/M -0.089a (0.004) 0.045a (0.004) 0.008a (0.001)
PastRET(6m) 0.035a (0.002) -0.040a (0.002) 0.006a (0.001)
∆EPS 0.004c (0.002) -0.009a (0.002) 0.002b (0.001)
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Table 3.4: Panel regressions: Post earnings announcement abnormal returns.
This table reports panel regressions of post earnings announcements abnormal returns on the trading
activity of insiders and short sellers. The dependent variable for all columns is size and book to market
adjusted abnormal returns. Panel A includes abnormal returns during subsequent returns period 2 and
Panel B during period 1 (see Figure 3.1). Returns are adjusted for the corresponding 5x5 size and book to
market portfolio return as downloaded from the Kenneth French web site. Abnormal returns are computed
starting 5 days after the announcement date and cumulated over 1, 3 and 6 month later. Onloan&INsales
is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with high intensity of insider sales together with short
sales during the corresponding trading response period ((0,+20) in Panel A and (0,+5) in Panel B)) and
0 otherwise. Only Onloan is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive short selling
activity and little or no insider sales during the informed trading response period ((0,+20) in Panel A and
(0,+5) in Panel B)) and 0 otherwise. Only INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with
intensive insider selling and little or no short sales during the informed trading response period ((0,+20) in
Panel A and (0,+5) in Panel B)) and 0 otherwise. GOOD (BAD) news is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 for all firm-quarters in the top (lowest) tercile of the 3-day earnings announcements abnormal return
(window (-1,+1)) and 0 otherwise. Lendable is the average daily number of shares available for lending
before earnings announcements (trading days -30 to -3) scaled by the number of shares outstanding. All
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a,
b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Panel A: Future returns period 1
PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR
VARIABLES (+20,+40) (+20,+61) (+20,+82) (+20,+145)
Onloan&INsales -0.075a -0.131a -0.162a -0.232a
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Only Onloan -0.028a -0.067a -0.078a -0.124a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Only INsales 0.001 -0.047b -0.085a -0.119a
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
GOOD news 0.038a 0.043a 0.020b 0.026a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
BAD news -0.013 -0.004 0.008 0.019b
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lendable -0.045a -0.086a -0.117a -0.158a
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant -0.021 0.023c 0.070a 0.051a
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 92,913 92,913 92,913 92,913
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
continued on next page
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Panel B: Future returns period 2
PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR
Variables (+5,+25) (+5,+46) (+5,+67) (+5,+130)
Onloan&INsales -0.052a -0.096a -0.153a -0.215a
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Only Onloan 0.007 -0.032a -0.065a -0.106a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Only INsales -0.031 -0.028 -0.086a -0.115a
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
GOOD news 0.035a 0.049a 0.039a 0.034a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
BAD news -0.043a -0.035a -0.011 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lendable -0.069a -0.092a -0.125a -0.176a
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant 0.086a 0.032b 0.072a 0.073a
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 92,913 92,913 92,913 92,913
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
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Table 3.5: Panel regressions: Post-earnings announcement abnormal returns by earnings news.
This table reports panel regressions of post earnings announcements abnormal returns on the trading activity of insiders and short sellers. The dependent variable
for all columns is size and book to market adjusted abnormal returns. Returns are adjusted for the corresponding 5x5 size and book to market portfolio return as
downloaded from the Kenneth French web site or the market portfolio return. Abnormal returns are computed starting 5 days after the announcement date and
cumulated over 1, 3 and 6 month later. Onloan&INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with high intensity of insider sales together with short
sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. Only Onloan is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive short
selling activity and little or no insider sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. Only INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for
a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little or no short sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. GOOD (BAD) news
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-quarters in the top (lowest) tercile of the 3-day earnings announcements abnormal return (window (-1,+1)) and
0 otherwise. Lendable is the average daily number of shares available for lending before earnings announcements (trading days -30 to -3) scaled by the number of
shares outstanding. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the
one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
GOOD news NO news BAD news
PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR PostBHAR
VARIABLES (+5,+25) (+5,+46) (+5,+67) (+5,+25) (+5,+46) (+5,+67) (+5,+25) (+5,+46) (+5,+67)
Onloan&INsales -0.066a -0.123a -0.208a -0.036c -0.059a -0.079a -0.038 -0.089a -0.147a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Only Onloan -0.028 -0.062a -0.124a 0.001 -0.024 -0.037b 0.030 -0.031 -0.050b
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Only INsales -0.011 0.011 -0.095a -0.050c -0.033 -0.069b -0.032 -0.069 -0.106b
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
Lendable -0.077a -0.117a -0.158a -0.036b -0.053a -0.084a -0.089a -0.100a -0.126a
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.135a 0.078a 0.139a 0.080a 0.018 0.030 0.072a 0.037 0.092a
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 30,969 30,969 30,969 30,878 30,878 30,878 31,066 31,066 31,066
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics and panel regression of post earnings returns on
buy order imbalance.
This table reports an analysis of post earnings announcements abnormal returns conditional on different
levels of buy order imbalance Oimb+(0,+5). Panel A displays the distribution of post earnings announce-
ment abnormal returns by quartiles of Oimb+(0,+5). In Panel B we regress post earnings announce-
ments abnormal returns on our categorical variable for informed trading by quartiles of Oimb+(0,+5).
Oimb+(0,+5) is the buy order imbalance of a firm averaged from day 0 to day 5 after the earnings
announcement date. Onloan&INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with high in-
tensity of insider sales together with short sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and
0 otherwise. Only Onloan is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive short selling
activity and little or no insider sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise.
Only INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little
or no short sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. GOOD (BAD)
news is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-quarters in the top (lowest) tercile of the 3-day
earnings announcements abnormal return (window (-1,+1)) and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles and standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five-
and ten-percent levels.
Panel A: Posterior return per Oimb quartiles
Oimb+(0,+5) PostBHAR(+5,+25) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+67) PostBHAR(+5,+130)
quartile 1 -0.71% -0.57% -0.71% -0.82%
quartile 2 -0.36% -0.09% -0.28% -0.17%
quartile 3 -0.32% -0.02% -0.49% -0.78%
quartile 4 -0.58% -0.77% -0.98% -1.87%
Total -0.49% -0.36% -0.61% -0.90%
Panel B: Panel regressions for each Oimb+(0,+5) quartile
quartile 1 quartile 2 quartile 3 quartile 4
VARIABLES PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46)
Onloan&INsales -0.017 -0.097a -0.092a -0.091a
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
Only Onloan 0.017 -0.042c -0.021 -0.054b
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Only INsales 0.052 0.023 -0.002 -0.089b
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.037)
BAD news -0.018 -0.004 -0.027 -0.071a
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
GOOD news 0.036b 0.045a 0.023 0.090a
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Lendable -0.071a -0.066a -0.101a -0.156a
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
Constant -0.008 0.033 0.016 -0.068b
(0.039) (0.035) (0.028) (0.031)
Observations 23,282 23,405 22,631 21,815
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics and panel regression of post earnings returns on
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.
This table reports an analysis of post earnings announcements abnormal returns conditional on different
levels of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (DISP). Panel A displays the distribution of post earnings an-
nouncement abnormal returns by quartiles of DISP. In Panel B we regress post earnings announcements
abnormal returns on our categorical variable for informed trading by quartiles of DISP. DISP is the
standard deviation of quarterly earnings per share (EPS) forecasts for the current earnings announce-
ments that are issued in the period between the last earnings announcements and two days prior to
the current earnings announcement date, divided by the absolute value of the median analyst forecast.
Onloan&INsales is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with high intensity of insider sales
together with short sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. Only
Onloan is a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive short selling activity and little
or no insider sales during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. Only INsales is
a dummy variable equals to 1 for a firm-quarter with intensive insider selling and little or no short sales
during the informed trading response period (0,+5) and 0 otherwise. GOOD (BAD) news is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 for all firm-quarters in the top (lowest) tercile of the 3-day earnings announce-
ments abnormal return (window (-1,+1)) and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles and standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels.
Panel A: Posterior return per DISP quartiles
DISP PostBHAR(+5,+25) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+67) PostBHAR(+5,+130)
quartile 1 0.01% 0.27% -0.11% 0.00%
quartile 2 -0.05% 0.22% 0.13% 0.42%
quartile 3 -0.19% 0.37% 0.50% 0.77%
quartile 4 -0.35% 0.01% -0.37% -0.46%
Total -0.15% 0.22% 0.04% 0.18%
Panel B: Panel regressions on each DISP quartile
quartile 1 quartile 2 quartile 3 quartile 4
Variables PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46) PostBHAR(+5,+46)
Onloan&INsales 0.013 -0.069b -0.112a -0.112b
(0.023) (0.031) (0.035) (0.043)
Only Onloan 0.014 -0.018 -0.038 -0.003
(0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.037)
Only INsales -0.033 -0.034 0.015 0.018
(0.032) (0.049) (0.057) (0.079)
BAD news 0.002 0.000 -0.008 -0.054b
(0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026)
GOOD news 0.008 0.008 0.049b 0.024
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026)
Lendable -0.059a -0.039c -0.102a -0.155a
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.031)
Constant 0.016 0.055 0.062 0.024
(0.024) (0.035) (0.043) (0.056)
Observations 14,488 14,428 14,225 14,145
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
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Figure 3.1: Timings of earnings announcements and related returns
The figure shows the exact timings of earnings announcements, informed trading response and related
abnormal returns. We establish three important periods: (i) the earnings announcement period: the
period beginning on day -1 and ending on day +1 working days, (ii) the informed trader response period:
the period beginning on working day 0 and ending either after day +5 or +20. (iii) The subsequent return
period: the period runs over day +5 up to day +130 or alternatively over +20 until +145.
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Figure 3.2: Daily shares sold by insiders and short sellers around earnings an-
nouncements.
The figure shows the number of shares sold by insiders (INsales) and the number of shares shorted
(Onloan) around earnings announcements scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
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Figure 3.3: Daily shares sold by insiders and short sellers around earnings an-
nouncements categorized by earnings news.
The figure shows the number of shares sold by insiders (INsales) and the number of shares shorted
(Onloan) around earnings announcements scaled by the number of shares outstanding. GOOD, BAD
and NO news are firms with a 3-day earnings announcements abnormal return (window (-1,+1)) in the
top, lowest and middle tercile of the returns for all the quarters respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Daily shares sold by insiders and short sellers around earnings an-
nouncements categorized by informed trading type.
The figure shows the number of shares sold by insiders (INsales) and the number of shares shorted
(Onloan) around earnings announcements scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Onloan&INsales
is a firm-quarter with intensive short selling and insider selling activity during the informed trading
response period (see Figure 3.1). Only Onloan is a firm-quarter with intensive short selling activity and
little or no insider sales during the informed trading response period. Only INsales is a firm-quarter with
intensive insider selling and little or no short sales during the informed trading response period. Low
informed trading is a firm-quarter with low or no insider and short selling activity during the informed
trading response period.
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Concluding remarks
Corporate insiders are executives, directors and beneficial owners of more than
10% of the company stocks. Insiders know their companies better than any
analyst in the market and therefore possess superior information about their
firms’ future performance. A large body of the literature question whether
insider trading is harmful or beneficial for the financial markets. On the one
hand, early studies show that insider trading increases informational efficiency
of the market because it helps to incorporate private information into stock
prices (Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Shin, 1996). On the other
hand, insider transactions could crowd out information collection from out-
side investors and so deter the informational efficiency of the market (Fishman
and Hagerty, 1992; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). Moreover, the literature
also question which set of information insiders use when trading. One argu-
ment is that insiders trade on material information about future realization of
their firm’s cash flows (Noe, 1999; Ke et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone,
2005; Cheng et al., 2007). In contrast, another argument is that insiders time
very well their transactions and trade against current investor sentiment by
recognizing when their stocks are mispriced by the market (Sivakumar and
Waymire, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Jenter, 2005).
This thesis addresses these questions by focusing on insider trading strate-
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gies around earnings announcements for a large sample of U.S. firms. The first
chapter studies whether insiders exploit their stocks’ mispricing to make prof-
itable trades. We contribute to the literature by directly showing that insiders
trade after earnings announcements on deviations of stock prices from their
own perception of fundamental firm value rather than plainly against past re-
turns or with book to market ratio. The analysis is twofold. First, insiders’
purchases and sales are profitable both after positive and negative earnings
surprises, which indicates that their trading strategies are superior to simple
contrarian or momentum trading strategies. Second, we estimate a model of
‘normal’ market reaction to an earnings announcement and use the deviation
of the fitted value from the realized market reaction as a measure of mispricing
after earnings announcements. In line with the mispricing hypothesis, insiders
sell (buy) more often after large positive (negative) values of our mispricing
measure and earn significant post trading returns.
The second chapter shows evidence that insiders exploit investors’ senti-
ment during earnings announcements to make profitable trades. Insiders sell
in response to market reaction of earnings announcements that are associated
with an increase in divergence in investors’ opinions about their firms’ valua-
tion and more binding short sale constraints. We argue that this divergence in
investors’ opinions originates from investors’ differential interpretations of the
news contained in the earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that
insiders sell in firms that are prone to become overvalued as a result of the
earnings news.
Finally, the third chapter studies the interaction between 2 types of in-
formed investors, corporate insiders and short sellers, after earnings announce-
ments. The results show that insiders and short sellers are skilled information
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processors who compete for trading on publicly available information. The 2
type of informed investors trade intensively in the same stocks very frequently
(for about 29% of firm-quarters in the sample). In line with competition, stock
returns are significantly more negative faster for stocks with intensive trading
by both traders together than in cases where they trade intensively alone.
This evidence suggests that insiders and short sellers tend to accelerate their
processing skills after earnings announcements and trade faster making stock
prices more efficient.
Overall, the evidence presented in the three chapters strongly indicates that
a large portion of insiders’ superior trading advantage comes from their ability
to better process new information embedded in public news announcements.
Insiders take advantage of situations when the market misinterpret the news
and trade profitable. Processing this information for insiders is costless as
they have privileged access to material information about their firms. More-
over, insider trading doesn’t seem to deter information collection from market
professionals, in contrast, the evidence in this thesis strongly suggests that
insiders compete with other informed investors for trading on their superior
information processing skills. As a result of this competition for trading on
publicly available information, their trades allow information to be rapidly im-
pounded into stock prices increasing market efficiency. On top of it, by trading
on mispricing originated during earnings announcements insiders take advan-
tage of market sentiment, trade profitable and at the same time minimize their
own legal jeopardy.
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